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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111621

CVE-2026-111621: TDuck Survey Form Authorization Bypass

CVE-2026-111621 is an authorization bypass in TDuck Survey Form that exposes sensitive form data to authenticated users. Attackers can access form passwords and owner details using public form keys. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111621 Overview

CVE-2026-111621 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-639] in TDuck Survey Form through version 5.3. The flaw resides in the GET /user/form/setting/{key} endpoint, which fails to verify that the authenticated requester owns the referenced form. Any logged-in user can submit an 8-character form key harvested from a public fill link and retrieve another owner's raw form settings. Exposed data includes the form write password, the owner notification e-mail address, and associated WeChat openIds. The weakness enables cross-tenant disclosure of sensitive configuration data without exploiting memory corruption or injection flaws.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can enumerate 8-character form keys and extract write passwords, notification e-mails, and WeChat openIds belonging to other TDuck Survey Form tenants.

Affected Products

  • TDuck Survey Form versions up to and including 5.3
  • UserFormSettingController component in the tduck-api module
  • Deployments exposing the /user/form/setting/{key} endpoint to authenticated users

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111621 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111621

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the TDuck Survey Form API. The UserFormSettingController handler accepts a form key path parameter and returns the full settings record for that form. Authentication is enforced, but ownership verification between the authenticated session and the queried form key is absent. Because form keys are only 8 characters and are published in public fill links, an attacker needs no privileged knowledge to target other tenants. The response payload includes the form write password used to edit submissions, the owner notification e-mail, and WeChat openIds tied to the owner's social integrations.

Root Cause

The controller logic looks up form settings by key without comparing the resolved owner identifier against the current authenticated principal. This is a classic [CWE-639] authorization-by-object-key pattern where the server trusts the identifier supplied in the URL. See the vulnerable handler in UserFormSettingController.java lines 66-75.

Attack Vector

An attacker registers or already holds a valid TDuck account. They collect form keys from publicly shared fill URLs, then issue authenticated GET /user/form/setting/{key} requests against each key. The API returns settings for forms owned by any user, enabling bulk harvesting of write passwords and contact data. Additional analysis is available in the HackMD Disclosure Analysis and the VulnCheck Advisory.

text
// Vendor commit referenced for the v6 release (dependency bump excerpt)
<commons.io.version>2.9.0</commons.io.version>
<commons.configuration.version>1.10</commons.configuration.version>
<jwt.version>0.9.1</jwt.version>
-<hutool.version>5.8.16</hutool.version>
+<hutool.version>5.8.43</hutool.version>
<aliyun-oss.sdk.vesion>3.12.0</aliyun-oss.sdk.vesion>

Source: GitHub Commit 984efd69

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111621

Indicators of Compromise

  • Repeated authenticated GET requests to /user/form/setting/{key} using varying 8-character keys from a single session or IP address.
  • Access patterns where a user retrieves settings for form keys that were never created, edited, or submitted to by that account.
  • Unexpected changes to form submissions performed with a leaked write password that originated from another tenant.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument the UserFormSettingController endpoint to log the authenticated user identifier alongside the resolved form owner, and alert on any mismatch.
  • Baseline per-user request rates to /user/form/setting/* and flag enumeration-style traffic that iterates sequentially or at high velocity.
  • Review web application firewall logs for requests to the settings endpoint originating from accounts that have not interacted with the queried form.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward TDuck application and reverse-proxy logs to a centralized analytics platform for cross-user correlation.
  • Monitor outbound notifications and WeChat API activity for messages triggered by configuration changes made outside expected owners.
  • Track account-creation spikes followed immediately by bursts of /user/form/setting/ requests, which often indicate automated harvesting.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111621

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict the /user/form/setting/{key} endpoint through reverse-proxy rules or an API gateway until an authorization check is deployed.
  • Rotate every form write password and audit WeChat openId bindings and notification e-mail addresses that may have been exposed.
  • Invalidate active sessions and require re-authentication for all TDuck Survey Form users after rotation.

Patch Information

The TDuck maintainers published the v6 initial commit referenced as GitHub Commit 984efd69 in the TDuck Survey Form repository. Operators of version 5.3 and earlier should upgrade to the fixed release line and confirm that the UserFormSettingController verifies the authenticated principal against the form owner before returning settings.

Workarounds

  • Add a server-side ownership check that compares the session user ID with the userId stored on the form record before serializing the response.
  • Deploy a WAF or API gateway rule that denies GET /user/form/setting/{key} unless the requester has previously authenticated to a session that created the form.
  • Shorten the lifetime of public fill links and regenerate form keys periodically to limit the window for enumeration against known keys.
bash
# Example NGINX rule to block the vulnerable endpoint until patched
location ~ ^/user/form/setting/[A-Za-z0-9]{8}$ {
    return 403;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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