Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-107193 Overview
A flaw in the foreman package allows a low-privileged authenticated user to delete permission filters belonging to roles they are not authorized to manage. The API loads a filter by its identifier without enforcing the search limit tied to the caller's permissions. An attacker who holds the ability to delete filters for a single role can therefore delete filters assigned to any other unlocked role. When those filters are removed, the affected roles lose the access those filters previously granted, degrading integrity of the authorization model.
Critical Impact
Authenticated low-privileged users can remove permission filters from unrelated roles, stripping access rights from users assigned to those roles and disrupting authorization boundaries.
Affected Products
- Foreman (foreman package) — see Red Hat CVE-2026-107193 Advisory for affected versions
- Red Hat distributions bundling the affected foreman package
- Downstream products embedding Foreman permission filter logic
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-12 - CVE-2026-107193 published to NVD
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-107193
Vulnerability Analysis
Foreman implements role-based access control through permission filters attached to roles. Each filter grants or restricts a set of actions on specific resources. The API endpoint that handles filter deletion resolves the target filter directly by its identifier. It does not re-apply the caller's search scope that limits which filters the user is actually permitted to modify.
The weakness is classified as [CWE-639] Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, commonly known as an Insecure Direct Object Reference. A user whose role permits deleting filters within one role can submit the identifier of a filter attached to a different, unlocked role. The API accepts the request and removes the filter.
The downstream effect is loss of integrity in the authorization model. Users assigned to the targeted role immediately lose the privileges granted by the deleted filter. Repeated abuse can disable access across multiple roles without the attacker ever gaining direct administrative control.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing object-level authorization. The delete handler trusts the filter identifier supplied by the client and omits a check that the filter falls within the roles the caller is scoped to manage. Locked roles are excluded from the behavior, but all unlocked roles are reachable.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Foreman API and valid credentials for an account that is permitted to delete filters on at least one role. The attacker enumerates or guesses filter identifiers assigned to other unlocked roles and issues a delete request against each one. No user interaction is required and the attack complexity is low.
No verified public exploit code is available. See the Red Hat Bug Report #2547437 for additional technical context.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-107193
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected DELETE /api/permissions/:id or filter-deletion API calls originating from non-administrative accounts.
- Audit log entries showing filter removals from roles the acting user does not administer.
- Users suddenly losing permissions tied to a role whose filter set was recently modified.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate Foreman audit logs with user role assignments to flag filter deletions performed outside the actor's managed role scope.
- Baseline normal filter-management activity per account and alert on deviations in deletion volume or target roles.
- Monitor API gateway logs for sequential filter-ID enumeration patterns against the filters endpoint.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable and ship Foreman audit logs to a centralized SIEM for retention and correlation.
- Alert on any filter deletion affecting roles classified as privileged or production-critical.
- Track role effective permissions over time and alert on sudden permission reductions.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-107193
Immediate Actions Required
- Review and restrict the delete_filters and related role-management permissions to trusted administrators only.
- Lock sensitive roles so their filters cannot be modified through this code path.
- Audit recent filter deletions and restore any filters removed by accounts outside the authorized administrator set.
Patch Information
Consult the Red Hat CVE-2026-107193 Advisory for fixed package versions and apply vendor-supplied updates for the foreman package as they become available. Track status in Red Hat Bug Report #2547437.
Workarounds
- Lock all roles that do not require ongoing filter modifications to block deletion through this path.
- Remove delete_filters from any role that does not strictly require filter management.
- Place the Foreman API behind access controls that restrict filter-management endpoints to administrative networks.
# Review which roles currently hold filter-modification permissions in Foreman
hammer role list
hammer filter list --role <role-name>
# Lock a role to prevent its filters from being modified through the vulnerable path
hammer role update --name <role-name> --locked true
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

