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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111627

CVE-2026-111627: HestiaCP Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111627 is an authorization bypass flaw in HestiaCP that lets non-ROOT_USER admins impersonate protected accounts and execute commands. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111627 Overview

CVE-2026-111627 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in HestiaCP control panel versions before 1.10.5. Non-ROOT_USER administrators can impersonate the protected ROOT_USER account and perform write actions through the loginas parameter. By POSTing to /add/cron/, attackers bypass the read-only flag that is never validated server-side. The resulting cron entries execute under the protected administrator's system account via crond, giving the attacker arbitrary command execution in that privileged context. The flaw is tracked under CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization and documented in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vp7q-fjv5-5vg8.

Critical Impact

An authenticated non-root administrator can execute arbitrary commands as the protected ROOT_USER system account by abusing the cron job creation endpoint while impersonating that account.

Affected Products

  • HestiaCP versions prior to 1.10.5
  • HestiaCP 1.10.4 (confirmed vulnerable in referenced source code)
  • Deployments with POLICY_SYSTEM_PROTECTED_ADMIN enabled

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111627 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111627

Vulnerability Analysis

HestiaCP implements a protected administrator policy (POLICY_SYSTEM_PROTECTED_ADMIN) intended to block impersonation and write actions targeting the designated ROOT_USER. The policy enforcement, however, only checks whether the impersonated account name equals the hardcoded string admin. When the ROOT_USER is set to a different username, the comparison fails and the read-only restriction is never applied.

An authenticated administrator logs in and uses the loginas parameter to switch session context into the ROOT_USER account. Because the read-only guard is bypassed, the attacker can POST to /add/cron/ and insert arbitrary cron entries. The crond daemon then runs those commands under the privileges of the protected administrator's system account.

Root Cause

The root cause is an incorrect authorization check in HestiaCP session handling. The protected-admin policy compared $_SESSION["look"] against the literal string "admin" rather than against the actual configured ROOT_USER. Any deployment whose root user was renamed left the read-only enforcement inactive during impersonation.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires authenticated access as a non-root HestiaCP administrator. The attacker initiates impersonation via loginas, submits a crafted POST to /add/cron/index.php, and waits for crond to execute the payload. No user interaction from the real ROOT_USER is required, and the attack is network-reachable through the HestiaCP web interface.

php
// Patch excerpt - install/deb/filemanager/filegator/backend/Services/Auth/Adapters/HestiaAuth.php
				$v_user = $_SESSION["look"];
			}
			if (
-				$_SESSION["look"] == "admin" &&
+				$_SESSION["look"] == $_SESSION["root"] &&
				$_SESSION["POLICY_SYSTEM_PROTECTED_ADMIN"] == "yes"
			) {
				// Go away do not login

Source: GitHub Commit 1af7e057

The fix replaces the hardcoded "admin" string with the session-stored ROOT_USER value, so the protected-admin policy applies regardless of the account name.

php
// Patch excerpt - install/deb/filemanager/filegator/configuration.php
		}
		if (
			isset($_SESSION["look"]) &&
-			$_SESSION["look"] == "admin" &&
+			$_SESSION["look"] == $_SESSION["ROOT_USER"] &&
			$_SESSION["POLICY_SYSTEM_PROTECTED_ADMIN"] == "yes"
		) {
			header("Location: /");

Source: GitHub Commit 1af7e057

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111627

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected POST requests to /add/cron/index.php from administrator sessions that recently used the loginas parameter.
  • New cron entries in /var/spool/cron/ or user-level crontabs attributed to the ROOT_USER system account without a legitimate change ticket.
  • Session logs showing non-root administrators impersonating the ROOT_USER followed by write actions.

Detection Strategies

  • Review HestiaCP web server access logs for the pattern of loginas followed by POSTs to /add/cron/.
  • Correlate HestiaCP audit entries with crond execution of unfamiliar scripts or outbound network connections.
  • Flag any cron job whose command field invokes shells, curl, wget, or base64-decoded payloads created shortly after an impersonation event.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the HestiaCP front-end and forward logs to a centralized SIEM for correlation.
  • Monitor file integrity on /etc/cron.d/, /var/spool/cron/, and HestiaCP user cron directories.
  • Alert on new child processes spawned by crond under the protected administrator account outside maintenance windows.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111627

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade HestiaCP to version 1.10.5 or later as published in the 1.10.5 release notes.
  • Audit existing cron entries for the ROOT_USER and remove any unauthorized jobs.
  • Rotate credentials for all HestiaCP administrator accounts and review recent loginas activity.

Patch Information

The fix is included in HestiaCP 1.10.5 via commit 1af7e057cd5ad2ea945acba6c9932ea1a1802c24. The patch replaces the hardcoded "admin" string comparison with a comparison against the configured ROOT_USER session variable, correctly enforcing the POLICY_SYSTEM_PROTECTED_ADMIN read-only flag during impersonation. Additional background is available in the VulnCheck advisory.

Workarounds

  • Restrict HestiaCP administrator accounts to the minimum number of trusted operators until patching is complete.
  • Disable the loginas impersonation feature for non-root administrators where organizationally feasible.
  • Place the HestiaCP management interface behind VPN or IP allowlists to limit exposure of the authenticated attack surface.
bash
# Upgrade HestiaCP to the patched release
v-update-sys-hestia
# Verify installed version is 1.10.5 or later
v-list-sys-info | grep -i version
# Audit cron entries for the protected ROOT_USER account
crontab -u <ROOT_USER> -l
ls -la /var/spool/cron/

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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