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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-109292

CVE-2026-109292: Open WebUI Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2026-109292 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Open WebUI that exposes user session cookies to destination servers during OAuth connections. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-109292 Overview

CVE-2026-109292 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Open WebUI versions 0.6.27 through versions before 0.11.4. The flaw causes the application to forward the full browser cookie jar — including user session cookies — to destination servers when OAuth-mode connections are used. Operators of OpenAI-compatible connections, OpenAPI tool servers, or terminal servers can capture these forwarded session cookies from routine requests. Captured cookies can then be replayed to hijack accounts, including administrator accounts. The issue is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.

Critical Impact

Malicious or compromised downstream server operators can harvest Open WebUI session cookies and replay them to take over any account, including administrators.

Affected Products

  • Open WebUI version 0.6.27 and later
  • Open WebUI versions before 0.11.4
  • Deployments configured with OpenAI-compatible connections, OpenAPI tool servers, or terminal servers using OAuth mode

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-109292 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-109292

Vulnerability Analysis

Open WebUI acts as a frontend that proxies requests from authenticated users to downstream services such as model providers, tool servers, and terminal servers. For connections configured with auth_type of session or system_oauth, the backend unconditionally attached request.cookies to outbound requests. This meant the browser cookie jar — including the Open WebUI session cookie — was transmitted to arbitrary third-party endpoints controlled by connection operators.

The downstream service receives valid session cookies in standard HTTP headers. An operator who logs incoming request headers can extract these cookies and replay them against the Open WebUI instance. The replayed cookie authenticates the attacker as the victim user without requiring password or OAuth credentials.

Root Cause

The root cause is unconditional cookie forwarding in connection handlers. In backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py and backend/open_webui/routers/openai.py, cookies from the inbound user request were copied directly into outbound requests whenever OAuth or session authentication was configured. No scoping, filtering, or opt-in mechanism gated the behavior.

Attack Vector

The attack requires a user to interact with a connection controlled by the attacker — for example, invoking a tool call or chat completion against an attacker-operated OpenAPI server. The attacker observes the inbound HTTP request, extracts the Open WebUI session cookie from the Cookie header, and replays it in a new request to the Open WebUI instance. The replay grants full access to the victim's account.

python
# Patch from backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py (commit 3cda47c)
auth_type = connection.get('auth_type', 'bearer')
headers = {}
-cookies = {}
+cookies = getattr(request, 'cookies', {}) if connection.get('forward_cookies', False) else {}

if auth_type == 'bearer':
    headers.update(bearer_auth_header(connection.get('key', '')))
elif auth_type == 'session':
-    cookies = request.cookies if hasattr(request, 'cookies') else {}
    headers.update(bearer_auth_header(request.state.token.credentials))
elif auth_type == 'system_oauth':
-    cookies = request.cookies if hasattr(request, 'cookies') else {}
    oauth_token = extra_params.get('__oauth_token__', None)
    if oauth_token:
        headers.update(bearer_auth_header(oauth_token.get('access_token', '')))

Source: GitHub Commit 3cda47c. The patch removes implicit cookie forwarding and introduces an explicit forward_cookies opt-in on the connection configuration.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-109292

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from Open WebUI containing a Cookie header with the application session cookie destined for third-party connection endpoints.
  • Repeated use of the same Open WebUI session cookie from unexpected source IP addresses or user-agent strings.
  • Administrative actions originating from sessions that were never issued through an interactive login event.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect reverse proxy or egress logs for outbound requests from the Open WebUI backend that include session cookies in headers.
  • Correlate authentication events with session cookie usage patterns to flag concurrent use of a single session ID from distinct network origins.
  • Review audit logs for privilege changes or new API keys created shortly after a user interacted with an external tool server or OpenAI-compatible connection.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose access logging on the Open WebUI reverse proxy and ship logs to a central analytics platform for session cookie correlation.
  • Alert on session reuse where the client IP, ASN, or user-agent changes mid-session without a corresponding re-authentication event.
  • Track configuration changes to connection entries, especially new OpenAI-compatible endpoints, OpenAPI tool servers, or terminal servers added by non-administrative users.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-109292

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Open WebUI to version 0.11.4 or later, which removes implicit cookie forwarding and introduces the explicit forward_cookies opt-in flag.
  • Invalidate all active user sessions and rotate the application secret used to sign session cookies after upgrading.
  • Audit all configured OpenAI-compatible connections, OpenAPI tool servers, and terminal servers; remove any endpoints that are not fully trusted.

Patch Information

The vulnerability is fixed in Open WebUI 0.11.4. The fix is distributed across three commits that change cookie handling defaults and add an opt-in configuration field forward_cookies to connection schemas. See GitHub Commit 3cda47c, GitHub Commit b71744b, and GitHub Commit f9f815c. Additional context is available in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-gqfh-jxvw-74rp and the VulnCheck Advisory.

Workarounds

  • Restrict connection creation to administrators and disable user-configurable OpenAPI tool servers until the upgrade is complete.
  • Terminate existing OAuth-mode and session-mode connections pointing to any third-party or externally hosted endpoints.
  • Place the Open WebUI backend behind an egress proxy that strips Cookie headers from outbound requests to non-trusted destinations.
bash
# Example: strip Cookie headers from outbound traffic at an egress nginx proxy
location / {
    proxy_pass $upstream;
    proxy_set_header Cookie "";
    proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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