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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-107856

CVE-2026-107856: CiviForm Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-107856 is an information disclosure flaw in CiviForm that allows authenticated Trusted Intermediaries to access citizen names and email addresses outside their assigned group. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-107856 Overview

CiviForm is an open-source platform that simplifies applications for government benefits programs by reusing applicant data across multiple benefit applications. CVE-2026-107856 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability [CWE-639] in versions prior to 3.33.0. The GET /admin/tiDash/editClientForm/:accountId endpoint confirms that the requester holds the Trusted Intermediary (TI) role but fails to verify that the targeted citizen account belongs to the requester's trustedIntermediaryGroup. An authenticated Trusted Intermediary can enumerate accountId values and read applicant display names, including citizen names and email addresses, for accounts outside their group. The issue is fixed in version 3.33.0.

Critical Impact

Any authenticated Trusted Intermediary can enumerate account identifiers to disclose citizen names and email addresses belonging to applicants outside their assigned intermediary group.

Affected Products

  • CiviForm versions prior to 3.33.0
  • CiviForm TrustedIntermediaryController component
  • Government benefits deployments relying on TI group-scoped access

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-09 - CVE-2026-107856 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-107856

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in the showEditClientForm handler of TrustedIntermediaryController.java. The controller enforces that the requesting user holds the Trusted Intermediary role but then performs a raw lookupAccount(accountId) using the untrusted path parameter. The lookup returns any account in the system, regardless of whether that account is linked to the requester's trustedIntermediaryGroup.

Trusted Intermediaries are privileged users who legitimately file applications on behalf of citizens within their assigned group. The missing scope check converts that privilege into a cross-group data read. An attacker-controlled TI can iterate sequential or guessed accountId values and harvest the applicant display name, which contains the citizen's full name and email address.

The disclosure is limited to display metadata rather than full application contents, but it still exposes personally identifiable information (PII) across tenancy boundaries intended to isolate benefit programs and intermediary organizations.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check between the authenticated principal and the requested object [CWE-639]. The controller conflates role authentication (is this user a TI?) with object-level authorization (does this user own this record?).

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an authenticated Trusted Intermediary account and user interaction with the admin dashboard route. The attacker issues HTTP GET requests to /admin/tiDash/editClientForm/:accountId, incrementing or fuzzing the accountId parameter and parsing the returned display name and email from the rendered edit form.

java
// Patch excerpt from TrustedIntermediaryController.java
 package controllers.ti;
 
+import static play.mvc.Results.forbidden;
 import static play.mvc.Results.notFound;
 import static play.mvc.Results.ok;
 import static play.mvc.Results.redirect;

Source: GitHub Commit ccfd84f

The patch introduces the forbidden result so that showEditClientForm can reject requests when the resolved account does not belong to the requester's trustedIntermediaryGroup.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-107856

Indicators of Compromise

  • Sequential or high-volume GET requests to /admin/tiDash/editClientForm/ with varying accountId path segments from a single TI session.
  • Requests to editClientForm returning HTTP 200 for accountId values that do not map to the requester's historical client set.
  • Spikes in lookupAccount calls originating from TrustedIntermediaryController logs.

Detection Strategies

  • Baseline the typical number of distinct accountId values a TI accesses per session and alert on deviations.
  • Correlate HTTP access logs with the application's trustedIntermediaryGroup membership to flag cross-group reads.
  • Review authentication and application audit logs for TI accounts that iterate client identifiers in short time windows.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward CiviForm application and reverse-proxy logs to a central analytics platform for query-based hunting.
  • Alert on 4xx-to-2xx ratio changes on the editClientForm route, which can indicate successful enumeration.
  • Monitor TI accounts for abnormal working hours or geographic access patterns alongside enumeration behavior.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-107856

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade CiviForm to version 3.33.0 or later, which adds group-scope enforcement to showEditClientForm.
  • Audit application logs for prior enumeration of /admin/tiDash/editClientForm/:accountId by TI accounts.
  • Rotate or review TI accounts that show anomalous access patterns and notify affected citizens if PII exposure is confirmed.

Patch Information

The fix is included in the CiviForm v3.33.0 release and implemented via Pull Request #13635 and commit ccfd84f. Additional details are available in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-qv7c-9hjr-9rv7.

Workarounds

  • Restrict access to the /admin/tiDash/ routes at the reverse proxy layer to known TI source networks until the upgrade is applied.
  • Temporarily disable or reduce the number of active Trusted Intermediary accounts to minimize the enumeration surface.
  • Enable verbose request logging on the admin dashboard so cross-group access attempts can be reconstructed post-upgrade.
bash
# Example nginx restriction for /admin/tiDash/ endpoints
location /admin/tiDash/ {
    allow 10.0.0.0/24;      # trusted intermediary network
    deny  all;
    proxy_pass http://civiform_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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