Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-108657 Overview
CVE-2026-108657 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in JeecgBoot through version 3.9.5. The flaw resides in the SysTenantControllerpassApply handler, which fails to verify that the caller holds administrative privileges before approving tenant administrator applications. Any authenticated user can submit a pending tenant pack user application via doApplyTenantPackUser, then approve their own request through PUT /sys/tenant/passApply. The result is unauthorized elevation to tenant administrator pack permissions in any targeted tenant. JeecgBoot is a widely deployed low-code development platform used to build enterprise web applications.
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can self-approve tenant administrator access in arbitrary tenants, bypassing multi-tenant isolation and gaining control over tenant-scoped data and configuration.
Affected Products
- JeecgBoot versions up to and including 3.9.5
- Deployments exposing the SysTenantController endpoints to authenticated users
- Multi-tenant JeecgBoot installations relying on tenant isolation boundaries
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-10 - CVE-2026-108657 published to NVD
- 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-108657
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability stems from an authorization check missing from the passApply handler in SysTenantController.java. The endpoint PUT /sys/tenant/passApply is intended to let a tenant administrator approve pending user applications for tenant pack membership. However, the implementation does not validate the caller's role or tenant ownership before updating the application state.
An attacker only needs a valid authenticated session on the JeecgBoot instance. They first create a pending application against a target tenant through doApplyTenantPackUser, then invoke passApply to approve the same application. The handler accepts the approval and grants tenant administrator pack permissions. This breaks the trust boundary between regular users and tenant administrators across all tenants on the platform.
Root Cause
The root cause is an improper access control defect classified under [CWE-862]. The passApply controller method performs the state transition without verifying that the authenticated principal has administrative authority over the tenant referenced in the request. Role and tenant-ownership predicates are absent from the request-handling path, so any authenticated identity satisfies the implicit precondition.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the JeecgBoot HTTP interface and a low-privilege authenticated account. The attacker issues a POST request to doApplyTenantPackUser to create a pending application for a chosen tenant. They then issue a PUT request to /sys/tenant/passApply with the application identifier to approve it. No user interaction is required on the victim side. A public proof-of-concept script demonstrating the full chain is available at the GitHub PoC Script, and the vulnerable code path is documented in the JeecgBoot source repository.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-108657
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to POST /sys/tenant/doApplyTenantPackUser followed closely by PUT /sys/tenant/passApply from the same low-privilege session.
- Unexpected changes in the sys_user_tenant or tenant-pack membership tables where the approving user is not an existing tenant administrator.
- Audit log entries showing tenant pack approvals performed by accounts that do not own the target tenant.
Detection Strategies
- Review application and reverse-proxy logs for passApply calls and correlate approver identity against the target tenant's administrator list.
- Alert when the same session identifier submits a tenant pack application and approves it within a short time window.
- Monitor for sudden grants of tenant administrator pack permissions across multiple tenants originating from a single source IP.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose audit logging on SysTenantController endpoints, including request body, principal, and tenant context.
- Forward JeecgBoot application logs to a centralized analytics platform and build retention sufficient for historical hunts.
- Baseline normal tenant administration activity volume and alert on statistical deviations.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108657
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network exposure of the JeecgBoot management interface to trusted administrative networks until a fix is deployed.
- Audit all tenant administrator and tenant pack membership assignments created in versions up to 3.9.5 and revoke unauthorized grants.
- Rotate credentials for any accounts suspected to have exercised the passApply flow without authorization.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed version is listed in the NVD entry. Monitor the VulnCheck Security Advisory and the upstream JeecgBoot repository for a patched release. Apply the vendor update as soon as it becomes available and re-run tenant membership audits post-upgrade.
Workarounds
- Add a reverse-proxy or Web Application Firewall rule that blocks PUT /sys/tenant/passApply and POST /sys/tenant/doApplyTenantPackUser from non-administrative users.
- Introduce a custom Spring interceptor that enforces a role check on the passApply handler before controller logic executes.
- Disable the self-service tenant application workflow entirely if it is not required by the deployment.
# Example nginx rule to restrict access to the vulnerable endpoints
location ~* ^/sys/tenant/(passApply|doApplyTenantPackUser) {
allow 10.0.0.0/8; # trusted admin network
deny all;
proxy_pass http://jeecgboot_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

