Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-110254

CVE-2026-110254: Finsys Dockhand SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-110254 is an SSRF flaw in Finsys Dockhand that lets authenticated attackers access internal services through IPv6 transition ranges. This post covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-110254 Overview

CVE-2026-110254 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in Finsys Dockhand versions before 1.0.45. The flaw resides in the ipCategory() function within src/lib/server/url-safety.ts, which fails to classify NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo IPv6 transition address ranges as unsafe. Authenticated attackers can encode loopback, cloud metadata, or private IPv4 addresses inside IPv6 transition literals to bypass URL safety checks. These crafted URLs can be supplied through notification, backup, template, registry, git, or secret provider configuration fields. The resulting requests reach internal services that the Dockhand host can access.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can reach internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and loopback resources from the Dockhand server, enabling internal reconnaissance and secondary attacks.

Affected Products

  • Finsys Dockhand versions prior to 1.0.45
  • Dockhand deployments exposing notification, backup, template, registry, git, or secret provider URL configuration
  • Instances relying on ipCategory() in src/lib/server/url-safety.ts for SSRF protection

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-110254 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-110254

Vulnerability Analysis

Dockhand validates outbound URLs through the ipCategory() helper to prevent requests from reaching sensitive address ranges. The function enumerates known IPv4 reserved ranges and standard IPv6 ranges but omits three IPv6 transition mechanisms: NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), and Teredo (2001::/32). Each of these mechanisms embeds an IPv4 address inside an IPv6 literal. When Dockhand resolves such literals and establishes an outbound connection, the request is routed to the embedded IPv4 destination even if that destination is otherwise blocked by the safety checks.

An authenticated user supplies the crafted URL through any configuration surface that triggers an outbound request. The host operating system handles the transition address according to its network stack, meaning the SSRF primitive works wherever IPv6 transition routing is available or where the application resolves the embedded IPv4 portion directly.

Root Cause

The root cause is incomplete allow/deny list logic in ipCategory(). The classifier treats transition-range addresses as ordinary public IPv6 addresses, so loopback (127.0.0.1), link-local metadata (169.254.169.254), and RFC 1918 ranges can be smuggled past validation when wrapped in NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo notation.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an authenticated account with permission to configure a URL-bearing field. The attacker submits a URL such as a 6to4-wrapped literal that encodes 127.0.0.1 or a cloud metadata address. Dockhand accepts the URL, issues the outbound request, and returns or acts on the response. Common targets include AWS and GCP instance metadata services, internal admin APIs, and services bound to the loopback interface. Full technical detail is available in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8rv7-48hx-jfw9 and the VulnCheck Advisory for Dockhand SSRF.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-110254

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound requests from the Dockhand host to IPv6 literals in 64:ff9b::/96, 2002::/16, or 2001::/32 ranges
  • Dockhand application logs showing notification, backup, registry, git, template, or secret provider URLs containing IPv6 transition prefixes
  • Access attempts from the Dockhand host to cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254 or fd00:ec2::254
  • Unexpected connections from Dockhand to loopback or RFC 1918 services it does not normally reach

Detection Strategies

  • Parse Dockhand configuration audit logs for URLs matching the transition-address patterns above
  • Alert on any proxy or firewall event where the Dockhand service account initiates traffic to internal management ranges
  • Review web application logs for authenticated configuration changes that introduce IPv6 literal hostnames

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Dockhand application and proxy logs into a centralized analytics pipeline for query across outbound destinations
  • Baseline normal Dockhand egress destinations and alert on deviation, especially to metadata or loopback addresses
  • Monitor configuration-change events on URL fields and correlate with subsequent outbound connections

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-110254

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Dockhand to version 1.0.45 or later, where ipCategory() rejects NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo ranges
  • Audit existing notification, backup, template, registry, git, and secret provider URLs for IPv6 transition literals
  • Rotate any cloud credentials or secrets that may have been exposed through the metadata service
  • Restrict Dockhand configuration privileges to trusted administrators only

Patch Information

Finsys released a fix in Dockhand 1.0.45. The patched ipCategory() function classifies NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), and Teredo (2001::/32) addresses as unsafe and blocks outbound requests to them. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8rv7-48hx-jfw9 for upgrade guidance.

Workarounds

  • Deploy an egress proxy or firewall that denies traffic from the Dockhand host to loopback, link-local, metadata, and RFC 1918 ranges regardless of IPv6 encoding
  • Disable IPv6 transition routing on the Dockhand host where business requirements allow
  • Enforce metadata service hardening such as AWS IMDSv2 with hop-limit 1 to block SSRF-based credential theft
  • Temporarily restrict which users can modify outbound URL configuration until the upgrade is applied
bash
# Example egress hardening via iptables and ip6tables on the Dockhand host
iptables  -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 127.0.0.0/8     -j REJECT
iptables  -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 169.254.0.0/16  -j REJECT
iptables  -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 10.0.0.0/8      -j REJECT
iptables  -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 172.16.0.0/12   -j REJECT
iptables  -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 192.168.0.0/16  -j REJECT
ip6tables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d ::1/128         -j REJECT
ip6tables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 64:ff9b::/96    -j REJECT
ip6tables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 2002::/16       -j REJECT
ip6tables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner dockhand -d 2001::/32       -j REJECT

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.