Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111075

CVE-2026-111075: Eclipse OpenJ9 JITServer DOS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111075 is a denial of service flaw in Eclipse OpenJ9 JITServer that allows unauthenticated attackers to crash the process remotely. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111075 Overview

CVE-2026-111075 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability [CWE-125] in Eclipse OpenJ9 versions prior to 0.63.0. The flaw resides in the JITServer component, which fails to perform cross-field validation on attacker-controlled _size, _paddingSize, and _dataOffset fields during DataDescriptor message deserialization. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a crafted network payload that triggers an unsigned integer underflow in DataDescriptor::getPayloadSize() and DataDescriptor::getNextDescriptor(). The result is an out-of-bounds heap read followed by an immediate SIGSEGV process crash, producing a denial of service against the JITServer.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated remote attackers can crash the Eclipse OpenJ9 JITServer process over the network, disrupting JIT compilation services for all connected JVM clients.

Affected Products

  • Eclipse OpenJ9 versions prior to 0.63.0
  • JITServer component shipped with affected OpenJ9 builds
  • JVMs and runtimes that embed vulnerable OpenJ9 builds and rely on JITServer

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111075 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111075

Vulnerability Analysis

The JITServer component in Eclipse OpenJ9 offloads Just-In-Time compilation work from client JVMs to a remote server over the network. Messages exchanged between clients and the server include DataDescriptor structures that carry size, padding, and offset metadata describing payload layout.

The deserialization path accepts the _size, _paddingSize, and _dataOffset fields without validating their relationship. When DataDescriptor::getPayloadSize() and DataDescriptor::getNextDescriptor() perform unsigned arithmetic across these fields, attacker-chosen values cause the computation to wrap below zero. The resulting value is treated as a large positive length, driving reads far outside the allocated heap region.

Because the read targets unmapped or protected memory, the JITServer process receives SIGSEGV and terminates. All clients relying on that server lose remote JIT compilation until the process restarts.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing cross-field validation during message deserialization combined with unchecked unsigned integer arithmetic. The code trusts _size, _paddingSize, and _dataOffset individually and never enforces invariants such as _dataOffset <= _size or _paddingSize <= _size. This maps to the broader class of input validation failures that lead to out-of-bounds reads [CWE-125].

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the JITServer TCP endpoint can trigger the condition. The attacker crafts a DataDescriptor message with _dataOffset or _paddingSize values greater than _size, then transmits it to the server. On deserialization, the arithmetic underflow causes the server to read outside the heap allocation and crash. No credentials, user interaction, or prior foothold is required. See the Eclipse OpenJ9 pull request for the technical fix.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111075

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected SIGSEGV crashes or core dumps from the jitserver process coinciding with inbound client traffic.
  • Abrupt termination of JITServer followed by client JVM logs reporting lost compilation sessions or reconnect attempts.
  • Malformed DataDescriptor messages captured on the JITServer listening port from unknown source addresses.

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor the JITServer process for repeated crash-restart cycles using systemd, Kubernetes, or container runtime health signals.
  • Inspect network flows to the JITServer port for connections originating outside the expected client allowlist.
  • Correlate OpenJ9 client logs reporting remote compilation failures with server-side segmentation faults across the same time window.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable core dump collection on JITServer hosts and alert when new dumps appear.
  • Instrument the host with eBPF or auditd rules that record jitserver process exits with non-zero signal status.
  • Forward JITServer and kernel logs to a centralized analytics platform for cross-host crash pattern analysis.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111075

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Eclipse OpenJ9 to version 0.63.0 or later on every host running JITServer.
  • Restrict network access to the JITServer listening port using firewalls, security groups, or service mesh policy so only trusted JVM clients can connect.
  • Audit infrastructure for any JITServer instances exposed to untrusted networks or the public internet and remove that exposure.

Patch Information

The fix is included in Eclipse OpenJ9 0.63.0 and is tracked in the upstream GitHub pull request #25009. Additional advisory details are available via the Eclipse GitLab CVE assignment and the Eclipse GitLab vulnerability report. Operators consuming OpenJ9 through downstream distributions should track vendor rebuilds that incorporate 0.63.0.

Workarounds

  • Disable JITServer and fall back to in-process JIT compilation on client JVMs where the performance tradeoff is acceptable.
  • Terminate JITServer TLS at a reverse proxy that enforces mutual authentication, limiting reachability to vetted clients.
  • Place JITServer on an isolated management network segment with explicit allowlists for known client IP ranges.
bash
# Configuration example: restrict JITServer exposure with iptables
# Replace 10.0.0.0/24 with your trusted JVM client subnet and 38400 with your JITServer port
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 38400 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 38400 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.