Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111367 Overview
BillionMail versions through 4.9 contain a hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability [CWE-1394] that enables unauthenticated attackers to forge JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). The signing key is derived deterministically from configuration constants shipped with the application, allowing any attacker who inspects the public repository to reproduce it.
Once the key is reconstructed, attackers can forge unsubscribe and subscribe-confirm tokens. Submitting these forged tokens to /api/unsubscribe, /api/unsubscribe_new, or /api/subscribe/confirm lets attackers deactivate arbitrary contacts or force-confirm subscriptions without owning the target email address.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can forge JWTs to tamper with any subscriber record in a BillionMail deployment, undermining list integrity and subscriber consent.
Affected Products
- BillionMail (aaPanel) versions up to and including 4.9
- /api/unsubscribe endpoint
- /api/unsubscribe_new and /api/subscribe/confirm endpoints
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-111367 published to NVD
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111367
Vulnerability Analysis
BillionMail uses JWTs to authorize sensitive subscription state changes. The token signing key is not drawn from a per-installation secret. Instead, the key is computed at runtime from static constants that ship inside the public repository configuration.
Because both the derivation algorithm and its inputs are public, any attacker can replicate the computation offline. The attacker produces a valid HMAC signature over an arbitrary JWT payload. BillionMail then accepts the forged token as authentic.
The weakness is categorized under CWE-1394: Use of Default Cryptographic Key. It falls under the Cryptographic Vulnerabilities category, specifically Hardcoded Credentials and Key Management Issues.
Root Cause
The JWT signing routine in core/internal/service/batch_mail/jwt.go derives its secret from values present in core/manifest/config/config.yaml. Both files are tracked in the public BillionMail repository, so every deployment that uses the default configuration shares the same signing key.
See the JWT code snippet and the configuration YAML for the specific constants involved.
Attack Vector
The attack requires no authentication, no user interaction, and is reachable over the network. An attacker computes the signing key, mints a JWT whose claims target a victim contact ID or email, and POSTs the forged token to the vulnerable endpoints.
The server validates the signature with the same deterministic key and executes the requested action. Full technical analysis is published in the HackMD write-up and the VulnCheck advisory.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111367
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected POST requests to /api/unsubscribe, /api/unsubscribe_new, or /api/subscribe/confirm from unfamiliar source addresses.
- Spikes in subscriber state transitions (confirmed or deactivated) with no corresponding user-initiated email interaction.
- JWTs presented to subscription endpoints that reference contact IDs the application never issued tokens for.
- Repeated requests targeting sequential contact IDs, indicating enumeration.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument the three vulnerable endpoints to log the full JWT, source IP, and resulting contact action for correlation.
- Compare token issuance records against tokens accepted at the endpoints; mismatches indicate forgery.
- Alert on burst patterns of unsubscribe or confirm events that exceed baseline campaign activity.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward BillionMail application logs and reverse-proxy access logs to a centralized SIEM for retention and correlation.
- Monitor the deployed version string and flag any instance still running BillionMail 4.9 or earlier.
- Track outbound mail metrics for anomalies consistent with mass unsubscribes or forged confirmations.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111367
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade BillionMail to a release later than 4.9 that replaces the deterministic key with an installation-specific secret.
- Rotate any JWT signing secret immediately and invalidate existing tokens after the upgrade.
- Review subscriber activity logs for unauthorized state changes since deployment and restore affected records from backups.
- Restrict exposure of the three vulnerable endpoints to the public internet while remediation is in progress.
Patch Information
Consult the BillionMail repository and the VulnCheck advisory for the fixed version and upgrade guidance. The fix must replace the hard-coded key material with a secret generated per installation and stored outside the public configuration tree.
Workarounds
- Place the vulnerable endpoints behind a web application firewall rule that requires an additional server-issued header absent from forged requests.
- Override the default JWT secret with a strong randomly generated value in the local configuration if the deployment supports it, and redeploy.
- Temporarily disable the unsubscribe and subscribe-confirm API routes if business operations permit, pending upgrade.
# Generate a strong replacement JWT secret and store it outside the repo tree
openssl rand -base64 48 > /etc/billionmail/jwt.secret
chmod 600 /etc/billionmail/jwt.secret
chown billionmail:billionmail /etc/billionmail/jwt.secret
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

