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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-109402

CVE-2026-109402: Conductor-OSS SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-109402 is a server-side request forgery flaw in Conductor-OSS 3.22.0 affecting the MCP Service component. Attackers can manipulate the mcpServer argument remotely. This post covers technical details, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-109402 Overview

CVE-2026-109402 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in conductor-oss conductor version 3.22.0. The flaw resides in the MCPService.listTools function within ai/src/main/java/org/conductoross/conductor/ai/mcp/MCPService.java, part of the MCP Service component. An authenticated remote attacker can manipulate the mcpServer argument to coerce the server into issuing arbitrary outbound HTTP requests. Public exploit details have been disclosed, lowering the barrier for opportunistic abuse. The issue carries a CVSS 4.0 base score of 2.1 (LOW).

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can abuse the MCPService.listTools endpoint to force the conductor server to initiate requests to attacker-chosen destinations, enabling internal network reconnaissance and interaction with internal-only services.

Affected Products

  • conductor-oss conductor 3.22.0
  • Component: MCP Service (ai/src/main/java/org/conductoross/conductor/ai/mcp/MCPService.java)
  • Function: MCPService.listTools

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-109402 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-109402

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is a classic server-side request forgery flaw. The MCPService.listTools method accepts an mcpServer argument that is used to construct an outbound request without adequate validation of the target host or scheme. An attacker who can reach the API can supply an arbitrary URL, causing the conductor backend to issue HTTP requests on the attacker's behalf.

Because the request originates from the conductor host, it inherits the server's network position. This exposes internal-only services, cloud metadata endpoints, and administrative interfaces that are typically shielded from external traffic. The EPSS score of 0.256% reflects limited near-term exploitation telemetry, but public exploit availability raises operational risk for exposed deployments.

Successful exploitation requires low privileges and no user interaction, and the attack can be launched over the network. Impact is bounded to limited confidentiality, integrity, and availability effects on the conductor service itself under the current scoring.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing allow-list validation of the mcpServer parameter before it is used as the destination of a server-initiated HTTP request. Without constraints on scheme, host, or resolved IP range, the parameter functions as an open proxy input, which maps directly to [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery].

Attack Vector

An authenticated client submits a request to the MCP Service endpoint that invokes listTools, specifying an mcpServer value pointing to an internal resource such as http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ on cloud deployments, http://127.0.0.1:<port> for loopback services, or an internal admin host. The conductor server then performs the request and may return response data, status codes, or timing signals that leak information about the internal environment.

No verified proof-of-concept code is published in the referenced advisories. See the VulDB entry for CVE-2026-109402 for additional technical context.

// No verified exploit code is available in authoritative sources.
// Refer to the VulDB advisory for disclosed technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109402

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from the conductor host to internal RFC1918 ranges, loopback addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254.
  • Unexpected invocations of MCPService.listTools with mcpServer values containing internal hostnames, IP literals, or non-HTTPS schemes.
  • Application logs showing DNS resolutions for internal-only names originating from the conductor process.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect conductor application logs for listTools calls and correlate the mcpServer parameter against an allow-list of expected MCP server URLs.
  • Deploy egress monitoring on the conductor host to flag connections to metadata services, link-local addresses, and private ranges.
  • Add a web application firewall rule that blocks or alerts on API payloads where mcpServer resolves to private or reserved IP space.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward conductor application and access logs to a centralized analytics platform and alert on anomalous mcpServer values.
  • Baseline normal outbound destinations from the conductor service and alert on deviations.
  • Review authentication logs to identify which accounts invoke the MCP Service and detect credential abuse patterns.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109402

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the conductor API so only trusted clients can reach the MCP Service endpoints.
  • Revoke or rotate credentials for low-privilege accounts that do not require MCP functionality.
  • Enforce egress filtering on the conductor host to block traffic to internal management networks and cloud metadata services.

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no fixed version is referenced in the NVD entry for CVE-2026-109402. Monitor the conductor-oss project and vendor advisories for an upstream fix. Apply any released patch to all deployments running conductor 3.22.0 as soon as it becomes available.

Workarounds

  • Place the conductor service behind a forward proxy that enforces a strict allow-list of permitted MCP server destinations.
  • Reject mcpServer values whose resolved IP falls within loopback, link-local, or private ranges by adding input validation at a reverse proxy or API gateway.
  • Disable the MCP Service component in deployments that do not use MCP integrations until a vendor patch is applied.
bash
# Example egress block for cloud metadata and loopback at the host firewall
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 ! -o lo -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -m owner --uid-owner conductor -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/16 -m owner --uid-owner conductor -j REJECT

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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