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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-108265

CVE-2026-108265: Enclave OS Mini Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-108265 is an authentication bypass flaw in Enclave OS Mini affecting Intel SGX enclaves that allows attackers to relay genuine quotes onto unauthorized connections. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-108265 Overview

CVE-2026-108265 affects Enclave OS Mini, a Rust-based runtime for confidential applications running inside Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enclaves. The flaw resides in the Remote Attestation TLS (RA-TLS) challenge certificate path. Prior to wasm-v0.40.0, the SGX runtime placed only the certificate public-key hash and client nonce in the quote ReportData field, omitting any value bound to the active Transport Layer Security (TLS) session. An attacker possessing an enclave TLS private key could relay a genuine attestation quote onto a different connection. The relying party would then accept an attacker-terminated TLS session as if it were the attested enclave, defeating the confidentiality guarantees of SGX attestation.

Critical Impact

An attacker with access to an enclave TLS private key can impersonate a legitimate SGX enclave to any relying party, breaking the trust binding between attestation and the transport channel.

Affected Products

  • Enclave OS Mini (Privasys) versions prior to wasm-v0.40.0
  • SGX runtime components using the vulnerable RA-TLS challenge path
  • Downstream confidential applications depending on enclave-os-egress

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-09 - CVE-2026-108265 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-108265

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-346] Origin Validation Error. RA-TLS extends standard TLS by embedding an SGX quote inside an X.509 certificate extension. The quote's ReportData field is intended to cryptographically bind the attestation to the specific TLS endpoint presenting it. In the vulnerable implementation, ReportData contained only the certificate public-key hash concatenated with a client-supplied nonce. Neither value binds to session-specific TLS material such as the exporter secret or finished message. An adversary holding the enclave's TLS private key can therefore terminate a TLS connection on arbitrary infrastructure and replay a legitimate quote generated by the real enclave.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing channel binding between the attestation quote and the live TLS session. Because ReportData lacked a value derived from TLS session state, the relying party had no way to prove that the enclave producing the quote also terminated the TLS handshake it observed.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network reachability to the relying party and prior access to the enclave's TLS private key. The attacker obtains or exports a valid quote from the genuine enclave, presents the matching certificate on a controlled TLS endpoint, and completes the handshake. The relying party validates the SGX quote, matches the public-key hash, and accepts the attacker's endpoint as the attested enclave.

text
 enclave-os-common = { path = "../../common", features = ["crypto"] }
 
 # TLS (Privasys fork with RA-TLS 0xFFBB challenge extension)
-rustls = { git = "https://github.com/Privasys/rustls", tag = "privasys-v0.3.0", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "tls12", "std"] }
+rustls = { git = "https://github.com/Privasys/rustls", tag = "privasys-v0.7.0", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "tls12", "std"] }
 rustls-pemfile = "2"

Source: GitHub Commit 9f541c8. The patch upgrades the Privasys rustls fork to privasys-v0.7.0, which introduces systematic channel binding on the challenge path.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-108265

Indicators of Compromise

  • RA-TLS handshakes where the presented quote's ReportData matches a known-good enclave but originates from an unexpected network peer or ASN.
  • Reuse of the same enclave attestation quote across multiple distinct TLS sessions within a short window.
  • Enclave egress logs showing TLS private key export attempts or anomalous key material access.

Detection Strategies

  • Correlate attested enclave identity (MRENCLAVE, MRSIGNER) against TLS peer network metadata to flag mismatches.
  • Monitor for RA-TLS clients still negotiating with servers advertising the Privasys rustls privasys-v0.3.0 certificate extension profile after patch availability.
  • Hunt for ReportData values lacking a TLS exporter-derived component in captured handshakes.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose RA-TLS verification logging on relying parties and ship logs to a central analytics platform for anomaly detection.
  • Alert on duplicate SGX quotes observed from more than one source IP address.
  • Track dependency versions of enclave-os-egress and the Privasys rustls fork across build pipelines.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108265

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all deployments of Enclave OS Mini to wasm-v0.40.0 or later.
  • Rotate any enclave TLS private keys that may have been exposed to untrusted hosts or build systems.
  • Rebuild and redeploy enclave images using the patched privasys-v0.7.0 rustls fork.

Patch Information

The fix is published in the Enclave OS Mini wasm-v0.40.0 release and tracked in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-49qm-4pj3-w2c6. Design rationale is documented in the Privasys blog on binding attestation to the TLS session. The patch commit 9f541c8 enforces systematic channel binding by incorporating TLS session material into the ReportData field.

Workarounds

  • Restrict network access to relying parties so that only trusted enclave endpoints can initiate RA-TLS handshakes.
  • Enforce short-lived enclave TLS certificates and frequent rotation to reduce the exploitation window.
  • Require out-of-band verification of enclave peer network identity until the patched runtime is deployed.
bash
# Rebuild the enclave with the patched runtime
cmake -S "${SRC}" -B "${BUILD_DIR}" \
    -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
    "${FLAVOR_FLAGS[@]}" \
    ${EXTRA_CMAKE_FLAGS:-} \
    -DCMAKE_C_COMPILER=gcc \
    -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER=g++

Source: GitHub Commit 9f541c8.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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