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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-110214

CVE-2026-110214: Snowy Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-110214 is an authentication bypass flaw in Snowy 3.6.5 caused by a hard-coded HMAC key. Attackers can forge download signatures to access stored files without authentication. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-110214 Overview

CVE-2026-110214 is a hard-coded cryptographic key vulnerability [CWE-321] in Snowy 3.6.5, an open-source rapid development platform. The flaw resides in the /dev/file/download endpoint, which validates download requests using an HMAC-SHA256 signature derived from a published constant named FILE_DOWNLOAD_SIGN_SECRET. Because the secret is embedded in the public source tree, unauthenticated attackers can compute valid signatures for any file identifier offline. Successful exploitation enables retrieval of stored assets including user avatars, editor images, and attachments without authentication.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can forge download signatures and retrieve arbitrary files from the /dev/file/download endpoint by iterating guessed file identifiers.

Affected Products

  • Snowy 3.6.5 (xiaonuobase/Snowy)
  • snowy-plugin-dev module, specifically DevFileServiceImpl
  • Deployments relying on the default GlobalConfigure constants

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-110214 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-110214

Vulnerability Analysis

Snowy signs file download requests with HMAC-SHA256 using a static secret declared in GlobalConfigure.java. The DevFileServiceImpl service verifies the submitted signature server-side before serving the file at /dev/file/download. Because the signing secret is committed to the public repository, the signature acts as an obfuscation layer rather than a cryptographic access control. An attacker reading the source can replicate the signing routine locally. The design pattern conflates signature validation with authorization, so the endpoint intentionally skips authentication once a valid signature is presented. This weakness is cataloged as CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key.

Root Cause

The root cause is the hard-coded FILE_DOWNLOAD_SIGN_SECRET constant stored in GlobalConfigure at lines 174-175. Any party with access to the Snowy source code holds the same key as a production deployment. The signing routine in DevFileServiceImpl at lines 419-445 performs HMAC-SHA256 over the file id but trusts the secret as if it were installation-specific.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is remote and unauthenticated. An attacker computes HMAC-SHA256(FILE_DOWNLOAD_SIGN_SECRET, file_id) for guessed or enumerated identifiers, then issues a GET request to /dev/file/download with the file id and forged signature. File identifiers used by Snowy are often sequential or UUID-based, making enumeration or targeted retrieval feasible. The confidentiality impact is limited to stored files such as avatars, editor images, and uploaded attachments. Integrity and availability are not affected. See the VulnCheck Advisory for Snowy 3.6.5 and the HackMD Snowy Dev Access Control write-up for implementation details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-110214

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unauthenticated GET requests to /dev/file/download carrying a sign query parameter and no session cookie.
  • Sequential or scripted enumeration of fileId values against the download endpoint from a single source IP.
  • Spikes in successful 200 responses from /dev/file/download without preceding authenticated session activity.

Detection Strategies

  • Alert on web access logs where /dev/file/download is reached without an authenticated session identifier.
  • Baseline the normal rate of file download requests per source and flag outliers consistent with id brute-forcing.
  • Correlate download requests against application audit logs to identify signatures that no legitimate workflow produced.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Snowy application and reverse-proxy logs to a centralized log platform for retention and query.
  • Monitor outbound data volume from the application host to detect bulk file exfiltration.
  • Track unique fileId values requested per client over short windows to surface enumeration behavior.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-110214

Immediate Actions Required

  • Replace the FILE_DOWNLOAD_SIGN_SECRET constant with a per-deployment secret loaded from configuration or a secret manager.
  • Require an authenticated session for /dev/file/download and enforce per-user authorization on each file id.
  • Rotate the signing secret and invalidate any previously issued download URLs.
  • Restrict exposure of the Snowy application to trusted networks until a fix is deployed.

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no vendor patch is referenced in the NVD entry for CVE-2026-110214. Review the upstream repository and the GitHub File Service Implementation, the GitHub File Service Method, and the GitHub Global Configuration Class for the vulnerable code paths that must be refactored.

Workarounds

  • Place /dev/file/download behind a reverse proxy that enforces authentication before the request reaches Snowy.
  • Add a server-side authorization check that validates the current user owns or may access the requested fileId, independent of signature verification.
  • Replace predictable file identifiers with high-entropy opaque identifiers to make enumeration impractical.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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