Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111617 Overview
CVE-2026-111617 is a missing authentication vulnerability [CWE-306] in WHartTest through version 2.8.1. The flaw exists in the UI automation WebSocket layer, where the UiAutomationConsumer class accepts every incoming connection without verifying identity. Unauthenticated attackers can connect to the /ws/ui/web/ and /ws/ui/actuator/ endpoints over the network. Once connected, they can register an actuator with a client-supplied identifier and intercept test-case payloads intended for other users. Attackers can also receive broadcast step results and inject spoofed results or screen frames into victim sessions.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated network attackers can hijack UI automation sessions, intercept test payloads, and spoof execution results or screen frames into legitimate user sessions.
Affected Products
- WHartTest through version 2.8.1
- UiAutomationConsumer component in ui_automation/consumers.py
- ASGI routing configuration in wharttest_django/asgi.py
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111617 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111617
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in WHartTest's Django Channels WebSocket layer. The UiAutomationConsumer handles real-time communication between browser clients, actuator agents, and the orchestration server for UI automation runs. According to the published analysis, the consumer's connect handler accepts every incoming WebSocket connection without validating session tokens, user identity, or group membership. The ASGI routing configuration in wharttest_django/asgi.py likewise wires the /ws/ui/web/ and /ws/ui/actuator/ routes without authentication middleware.
Because actuator registration uses a client-supplied identifier, an attacker can impersonate any actuator by submitting a known or guessed id. Once registered, the attacker joins the broadcast groups used to deliver test-case payloads, step results, and screen frames. The attacker reads legitimate traffic and can also publish messages into victim channels.
Root Cause
The root cause is the absence of an authentication check in the WebSocket consumer and ASGI middleware stack. The design trusts the client to supply its own actuator identifier and never binds a connection to an authenticated user context. This maps directly to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only network reachability to the WebSocket endpoints. No credentials, user interaction, or prior privileges are needed. An attacker opens a WebSocket connection to /ws/ui/actuator/, registers an actuator using a client-chosen identifier, and begins receiving broadcast messages intended for other users. The attacker can then push forged step results or screen frames back into the orchestrator, which relays them into victim sessions. Technical details are documented in the HackMD WebSocket Authentication Analysis and the VulnCheck WHartTest Advisory.
No verified exploit code is published. See the HackMD and VulnCheck references above for protocol-level details.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111617
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected WebSocket connections to /ws/ui/web/ or /ws/ui/actuator/ from source IPs outside the trusted automation infrastructure.
- Multiple actuator registrations using the same id value or rapidly cycling identifiers from a single client.
- Test-case step results or screen frames appearing in user sessions that do not correlate with the originating test run.
Detection Strategies
- Enable Django Channels access logging and alert on /ws/ui/ connections that lack a valid authenticated session cookie or token.
- Correlate actuator registration events with the authenticated user who initiated the test run; flag mismatches.
- Inspect WebSocket frames at the reverse proxy for anomalous payload patterns, duplicate actuator IDs, or injected screen frames.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward WebSocket connection and application logs to a centralized analytics platform for retention and query.
- Baseline the normal set of actuator client IPs and alert on new or external sources connecting to automation endpoints.
- Monitor for connections from residential or cloud ranges that should not reach internal test infrastructure.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111617
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network exposure of the WHartTest server so that /ws/ui/web/ and /ws/ui/actuator/ are not reachable from untrusted networks.
- Place the WebSocket endpoints behind a reverse proxy that enforces authentication before upgrading the connection.
- Audit recent test-run logs for unexpected actuator registrations or anomalous step results.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed version is listed in the NVD entry. All releases of WHartTest through 2.8.1 are affected. Monitor the upstream project at the GitHub WHartTest UI Automation Code repository for a security release that adds authentication to the UiAutomationConsumer and the ASGI routing configuration.
Workarounds
- Deploy a reverse proxy or network ACL that denies anonymous access to /ws/ui/web/ and /ws/ui/actuator/.
- Require mutual TLS or a shared secret header on actuator connections and reject requests missing the credential at the proxy layer.
- Bind the WHartTest service to a loopback or private interface and tunnel legitimate clients through authenticated VPN or SSH.
# Example nginx snippet to require an auth header before upgrading to WebSocket
location /ws/ui/ {
if ($http_x_wharttest_token != "REPLACE_WITH_SECRET") {
return 401;
}
proxy_pass http://wharttest_backend;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

