Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111129 Overview
CVE-2026-111129 is a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability [CWE-476] in the Open Asset Import Library (assimp) through version 6.0.5. The flaw resides in the Ogre3D binary mesh importer, specifically within OgreBinarySerializer::ReadAnimationKeyFrames(). The function fails to validate animation track targets before dereferencing them. An attacker who supplies a crafted .mesh file containing a morph animation track that references a missing submesh or absent shared geometry can crash any host process that parses the file. Assimp is widely embedded in 3D content pipelines, game engines, and asset viewers, which broadens the exposure surface.
Critical Impact
Processing an untrusted .mesh file in any application linked against assimp ≤ 6.0.5 can trigger a process crash, denying service to the host application.
Affected Products
- Open Asset Import Library (assimp) through 6.0.5
- Applications embedding the assimp Ogre3D asset loader (AssetLib/Ogre)
- Downstream 3D tooling that imports Ogre .mesh files via assimp
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-111129 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111129
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability lives in assimp's Ogre3D binary mesh deserializer. When parsing a .mesh file, OgreBinarySerializer::ReadAnimationKeyFrames() iterates animation key frames and expects a valid target object representing either a submesh or shared geometry. The deserializer accepts an attacker-controlled target index from the file without verifying that the referenced object exists. When the resolver returns a null pointer and the subsequent code dereferences it, the host process terminates. The outcome is a reliable denial-of-service condition against any program that parses attacker-supplied Ogre meshes.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing input validation on an untrusted animation track target during binary deserialization. The code path reads a target identifier from the file, resolves it against the mesh's submesh table or shared geometry, and then operates on the resolved pointer without checking for null. Because malformed or truncated meshes can produce absent targets, the unchecked dereference becomes directly reachable from file input. See the implementation in OgreBinarySerializer.cpp lines 688-704 and the supporting resolver logic in OgreStructs.cpp lines 839-846.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires the victim to open or import a crafted .mesh file with an application that uses assimp. The attack vector is local, requires user interaction, and does not require privileges. Delivery can occur through downloaded game mods, shared 3D asset bundles, email attachments, or asset marketplaces. The impact is restricted to availability of the parsing process; the vulnerability does not provide code execution or data disclosure. Additional analysis is available in the HackMD write-up and the VulnCheck advisory.
// No verified exploit code published. Conceptual trigger:
// A crafted Ogre .mesh file includes an animation of type
// MORPH_KEYFRAME whose target index references a submesh
// (or shared geometry) that is not present in the file.
// During ReadAnimationKeyFrames(), the resolver returns NULL,
// and the next field access on that pointer crashes the process.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111129
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected crashes or segmentation faults in processes that import .mesh files via assimp.
- Crash dumps whose faulting frame traces back to OgreBinarySerializer::ReadAnimationKeyFrames or neighboring symbols under code/AssetLib/Ogre/.
- Delivery of untrusted .mesh files from external sources immediately preceding the crash.
Detection Strategies
- Scan software inventories and build manifests for assimp versions at or below 6.0.5, including statically linked copies.
- Hunt endpoint telemetry for repeated abnormal terminations of 3D asset viewers, game clients, or content pipelines after file open events on .mesh artifacts.
- Pre-screen inbound Ogre mesh files in content pipelines by parsing in a sandbox and flagging those that trigger null dereference crashes.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Collect and centralize application crash events (Windows WER, Linux coredumps, macOS CrashReporter) from workstations running 3D tooling.
- Alert on crash frequency anomalies for processes known to load assimp, correlated with recent file write events for .mesh extensions.
- Monitor software composition analysis (SCA) output for assimp dependency drift across internal applications.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111129
Immediate Actions Required
- Identify all applications and build artifacts that embed assimp and inventory their versions.
- Restrict import of .mesh files to trusted sources until a patched assimp build is deployed.
- Run asset ingestion workflows in isolated, least-privileged sandboxes so a crash cannot cascade into shared services.
Patch Information
At publication, no fixed version is referenced in the NVD entry. Track the upstream assimp repository for commits that add validation around animation track targets in OgreBinarySerializer::ReadAnimationKeyFrames(). Rebuild and redistribute any downstream software that statically links assimp once a fixed release is published. Also review the VulnCheck advisory for updates on remediation.
Workarounds
- Disable the Ogre importer at build time by excluding AssetLib/Ogre from the assimp build if .mesh support is not required.
- Gate .mesh ingestion behind a validation step that rejects files containing morph animation tracks referencing undefined submeshes or missing shared geometry.
- Process untrusted meshes in a short-lived worker process so that a crash is contained and automatically restarted.
# Example: exclude the Ogre loader when building assimp from source
cmake -S . -B build \
-DASSIMP_BUILD_OGRE_IMPORTER=OFF \
-DASSIMP_BUILD_TESTS=OFF
cmake --build build --config Release
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

