Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-109365 Overview
CVE-2026-109365 is an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Zebra, the Rust implementation of the Zcash protocol, affecting all versions before 6.4.0. Unauthenticated network peers can serve forged block bodies that preserve a valid header hash while flipping authorizing-only bytes such as the coinbase scriptSig. This forces Zebra to perform full Sapling, Orchard, and Ironwood proof verification on data that cannot be committed to the chain. The attack stalls block synchronization for approximately 67 seconds per forged body and wastes CPU on expensive zero-knowledge proof checks. The flaw is tracked under CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity.
Critical Impact
Remote unauthenticated attackers can waste proof-verification CPU and stall Zebra node synchronization by submitting forged block bodies with valid header hashes.
Affected Products
- Zcash Foundation Zebra node, all releases prior to 6.4.0
- Deployments participating in the Zcash peer-to-peer network as full nodes
- Downstream tooling and services depending on Zebra sync state
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109365 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-109365
Vulnerability Analysis
Zebra validates incoming block bodies received from peers by first checking the header hash and then verifying included zero-knowledge proofs. The vulnerability stems from Zebra accepting any block body whose serialized header hashes to an expected value, without ensuring that body fields outside the committed set match the canonical block. Several fields, including the coinbase scriptSig, carry authorization data that does not change the header hash when modified. An attacker can flip those bytes, send the mutated body, and still pass the initial hash check. Zebra then proceeds to run Sapling, Orchard, and Ironwood proof verification, which is CPU-intensive. Because the body ultimately fails final validation, no peer is penalized, allowing attackers to repeat the pattern across many connections.
Root Cause
The root cause is insufficient verification of data authenticity between the header commitment and the full block body contents. Zebra treats a matching header hash as sufficient to warrant expensive cryptographic verification work, even though authorizing-only fields are not committed to by that hash. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3c94-hf7p-g5mf for the maintainer analysis.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only network reachability to a target Zebra node. An unauthenticated peer connects over the Zcash P2P protocol and serves forged block bodies in response to sync requests. Each forged body forces full proof verification and stalls sync progress for roughly 67 seconds. Attackers can parallelize submissions across multiple peer connections to amplify the resource impact. No authentication, user interaction, or local access is required. Technical specifics are documented in the VulnCheck Denial of Service Advisory.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109365
Indicators of Compromise
- Repeated block synchronization stalls lasting approximately 67 seconds correlated with inbound peer traffic.
- Sustained CPU utilization spikes tied to Sapling, Orchard, or Ironwood proof verification without corresponding chain tip advancement.
- High volume of block body validation failures logged against specific peer addresses.
Detection Strategies
- Monitor Zebra logs for proof verification failures that occur after a successful header hash match on the same block height.
- Correlate peer connection metadata with block validation failure rates to identify abusive sources.
- Baseline normal sync throughput and alert on prolonged stalls that align with inbound block body deliveries.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Instrument Zebra process metrics for CPU time spent in zero-knowledge proof verification routines.
- Export peer-level validation statistics to a central log platform and alert on repeated same-height failures from the same peer.
- Track block synchronization lag and raise alerts when the chain tip falls behind expected progress by more than one block interval.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109365
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all Zebra nodes to version 6.4.0 or later.
- Audit inbound peer connections and disconnect peers exhibiting repeated same-hash block body failures.
- Restrict inbound peer counts on exposed nodes until patching is complete to limit parallel exploitation.
Patch Information
The Zcash Foundation addressed the issue in Zebra 6.4.0. The fix validates authorizing-only fields before performing expensive proof verification, ensuring that forged block bodies are rejected cheaply. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3c94-hf7p-g5mf for release notes and upgrade instructions.
Workarounds
- Limit the number of inbound peers accepted by the node to reduce the attack surface.
- Peer only with trusted nodes using allow-listing where operationally feasible.
- Deploy network-layer rate limiting on the Zcash P2P port to constrain abusive connection volume.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

