Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111438 Overview
CVE-2026-111438 is an access control bypass [CWE-288] in openGauss-server affecting replication connection authentication. The flaw resides in src/common/backend/libpq/hba.cpp, where hba_getauthmethod() processes High Availability Disaster Recovery (HADR) and Streaming (SW) replication sender connections. The function calls check_hba_replication() directly without requiring is_node_internal_connection(). As a result, external HADR/SW replication clients can bypass internal connection restrictions and authenticate without the full pg_hba policy checks, including the remote trust prohibition. An authenticated replication peer can then read backup and log data through the replication protocol.
Critical Impact
External hosts can establish HADR/SW replication sessions and exfiltrate backup and WAL data by bypassing internal-only connection enforcement.
Affected Products
- openGauss-server 3.0.x, 3.1.x, 5.0.x
- openGauss-server 5.1.0 and 6.0.x
- openGauss-server 7.0.0-RC1, 7.0.0-RC2, 7.0.0-RC3
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-111438 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111438
Vulnerability Analysis
The defect lives in the replication authentication path of openGauss. When a client initiates a HADR or SW replication connection, hba_getauthmethod() routes the request to check_hba_replication() without first verifying that the peer is an internal node. check_hba_replication() performs only a weak match against the replication flag in pg_hba.conf. It omits the hardening checks present in the standard check_hba() path, including the policy that forbids trust for remote clients.
This logic has existed since version 3.0.0, when the HADR replication sender was first allowed to bypass is_node_internal_connection(). Any peer that can reach the replication port and negotiate the protocol can authenticate as a replication client. Once connected, the attacker can stream Write-Ahead Log (WAL) records and request base backups, exposing database contents and operational metadata.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authorization check in hba_getauthmethod(). The function treats HADR/SW replication connections as implicitly trusted internal traffic. It never confirms the connection originates from an internal node before applying the weaker replication-only pg_hba matcher. The absence of is_node_internal_connection() validation collapses the trust boundary between internal cluster members and external network peers.
Attack Vector
An attacker with network access to the replication listener can initiate a replication handshake from a non-internal network. Because check_hba_replication() does not reject remote trust entries, matching rules authenticate the session without strong credential validation. The attacker then issues standard replication protocol commands to read WAL streams and backup data. Exploitation requires network reachability to the replication endpoint but does not require legitimate internal infrastructure placement.
No verified exploit code is published for CVE-2026-111438. Technical details are available in the vendor's remediation pull request linked in the references.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111438
Indicators of Compromise
- Replication protocol sessions originating from source addresses outside the documented internal cluster subnet.
- Unexpected START_REPLICATION or BASE_BACKUP commands in openGauss server logs from unknown peers.
- pg_stat_replication entries showing client addresses that do not match registered standby or HADR nodes.
Detection Strategies
- Audit pg_hba.conf for replication entries that use trust or broad CIDR ranges and correlate with observed replication connection sources.
- Enable verbose connection logging for the replication subsystem and alert on authentication events that do not include an internal node identifier.
- Compare active replication peers against an authoritative list of HADR and streaming standby hosts; flag deviations.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor TCP connections to the openGauss replication port and alert on sources outside approved management networks.
- Track WAL shipping volume per peer and alert on sudden transfers to previously unseen clients.
- Centralize openGauss logs in a SIEM and build detections for replication authentication from unexpected address ranges.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111438
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade openGauss-server to version 7.0.0-LTS, which enforces is_node_internal_connection() for HADR/SW replication senders.
- Restrict access to the replication TCP port using host firewalls or network ACLs so only known standby nodes can connect.
- Review pg_hba.conf and remove any replication lines that use trust or allow remote address ranges.
Patch Information
The issue is fixed in openGauss-server 7.0.0-LTS. The patch requires HADR and SW replication senders to pass is_node_internal_connection() validation. External replication connections are redirected through the standard check_hba() path, which rejects remote trust entries. See OpenGauss Pull Request #9757 for the fix.
Workarounds
- Place the replication endpoint on a dedicated management network segregated from untrusted hosts.
- Replace trust with md5, scram-sha-256, or certificate-based authentication for all replication entries in pg_hba.conf.
- Enforce TLS with mutual certificate verification between primary and standby nodes to prevent unauthorized peers from completing the handshake.
# Example pg_hba.conf hardening for replication
# Remove trust entries and restrict to known standby addresses
hostssl replication repl_user 10.0.10.11/32 scram-sha-256
hostssl replication repl_user 10.0.10.12/32 scram-sha-256
# Explicitly reject other replication sources
host replication all 0.0.0.0/0 reject
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

