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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-108623

CVE-2026-108623: JeecgBoot Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-108623 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in JeecgBoot that allows authenticated users to delete system audit logs. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-108623 Overview

CVE-2026-108623 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in JeecgBoot through version 3.9.5. The flaw resides in the SysLogController.deleteBatch handler, which fails to verify administrative privileges before processing audit log deletion requests. Any authenticated user, regardless of role, can issue a DELETE request with the ids parameter set to allclear and wipe the entire sys_log table. The action erases audit trails for every user on the platform, destroying forensic evidence of prior activity. Attackers commonly abuse this type of flaw after initial access to obscure lateral movement, privilege escalation attempts, and data access events.

Critical Impact

A low-privileged authenticated user can erase the complete system audit log by sending a single DELETE request, eliminating forensic evidence across all tenants and users.

Affected Products

  • JeecgBoot low-code development platform versions up to and including 3.9.5
  • Deployments exposing the jeecg-module-system component with the SysLogController endpoint
  • Any downstream application built on the affected JeecgBoot release line

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-10 - CVE-2026-108623 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-108623

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability sits in the deleteBatch handler of SysLogController within the jeecg-module-system module. The handler accepts an ids request parameter and passes it to the service layer for row deletion. When ids equals the literal string allclear, the backend interprets this as an instruction to truncate the sys_log table instead of deleting a specific set of records. The method lacks an authorization check that would restrict audit log deletion to administrators, so any session-authenticated principal can trigger the branch. The result is complete loss of audit history, which affects incident response, regulatory compliance obligations, and multi-tenant isolation of log data.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing authorization enforcement [CWE-862] at the handler level. Authentication alone is treated as sufficient to invoke the destructive branch. The controller does not consult the role or permission model before executing the allclear operation, and no annotation-driven access control such as @PreAuthorize or equivalent permission check guards the method. Business logic combines routine batch deletion and global log purge behind the same parameter surface, which concentrates risk on a single unchecked input value.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only a valid low-privileged account on the target JeecgBoot instance. The attacker sends an HTTP DELETE request to the system log batch deletion endpoint with the parameter ids=allclear and a valid session token. The backend evaluates the sentinel value, bypasses per-record deletion logic, and purges the entire sys_log table. The attack succeeds over the network without user interaction. A public proof-of-concept script demonstrating the request flow is available in the GitHub PoC repository, and additional context is published in the VulnCheck advisory.

See the vulnerable handler in the SysLogController source on GitHub for the exact branch that processes the allclear sentinel.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-108623

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP DELETE requests to the system log endpoint (for example, /sys/log/deleteBatch) with the query parameter ids=allclear.
  • Sudden drop of the sys_log table row count to zero or near-zero outside of scheduled retention jobs.
  • Audit log deletion events originating from non-administrative user accounts or unexpected source IP addresses.

Detection Strategies

  • Alert on any invocation of SysLogController.deleteBatch where the authenticated principal lacks the administrator role.
  • Baseline normal sys_log deletion volume and flag deletions that remove more than a configured threshold of rows in a single transaction.
  • Correlate audit log purges with recent authentication, permission change, or data export events to surface anti-forensic activity.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward JeecgBoot application and web server logs to a centralized log store with write-once retention so purges on the application side do not destroy upstream copies.
  • Monitor database-level DELETE statements against sys_log and record the invoking application user for each operation.
  • Enable alerts on administrative endpoints returning HTTP 200 for principals outside administrator groups.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108623

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the JeecgBoot management endpoints, particularly /sys/log/*, to administrative networks until a patched version is deployed.
  • Audit existing user accounts and revoke sessions or credentials for low-privileged users that are not required.
  • Review database backups and verify that an uncompromised copy of the sys_log table exists for forensic reference.

Patch Information

No fixed version is identified in the published CVE record at the time of writing. Monitor the JeecgBoot GitHub repository and the VulnCheck advisory for an official fix, then upgrade beyond version 3.9.5 once released. Until a patch is available, apply the workarounds below.

Workarounds

  • Add an authorization check (for example, @PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN')")) to the deleteBatch handler in SysLogController and rebuild the module.
  • Reject requests to the handler when the ids parameter equals the sentinel value allclear at a reverse proxy or web application firewall, returning HTTP 403.
  • Remove or disable the mass-purge code path and require administrators to delete logs through a dedicated, separately authorized endpoint.
bash
# Example NGINX rule to block the allclear sentinel until patched
location /sys/log/deleteBatch {
    if ($request_method = DELETE) {
        if ($args ~* "(^|&)ids=allclear(&|$)") {
            return 403;
        }
    }
    proxy_pass http://jeecgboot_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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