Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-109294

CVE-2026-109294: Open WebUI DOS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-109294 is a resource exhaustion vulnerability in Open WebUI that allows authenticated attackers to crash servers through compressed image URLs. This post covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-109294 Overview

CVE-2026-109294 is an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Open WebUI versions 0.6.42 through 0.11.3. The flaw resides in the get_image_base64_from_url function, which decompresses remote image responses without enforcing size limits. Authenticated users can submit chat messages containing an image URL that points to a server returning gzip-encoded responses. When Open WebUI fetches and decompresses the payload, memory consumption grows unbounded, exhausting server resources and denying service to all users. The weakness is classified under CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.

Critical Impact

An authenticated attacker can trigger server-wide denial of service by pointing a chat image URL at a host serving a highly compressed payload, exhausting memory for every tenant on the instance.

Affected Products

  • Open WebUI 0.6.42 and later
  • Open WebUI versions before 0.11.4
  • Deployments exposing chat message image fields to authenticated users

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109294 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-109294

Vulnerability Analysis

Open WebUI accepts image references inside chat messages and resolves them server-side through the get_image_base64_from_url helper. The helper issues an HTTP GET to the attacker-controlled URL and processes the response body based on content encoding. When the remote server advertises Content-Encoding: gzip, Open WebUI decompresses the stream into memory without applying a maximum decompressed size, a streaming boundary, or a timeout on allocation. The result is a classic decompression amplification condition where a small compressed payload expands into gigabytes of resident memory on the server process.

Because Open WebUI runs as a shared multi-tenant service, memory pressure caused by one request affects all concurrent users. The Python process is either killed by the operating system out-of-memory handler or stalls until swap and garbage collection exhaust the host, producing a denial-of-service condition that persists until the service is restarted.

Root Cause

The root cause is the absence of bounded reads and decompressed-size enforcement in get_image_base64_from_url. The function trusts the remote server's content length and encoding declarations instead of applying hard limits on bytes read, decompression ratio, and total allocation. This design choice converts any outbound image fetch into a vector for resource exhaustion.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires low-privileged authenticated access. The attacker hosts a web endpoint that returns a highly compressible gzip payload, for example a response consisting of a long run of zero bytes. The attacker then sends a chat message whose image field references that endpoint. When Open WebUI processes the message, it fetches the URL, decompresses the stream, and allocates memory proportional to the decompressed size. Repeating the request amplifies the impact and prevents service recovery. The attack is executed over the network without user interaction from victims.

See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-w8j8-jv6j-3m47 and the VulnCheck Advisory on Memory Exhaustion for additional technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109294

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from Open WebUI workers to unexpected external hosts referenced in chat image fields.
  • Server processes terminated by the Linux OOM killer with log entries referencing the Open WebUI Python runtime.
  • Repeated chat message submissions containing image URLs that resolve to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
  • Spikes in resident set size (RSS) correlated with image rendering code paths in get_image_base64_from_url.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument application logs to record the source URL, declared content length, and decompressed size for every image fetch, and alert on large expansion ratios.
  • Correlate authenticated user activity with sudden memory allocation spikes in the Open WebUI container.
  • Monitor egress proxy logs for responses with Content-Encoding: gzip whose decompressed size exceeds a reasonable image threshold.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Set container memory limits and alert when workers are evicted or restarted more than once per hour.
  • Track per-user rates of chat submissions containing remote image URLs and flag outliers.
  • Forward Open WebUI stdout and stderr to centralized logging and alert on MemoryError or kernel OOM events.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109294

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Open WebUI to version 0.11.4 or later, which bounds decompressed image sizes in get_image_base64_from_url.
  • Restrict new account registration and audit existing authenticated users until the upgrade is complete.
  • Enforce container memory limits and automatic restart policies to contain exploitation attempts.
  • Place Open WebUI behind an egress proxy that inspects and limits outbound fetch sizes.

Patch Information

The maintainers resolved the issue in Open WebUI 0.11.4. The fix is tracked in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-w8j8-jv6j-3m47. Operators should pull the patched release from the official repository and redeploy. No partial backports are listed for earlier branches, so upgrading is the only supported remediation path.

Workarounds

  • Block or allow-list outbound HTTP requests from the Open WebUI service so remote image URLs can only resolve to trusted hosts.
  • Disable or filter chat message features that accept remote image URLs until the patch is applied.
  • Apply reverse-proxy rules that strip Content-Encoding: gzip from responses to Open WebUI's outbound image fetches.
  • Rate-limit authenticated users to reduce the volume of amplification requests a single account can issue.
bash
# Configuration example
# Upgrade Open WebUI to the patched release
docker pull ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.11.4
docker stop open-webui && docker rm open-webui
docker run -d --name open-webui \
  --memory=2g --memory-swap=2g --restart=on-failure \
  -p 3000:8080 \
  ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:0.11.4

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.