Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-107569 Overview
CVE-2026-107569 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.0.0 through 6.3.6. The flaw lets a remote unauthenticated attacker stop mail delivery by abusing the X-hMailServer-LoopCount header that bounds generated-mail cycles. The server reads this header with a signed conversion and no validation, so a negative value bypasses the configured rule loop limit. A single crafted message can then loop up to roughly two billion times, each hop queuing another message and delivery, exhausting disk and queue capacity. The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-606: Unchecked Input for Loop Condition.
Critical Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can halt mail service by sending a single message that triggers an auto-reply, forward, or Sieve notify cycle with a manipulated loop counter.
Affected Products
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 (Windows builds)
- Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 (Linux builds)
- hMailServer 6.2.22 and later deployments using the Sieve notify action or editheader extension
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-107569 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
- hMailServer v6.3.7 - Vendor releases fixed version via GitLab hMailServer Release v6.3.7
Technical Details for CVE-2026-107569
Vulnerability Analysis
hMailServer bounds mail it auto-generates (rule forwards, replies, copies, account forwards, Sieve redirect, vacation, notify, bounces, out-of-office replies) using a counter stored in the X-hMailServer-LoopCount header. Once the counter reaches the configured rule loop limit (default 5), the server stops generating new mail in that chain. This mechanism exists to terminate forwarding or auto-reply cycles in a bounded number of hops.
The header is treated as an ordinary header and is not stripped from inbound mail. The server parses the counter using a signed integer conversion with no range validation. A value below zero therefore passes every comparison against the positive limit. An attacker who sets X-hMailServer-LoopCount to a negative value, or on Linux builds to a value above the 32-bit signed range that wraps negative, effectively lifts the bound. A message entering a generated-mail cycle then loops up to roughly two billion iterations, with each hop producing a queued message and delivery attempt.
Root Cause
The root cause is unchecked input used in a loop termination condition [CWE-606]. The parser accepts untrusted header input without validating sign or range before comparing it to the loop limit. Additional defects compound the issue: the Sieve notify action (introduced in 6.2.22) consults no limit at all and its increment can overflow a signed integer, and an account can reset the counter on its own mail using a Sieve editheader (from 6.2.22) or a rule Set-header-value action (all versions) before a forward or redirect.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires no authentication and no user interaction. The attacker sends a single SMTP message to an address that triggers any generated-mail path (forwarding rule, vacation auto-reply, Sieve redirect, bounce, or notify). The message carries a crafted X-hMailServer-LoopCount header with a negative integer value, or on Linux a value that wraps to negative after signed conversion. The server then enters an unbounded generation loop that fills the mail queue, consumes disk space, and stops mail service for all users.
See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #81 for technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-107569
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound SMTP messages containing an X-hMailServer-LoopCount header with a negative value or a value exceeding 2147483647.
- Rapid growth of the hMailServer outbound queue and sudden disk-space exhaustion on the mail spool volume.
- Repeated generated messages (forwards, auto-replies, bounces, Sieve notifications) tied to a single originating message ID.
- hMailServer error or warning entries indicating queue saturation or delivery backlog.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect SMTP ingress at the MTA or mail security gateway for the presence of a client-supplied X-hMailServer-LoopCount header and flag any non-standard value.
- Baseline normal generated-mail volume per account and alert on sudden multiplication of outbound messages from a single trigger.
- Monitor hMailServer logs for repeated loop counts advancing beyond the configured rule loop limit (default 5).
Monitoring Recommendations
- Track mail queue depth, delivery rate, and spool disk utilization with alerting thresholds tied to normal operating ranges.
- Correlate inbound message headers with outbound queue growth to identify loop-triggering senders.
- Review Sieve script changes that invoke editheader on X-hMailServer-LoopCount or that use the notify action without rate limits.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-107569
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.7 or later as published in the GitLab hMailServer Release v6.3.7.
- Configure the inbound MTA or mail gateway to strip the X-hMailServer-LoopCount header from all externally received mail.
- Audit Sieve scripts for use of editheader on hMailServer loop-tracking headers and for unrestricted notify actions.
- Review account forwarding rules and vacation responders to confirm no third-party resets the counter via Set-header-value.
Patch Information
The vendor fixed the issue in hMailServer 6.3.7. The release addresses the signed-conversion parsing of X-hMailServer-LoopCount, enforces a limit on the Sieve notify action, and prevents resetting the counter through editheader or rule-based header overrides. Release notes and the tracking issue are available at GitLab hMailServer Release v6.3.7 and GitLab hMailServer Work Item #81.
Workarounds
- Strip or rewrite the X-hMailServer-LoopCount header on all inbound SMTP traffic at a perimeter MTA.
- Disable automatic forwarding, vacation responders, and Sieve notify actions on externally reachable accounts until patched.
- Apply tight quotas on outbound queue size and per-account generated-mail rate to contain the blast radius if a loop is triggered.
# Example Postfix header_checks rule to strip the loop counter from inbound mail
# /etc/postfix/header_checks
/^X-hMailServer-LoopCount:/ IGNORE
# Enable in main.cf and reload
# header_checks = regexp:/etc/postfix/header_checks
# postmap /etc/postfix/header_checks && systemctl reload postfix
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

