Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111114 Overview
The Nexter Extension plugin for WordPress contains a privilege escalation flaw in all versions up to and including 4.7.11. The vulnerability resides in the View Admin Role Switcher feature, where the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller. A stale administrator value persists in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta after bulk role changes, allowing a demoted account to restore Administrator privileges. The flaw is classified under CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management.
Critical Impact
Authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or above can escalate to Administrator if their account previously held Administrator role and was demoted through the bulk role-change control.
Affected Products
- Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress
- All versions up to and including 4.7.11
- WordPress sites using the View Admin Role Switcher feature
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111114 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111114
Vulnerability Analysis
The Nexter Extension plugin ships a View Admin Role Switcher feature that lets administrators temporarily impersonate other user roles. To enable restoration of the original role, the plugin stores the caller's role in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta key before switching. A cleanup routine bound to the profile_update hook is expected to remove this stored value when an administrator's role changes.
The design breaks in two places. First, the /?reset-view endpoint in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() skips both nonce verification and capability checks when the submitted username equals the authenticated user. Second, the WordPress bulk role-change action at wp-admin/users.php?action=promote calls WP_User::set_role() directly and does not trigger the profile_update hook. The stored Administrator role therefore remains attached to the demoted account.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper privilege management (CWE-269) combined with incomplete lifecycle handling of persistent state. The reset handler trusts user-supplied input to determine authorization, and the cleanup hook does not cover all WordPress role-mutation paths.
Attack Vector
An attacker needs an authenticated account that previously held Administrator privileges and invoked the View Admin Role Switcher before being demoted through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen. The attacker then issues a request to the /?reset-view endpoint with their own username, causing the plugin to restore the stale administrator value from user meta and promote the account back to Administrator. Technical details are available in the Wordfence Vulnerability Report and the plugin source at line 265.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111114
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to the WordPress site containing the reset-view query parameter originating from non-administrator sessions.
- Presence of the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta key with value administrator on accounts that are not currently administrators.
- Unexpected role promotions in the WordPress wp_usermeta table for users whose last role change used the bulk promote action.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the wp_usermeta table for rows where meta_key = 'nxtext_view_admin_original_role' and correlate against the current role in wp_capabilities.
- Enable WordPress audit logging and alert on role changes to administrator that are not preceded by an Edit User screen submission.
- Inspect webserver access logs for GET or POST requests containing reset-view and a username parameter matching the session user.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor privilege changes on WordPress accounts and flag any Subscriber-to-Administrator transitions for review.
- Alert on direct invocations of the /?reset-view endpoint, particularly from accounts not currently holding administrative capabilities.
- Track plugin version inventory across managed WordPress sites to identify instances still running Nexter Extension 4.7.11 or earlier.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111114
Immediate Actions Required
- Update the Nexter Extension plugin to a version later than 4.7.11 that includes the fix from changeset 3740891.
- Audit all WordPress user accounts for stale nxtext_view_admin_original_role meta values and delete entries that do not match the user's current role.
- Review recent administrator role assignments and revoke any that cannot be tied to a legitimate administrative action.
Patch Information
The vendor addressed the vulnerability in the plugin update tracked under WordPress plugin changeset 3740891. The fix adds proper authorization checks to the reset handler and ensures the stored original role is cleared across all role-mutation paths, including bulk promotion.
Workarounds
- Disable the View Admin Role Switcher feature within the Nexter Extension settings until the plugin can be updated.
- Deactivate the Nexter Extension plugin entirely on sites that do not require its functionality.
- Restrict access to the WordPress admin area via web application firewall rules that block requests containing the reset-view parameter from non-administrator sessions.
# Configuration example: remove stale user meta via WP-CLI
wp user meta list <user_id> --keys=nxtext_view_admin_original_role
wp user meta delete <user_id> nxtext_view_admin_original_role
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

