Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111165 Overview
CVE-2026-111165 is a global out-of-bounds read vulnerability in libmikmod through version 3.3.15. The flaw resides in the MultiTracker module loader function MTM_Load() within load_mtm.c. The loader fails to clamp the module channel count against the fixed-size static pat array. An attacker who supplies a crafted .mtm file with a channel count greater than 32 can force the loader to read past the array boundary. The out-of-bounds read corrupts track indices and crashes any application that links against the library to parse the malicious module file. This issue is tracked as [CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read].
Critical Impact
Processing an attacker-supplied .mtm file causes memory corruption of track indices and application-level denial of service in any software using libmikmod for audio module playback.
Affected Products
- libmikmod versions through 3.3.15
- The MultiTracker loader MTM_Load() in libmikmod/loaders/load_mtm.c
- Downstream applications and media players that embed libmikmod for .mtm module decoding
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-111165 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111165
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability affects libmikmod, a widely used tracker-module playback library that supports formats such as MOD, S3M, XM, IT, and MTM. The MultiTracker (.mtm) loader reads a channel count field directly from the untrusted file header and uses it to index into a static array named pat. Because pat is statically sized to accommodate a maximum of 32 channels, any supplied value above that bound causes the loader to read adjacent global memory.
The out-of-bounds data is then written back into track indices used during pattern decoding. This produces corrupted internal state, invalid track references, and a reliable crash in the host process. Successful exploitation requires a user to open or play a crafted module file, aligning with the local attack vector and the requirement for user interaction.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing input validation on the module header. The channel count parsed from the .mtm file is used as an index without a sanity check against the compile-time bound of the pat array. The relevant code is referenced in load_mtm.c lines 257-261.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an attacker to deliver a malicious .mtm file and convince a user to open it with any application linked against vulnerable libmikmod. Delivery vectors include email attachments, download portals that host music module archives, or embedded media in web content. The primary impact is denial of service through application crash, with potential for information disclosure depending on the memory layout surrounding the pat array. See the VulnCheck advisory for mikmod and the HackMD OOB read analysis for parsing details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111165
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected crashes or segmentation faults in media players, audio converters, or games that invoke libmikmod after opening a .mtm file
- .mtm files whose header channel count field exceeds 32
- Core dumps referencing MTM_Load or neighboring symbols in load_mtm.c
Detection Strategies
- Enumerate installed packages across the fleet to identify systems shipping libmikmod 3.3.15 or earlier, including statically linked binaries
- Perform static scanning of custom builds and third-party media applications for the MTM_Load symbol and the vulnerable pat array handling
- Validate incoming .mtm files at email and web gateways by parsing the header and flagging channel counts greater than 32
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on repeated process crashes of audio or media applications on endpoints following the receipt of module files
- Collect and inspect crash telemetry for stack frames inside libmikmod loader functions
- Track outbound and inbound transfers of .mtm, .mod, and related tracker file formats across the environment
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111165
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all systems and applications linking against libmikmod and prioritize versions at or below 3.3.15
- Restrict opening of untrusted .mtm files until a patched library build is deployed
- Rebuild and redistribute downstream applications that statically link libmikmod once a fixed upstream commit is available
Patch Information
No fixed version is referenced in the NVD entry at publication time. Monitor the upstream mikmod GitHub repository for a commit that clamps the channel count in MTM_Load() to the bound of the pat array. Rebuild and redeploy any software that bundles libmikmod after the fix lands.
Workarounds
- Remove or disable .mtm format support in media players where it is not required
- Block .mtm attachments and downloads at the email gateway and web proxy for user populations that do not need tracker module playback
- Run media applications under sandboxing or seccomp policies that confine the process and limit the blast radius of a crash
# Example: identify binaries dynamically linked against libmikmod on Linux
for bin in $(find /usr /opt -type f -executable 2>/dev/null); do
ldd "$bin" 2>/dev/null | grep -q libmikmod && echo "$bin"
done
# Example: block .mtm files at a Postfix mail gateway via header_checks
# /etc/postfix/header_checks
/^Content-(Disposition|Type).*name\s*=\s*"?[^"]+\.mtm"?/ REJECT MTM attachments are blocked
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

