Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111629 Overview
CVE-2026-111629 is an insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in IoTSharp through version 3.6.1. The flaw allows any authenticated user to read other tenants' data because the Customers and Devices API handlers do not scope database queries to the caller's tenant. Attackers can self-register through the anonymous AccountController.Create endpoint and then supply other tenants' GUIDs to retrieve customer contact details, device inventories, and device attribute telemetry. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Critical Impact
Any attacker able to self-register can enumerate GUIDs to exfiltrate cross-tenant customer records, device inventories, and telemetry attributes from affected IoTSharp deployments.
Affected Products
- IoTSharp through version 3.6.1
- IoTSharp CustomersController API handlers
- IoTSharp DevicesController API handlers
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111629 published to NVD
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111629
Vulnerability Analysis
IoTSharp is a multi-tenant IoT platform that organizes resources such as customers, devices, and telemetry under per-tenant boundaries. The affected handlers in CustomersController.cs and DevicesController.cs accept object identifiers from the authenticated caller and resolve them against the database without filtering by the caller's tenant ID. As a result, any user who holds a valid session can request objects owned by other tenants and receive the full response.
The exposure spans three data categories: customer contact information, device inventories, and device attribute telemetry. Because the AccountController.Create endpoint is anonymous, there is no provisioning gate that would restrict access to the vulnerable APIs. An attacker only needs to create a tenant account and begin requesting GUIDs to pivot into cross-tenant reads.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing tenant-scoped authorization in the controller logic. The handlers at CustomersController.cs L164-L177 and DevicesController.cs L490-L507 perform direct lookups by GUID and return the resulting entity without validating that it belongs to the caller's tenant. Authorization is reduced to presence of a valid session, matching the CWE-639 pattern of authorization bypass through user-controlled keys.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the IoTSharp API and a valid account. An attacker first calls the anonymous registration endpoint to obtain credentials, then authenticates and issues GET requests to the Customers and Devices endpoints while substituting GUIDs belonging to other tenants. Valid GUIDs can be discovered through enumeration, telemetry metadata, or related endpoints that leak identifiers. The server returns full records without a tenant check.
See the HackMD Cross-Tenant IDOR Analysis and the VulnCheck IoTSharp Data Exposure Advisory for request-level reproduction details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111629
Indicators of Compromise
- Successful HTTP 200 responses from CustomersController or DevicesController where the returned entity's tenant GUID does not match the caller's tenant.
- High-volume GUID enumeration patterns against /api/Customers/{id} and /api/Devices/{id} from a single authenticated session.
- New accounts created through AccountController.Create immediately followed by sustained Customers or Devices API traffic.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument the IoTSharp API tier to log the caller tenant ID alongside the tenant ID of each returned object and alert when they diverge.
- Correlate authentication events from self-registration with downstream API access volume to flag reconnaissance behavior.
- Baseline per-account access rates to Customers and Devices endpoints and alert on deviations consistent with enumeration.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward IoTSharp application logs and reverse proxy access logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
- Monitor for repeated 404 responses interleaved with 200 responses on GUID-parameterized routes, which indicates ID guessing.
- Track account creation volume on the anonymous registration endpoint and alert on spikes from a single source IP.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111629
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to IoTSharp API endpoints to trusted networks until a patched build is deployed.
- Disable or gate the anonymous AccountController.Create endpoint to prevent attacker-controlled self-registration.
- Audit application logs for cross-tenant GUID access patterns and investigate any accounts created in the exposure window.
Patch Information
No fixed version is listed in the NVD entry at publication. The vulnerability affects IoTSharp through 3.6.1. Monitor the IoTSharp GitHub repository for a release addressing the Customers and Devices controller authorization logic, and review the VulnCheck IoTSharp Data Exposure Advisory for coordinated remediation guidance.
Workarounds
- Add a reverse proxy or API gateway rule that requires administrative approval before new tenant accounts can call Customers or Devices endpoints.
- Apply an application-layer filter that rejects requests where the GUID path parameter does not resolve to an object within the caller's tenant.
- Rotate GUIDs for high-value customers and devices after confirming no cross-tenant reads occurred against them.
# Example nginx rule to block anonymous tenant self-registration
location = /api/Account/Create {
allow 10.0.0.0/8;
deny all;
proxy_pass http://iotsharp_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

