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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-108109

CVE-2026-108109: PHPNuxBill Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-108109 is an authentication bypass flaw in PHPNuxBill that enables account takeover through OTP brute-forcing. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-108109 Overview

CVE-2026-108109 is an account takeover vulnerability in PHPNuxBill through version 2025.3.20. The flaw resides in the customer password reset flow implemented in system/controllers/forgot.php. Unauthenticated attackers can brute-force the 6-digit otp_code because the application lacks attempt limits and lockout controls. Once an attacker knows a valid customer username, they can iterate through the one-million possible codes and read the newly set password directly from the HTTP response. This grants full control of the targeted customer account. The weakness maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

Critical Impact

Any attacker who knows a customer username can hijack the account by brute-forcing the 6-digit reset code without lockout, then reading the new password from the HTTP response.

Affected Products

  • PHPNuxBill all releases through 2025.3.20
  • PHPNuxBill 2025.3.13 branch (confirmed via referenced source code)
  • Deployments of the PHPNuxBill project prior to the fix in commit c3c2a92

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-09 - CVE-2026-108109 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-09 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-108109

Vulnerability Analysis

PHPNuxBill is an open-source hotspot and PPPoE billing application. The customer password reset workflow accepts a username, generates a 6-digit one-time code, stores it on disk, and sends it to the customer by email or SMS. The verification step compares the user-supplied code against the stored value. The application does not record failed attempts, does not throttle submissions, and does not invalidate the code after repeated failures. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit up to one million guesses to reach the correct code with certainty. On success, the server responds with the account's newly generated password, giving the attacker both the credential and the account.

Root Cause

Two defects compound each other in system/controllers/forgot.php. First, the reset code is produced with mt_rand(100000, 999999), which is not a cryptographically secure random number generator. Second, the verification step performs no rate limiting and no attempt counting. The absence of a lockout budget is the primary condition that enables remote brute force.

Attack Vector

The attack requires network access to the PHPNuxBill customer portal and a known customer username. The attacker triggers a password reset for the target, then iterates POST requests to the OTP verification endpoint with sequential or randomized 6-digit values until the server returns a success response containing the new password. No authentication or user interaction is required.

php
                if ($via == 'email') {
                    $via = 'sms';
                }
-                $otp = mt_rand(100000, 999999);
-                file_put_contents($otpPath, $otp);
+                $otp = random_int(100000, 999999);
+                // Store the code together with a remaining-attempts budget so the
+                // verification step (step 2) can enforce a lockout. Format: "<otp>|<attempts_left>".
+                file_put_contents($otpPath, $otp . '|5');
                if ($via == 'sms') {
                    Message::sendSMS($user['phonenumber'], $config['CompanyName'] . " C0de: $otp");
                } else {

Source: GitHub commit c3c2a92. The patch replaces mt_rand with random_int and persists a remaining-attempts budget alongside the code so the verification step can enforce a lockout.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-108109

Indicators of Compromise

  • High volume of POST requests to the PHPNuxBill forgot-password verification endpoint from a single source IP within a short window.
  • Repeated password reset initiation events for the same username, followed by hundreds or thousands of OTP submission attempts.
  • Successful password reset events immediately followed by logins from a new IP, user-agent, or geolocation.
  • Presence of otp files under the PHPNuxBill writable storage path that are repeatedly read without a matching legitimate user session.

Detection Strategies

  • Alert on more than five failed OTP verifications per account per hour against the forgot-password endpoint.
  • Correlate password reset initiation, OTP submission bursts, and subsequent customer login from a different source IP.
  • Review web server access logs for POST /forgot or equivalent routes with uniform payload sizes and sequential codes.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the PHPNuxBill web tier and forward it to a centralized log platform for retention and analysis.
  • Monitor outbound SMS and email volumes for unexpected spikes in password reset deliveries.
  • Baseline normal customer password reset frequency and alert on statistical anomalies.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-108109

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade PHPNuxBill to a release that includes commit c3c2a92 or later.
  • Audit customer accounts for unexpected password changes or logins since the first vulnerable deployment date.
  • Force a password reset for all customer accounts if compromise cannot be ruled out.
  • Restrict access to the customer portal to known IP ranges where business requirements allow.

Patch Information

The fix is published in GitHub commit c3c2a92 and tracked in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-337r-rrrc-r559. The patch replaces mt_rand with random_int for OTP generation and stores a remaining-attempts counter in the format <otp>|<attempts_left> to enforce lockout at verification time. Additional context is available in the VulnCheck advisory.

Workarounds

  • Place the PHPNuxBill portal behind a web application firewall (WAF) and apply a rate limit to the forgot-password verification endpoint.
  • Block source IPs that exceed a small threshold of failed OTP submissions per account.
  • Temporarily disable the self-service password reset feature and require administrator-initiated resets until the patch is applied.
bash
# Example NGINX rate limit for the password reset verification endpoint
http {
    limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=pwreset:10m rate=5r/m;

    server {
        location /forgot {
            limit_req zone=pwreset burst=5 nodelay;
            proxy_pass http://phpnuxbill_backend;
        }
    }
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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