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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111615

CVE-2026-111615: Mall4cloud IDOR Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-111615 is an insecure direct object reference flaw in Mall4cloud that exposes buyer shipping data to unauthorized merchants. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111615 Overview

CVE-2026-111615 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Mall4cloud through version 4.0, an open-source multi-shop e-commerce platform. The flaw resides in the multishop OrderController.getOrderAddr handler, which accepts an orderAddrId path parameter without verifying that the requesting merchant owns the associated order. Authenticated merchants can enumerate sequential orderAddrId values via GET /m/order/order_addr/{orderAddrId} and retrieve buyer shipping records belonging to other shops. Exposed fields include consignee names, mobile numbers, physical addresses, and post codes across the entire platform. The weakness is classified as CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

Critical Impact

Any authenticated merchant can harvest platform-wide buyer personally identifiable information (PII) by iterating over auto-increment order address identifiers.

Affected Products

  • Mall4cloud through version 4.0
  • mall4cloud-order service — multishop OrderController
  • Deployments exposing the /m/order/order_addr/{orderAddrId} endpoint to merchant accounts

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111615 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111615

Vulnerability Analysis

Mall4cloud exposes a merchant-facing endpoint GET /m/order/order_addr/{orderAddrId} handled by OrderController.getOrderAddr in the mall4cloud-order module. The controller resolves the supplied orderAddrId directly through OrderAddrMapper, which issues a SELECT against the order_addr table keyed solely on the primary key. No tenant check validates that the resolved record belongs to an order fulfilled by the calling merchant's shop. Because orderAddrId is an auto-incrementing integer, an attacker with a single merchant account can script sequential requests from 1 upward and dump every buyer shipping record stored by the platform. The returned payload contains consignee names, mobile phone numbers, full postal addresses, and post codes, which constitute PII suitable for fraud, phishing, and physical-world abuse.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing object-level authorization. The data access layer, defined in OrderAddrMapper.xml, retrieves records by primary key without joining on the merchant's shopId or validating the authenticated session's shop context. The controller trusts the client-supplied identifier and omits a precondition check against the owning order's shopId.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only a low-privilege authenticated merchant account on the target instance. The attacker iterates integer values of orderAddrId in the request path and parses the JSON response. See the HackMD IDOR Analysis and the VulnCheck Advisory on IDOR for request/response traces, and the GitHub Order Controller Code and GitHub OrderAddrMapper XML for the vulnerable logic.

// Example exploitation code (sanitized)
No verified proof-of-concept code is published. Refer to the HackMD and
VulnCheck advisories above for request-level technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111615

Indicators of Compromise

  • High-volume, sequential GET /m/order/order_addr/{orderAddrId} requests originating from a single authenticated merchant session.
  • Access patterns where the orderAddrId values returned do not correlate with any order belonging to the requesting merchant's shopId.
  • Spikes in 200 OK responses from the mall4cloud-order service containing consigneeName, mobile, or addr fields.

Detection Strategies

  • Enable application-layer logging on OrderController.getOrderAddr to capture caller shopId, resolved orderAddrId, and the order's owning shopId.
  • Deploy a web application firewall (WAF) rule that rate-limits and alerts on enumeration patterns against /m/order/order_addr/*.
  • Add a backend audit query that flags any session reading more than N distinct orderAddrId values per hour where ownership does not match.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward application and reverse-proxy logs to a central SIEM and build correlation rules that alert on cross-tenant data access.
  • Monitor merchant account creation followed by rapid order address lookups, which is a common precursor to IDOR enumeration.
  • Track outbound data volume per merchant session to identify bulk PII extraction.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111615

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the /m/order/order_addr/ endpoint until a code-level authorization check is deployed.
  • Review authentication logs for merchant accounts created recently or showing anomalous read patterns against the order address endpoint.
  • Rotate or temporarily disable merchant API tokens suspected of enumeration activity.

Patch Information

No vendor patch is referenced in the NVD entry for Mall4cloud through 4.0 at time of publication. Operators should track the upstream gz-yami/mall4cloud repository for a fix that adds shopId ownership validation inside OrderController.getOrderAddr and the OrderAddrMapper query.

Workarounds

  • Add a server-side authorization check that joins order_addr to order and enforces order.shopId == session.shopId before returning data.
  • Replace exposed auto-increment identifiers with unguessable UUIDs to raise the cost of enumeration while the authorization fix is prepared.
  • Deploy a reverse-proxy rule that denies requests to /m/order/order_addr/{id} when the authenticated session cannot be mapped to the requested order's shop.
bash
# Configuration example
# Example NGINX rate-limit for the vulnerable endpoint (defense-in-depth, not a fix)
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=order_addr:10m rate=10r/m;

location ~ ^/m/order/order_addr/[0-9]+$ {
    limit_req zone=order_addr burst=5 nodelay;
    proxy_pass http://mall4cloud_order_upstream;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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