Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-108637 Overview
CVE-2026-108637 is a missing authorization vulnerability in JeecgBoot through version 3.9.5. The flaw resides in the DELETE /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch endpoint exposed by SysUserController. Low-privileged authenticated users can call this endpoint with any groupId and comma-separated userIds, and the server removes matching rows from sys_ugroup_user without verifying tenant membership or role permissions. Attackers can strip administrators from groups, disrupt role assignments, and tamper with group-based access control. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated JeecgBoot user can remove arbitrary members from any user group, including administrator-maintained groups, breaking group-based permissions and tenant isolation.
Affected Products
- JeecgBoot low-code platform, all versions up through 3.9.5
- The jeecg-system-biz module containing SysUserController.deleteUserGroupBatch
- Deployments relying on sys_ugroup_user group membership for authorization decisions
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-10 - CVE-2026-108637 published to NVD
- 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-108637
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerable handler is defined in SysUserController.java around lines 851-866 and accepts groupId plus a comma-separated userIds string. The controller parses the input and deletes matching rows from sys_ugroup_user directly. No check confirms that the caller owns the target group, administers it, or shares the same tenant as the members being removed.
As a result, a user whose only privilege is a valid session token can remove any user from any group. In JeecgBoot deployments that rely on group membership for authorization, removing a member from an administrative or operational group effectively revokes their downstream permissions. The flaw is a classic broken access control pattern where request authentication is enforced but object-level authorization is absent.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing authorization check in the deleteUserGroupBatch controller method. The handler trusts client-supplied groupId and userIds values and issues the deletion without evaluating whether the authenticated principal has rights over the specified group or its tenant scope. The code enforces authentication at the framework level but omits per-object permission validation before performing the destructive database operation.
Attack Vector
Exploitation is remote and requires only low-privileged authenticated access. An attacker issues a single HTTP DELETE request to /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch with arbitrary groupId and comma-separated userIds parameters. A public proof-of-concept script is available at the JeecgBoot deleteUserGroupBatch PoC. The vulnerable controller source is referenced in the JeecgBoot SysUserController source.
No exploitation code is reproduced here. See the referenced advisory and PoC for technical specifics.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-108637
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP DELETE requests to /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch originating from non-administrator accounts.
- Unexpected deletions in the sys_ugroup_user table where the deleting principal is not the group owner or tenant administrator.
- Users unexpectedly losing group-based permissions or being removed from administrative groups.
- Requests to deleteUserGroupBatch referencing groupId values outside the caller's tenant scope.
Detection Strategies
- Enable JeecgBoot access logging and alert on any invocation of deleteUserGroupBatch by accounts without administrator roles.
- Audit the sys_ugroup_user table for row deletions correlated with recent DELETE /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch calls.
- Deploy a WAF rule or reverse proxy filter that blocks DELETE /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch for sessions not holding the admin role claim.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward JeecgBoot application and database audit logs to a central SIEM for correlation of group-membership changes.
- Baseline normal frequency of group-management API calls and alert on anomalous spikes.
- Review sys_user_group and sys_ugroup_user modifications daily until the application is patched.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108637
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch endpoint via WAF, reverse proxy, or API gateway rules until a patched build is deployed.
- Review all low-privileged accounts and revoke sessions that are not operationally required.
- Audit sys_ugroup_user for unauthorized deletions and restore removed memberships from backups where necessary.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no vendor-released fixed version is listed in the NVD entry. Monitor the JeecgBoot GitHub repository and the VulnCheck advisory for JeecgBoot for an official patch. Operators maintaining custom builds should add an authorization check in SysUserController.deleteUserGroupBatch that verifies the caller's role, group ownership, and tenant scope before invoking the deletion.
Workarounds
- Block DELETE requests to /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch at the reverse proxy for all sessions that do not carry an administrator role.
- Apply a server-side filter or interceptor that enforces tenant and role checks on group-management endpoints before controller logic runs.
- Temporarily disable self-service group management features for non-administrators where business processes allow.
# Example nginx rule to restrict the vulnerable endpoint by source IP
location = /sys/user/deleteUserGroupBatch {
if ($request_method = DELETE) {
allow 10.0.0.0/8; # admin management network
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://jeecgboot_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

