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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-108553

CVE-2026-108553: OpenRefine CSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-108553 is a cross-site request forgery flaw in OpenRefine that enables remote attackers to execute Jython expressions and OS commands. This article covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-108553 Overview

CVE-2026-108553 is a cross-site request forgery vulnerability [CWE-352] in OpenRefine through version 3.10.1. The flaw resides in the get-rows command, which accepts a crafted engine parameter containing Jython facet expressions. Attackers can lure an authenticated OpenRefine user to a malicious web page that issues a cross-origin GET request. The server evaluates the attacker-supplied Jython code and executes operating system commands under the OpenRefine user context. The result is remote code execution triggered without direct network access to the target instance.

Critical Impact

A single victim visit to an attacker-controlled page can achieve remote code execution on the OpenRefine host, with full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Affected Products

  • OpenRefine versions through 3.10.1
  • OpenRefine deployments with the Jython extension enabled
  • Any workflow exposing OpenRefine to users who browse the web during active sessions

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-10 - CVE-2026-108553 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-108553

Vulnerability Analysis

OpenRefine exposes the get-rows endpoint to retrieve filtered rows from the current project. The endpoint accepts an engine JSON parameter that describes facets applied to the dataset. When a facet of type list includes an expression prefixed with jython:, the server routes evaluation to JythonEvaluable.java, which invokes the embedded Jython interpreter. The interpreter executes arbitrary Python code with access to standard library modules, including os and subprocess.

The GetRowsCommand handler accepts GET requests and does not require a CSRF token. Browsers automatically attach session cookies to cross-origin GET requests, so an attacker page hosted on a different origin can reach a local OpenRefine instance at http://127.0.0.1:3333 through the victim's browser. Review the VulnCheck CSRF to RCE Advisory and OpenRefine Issue #7999 for the full chain.

Root Cause

Two design issues combine to produce the vulnerability. First, state-changing or sensitive command endpoints lack CSRF protection and accept GET verbs. Second, user-controlled facet expressions are passed to a dynamic language evaluator without sandboxing. See GetRowsCommand.java, ListFacet.java, and JythonEvaluable.java.

Attack Vector

An attacker hosts a page that triggers a cross-origin GET to the victim's local OpenRefine listener. The request URL embeds an engine parameter whose facet expression contains Jython code calling os.system or equivalent. The victim's browser issues the request with any ambient session state, and OpenRefine executes the embedded Python payload as the service account. No prior credentials are required beyond the victim having an active OpenRefine project open. The vulnerability chain is described in prose above because no sanitized exploit code is published in the referenced advisory.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-108553

Indicators of Compromise

  • Inbound GET requests to /command/core/get-rows containing engine parameters with the string jython: in facet expressions
  • Child processes spawned by the OpenRefine Java process executing shell commands, interpreters, or network clients
  • Unexpected outbound connections from the OpenRefine host to attacker infrastructure shortly after a user session begins
  • HTTP Referer headers on get-rows requests pointing to third-party origins rather than the OpenRefine UI

Detection Strategies

  • Alert on cross-origin HTTP referers reaching OpenRefine endpoints when the server is bound to loopback or an internal address
  • Hunt for process-ancestry chains where java processes running OpenRefine spawn sh, cmd.exe, python, or powershell
  • Inspect web server or reverse proxy logs for engine query parameters containing URL-encoded jython strings or Python builtins such as __import__ or os.system

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Capture full URL query strings in access logs for all OpenRefine command endpoints and retain for threat hunting
  • Monitor file creation and modification in the OpenRefine working directory and user home directory for unexpected scripts or binaries
  • Baseline normal network egress from OpenRefine hosts and flag deviations consistent with reverse shells or data staging

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108553

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict OpenRefine network exposure to trusted hosts only and avoid running it alongside a general-purpose browser session
  • Terminate active OpenRefine sessions when not actively using the application to shrink the CSRF window
  • Disable or remove the Jython extension if facet scripting in Python is not required for current workflows
  • Place OpenRefine behind a reverse proxy that enforces Origin and Referer validation on all command endpoints

Patch Information

At the time of publication, the referenced OpenRefine Issue #7999 tracks remediation work. Monitor the OpenRefine GitHub Repository for a fixed release beyond 3.10.1 and apply it immediately upon publication. The expected fix pattern is enforcement of CSRF tokens on all command endpoints and rejection of cross-origin requests.

Workarounds

  • Bind OpenRefine to 127.0.0.1 and firewall off any non-loopback access until a patched release is installed
  • Front OpenRefine with a reverse proxy such as nginx that strips requests lacking a same-origin Referer header
  • Run OpenRefine as a dedicated low-privilege account with no shell, limiting the impact of code execution
  • Use a separate browser profile or dedicated workstation for OpenRefine sessions to prevent attacker pages from sharing the browser context
bash
# nginx snippet enforcing same-origin referer on OpenRefine commands
location /command/ {
    if ($http_referer !~* "^https?://openrefine\.internal/") {
        return 403;
    }
    proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3333;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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