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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-106441

CVE-2026-106441: Hydra Framework RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-106441 is a remote code execution flaw in Hydra framework that allows attackers to invoke arbitrary classes through logging configuration. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-106441 Overview

CVE-2026-106441 is a code injection vulnerability [CWE-94] in Hydra, a Python framework for configuring complex applications. Prior to versions 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev9, Hydra passed logging configuration directly to Python's logging.config.dictConfig() without applying its target authorization policy. An attacker who controls the Hydra logging configuration can specify an importable class or factory and cause it to be invoked with the privileges of the running application. The flaw bypasses the instantiate() protection because the logging code path never calls instantiate().

Critical Impact

Attackers controlling Hydra logging configuration can achieve arbitrary code execution by referencing attacker-chosen classes or factories, even in versions where instantiate() is already restricted.

Affected Products

  • Hydra versions prior to 1.3.6
  • Hydra 1.4.0 pre-release versions prior to 1.4.0.dev9
  • Applications that load Hydra logging configuration from untrusted sources

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE-2026-106441 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-106441

Vulnerability Analysis

Hydra enforces a target authorization policy (target_whitelist) to restrict which classes instantiate() can import and invoke. The logging subsystem bypassed this control. When Hydra loaded hydra.hydra_logging configuration, it forwarded the dictionary to logging.config.dictConfig() unchanged. Python's logging configuration schema accepts arbitrary importable callables through handler class values and () factory keys on formatters, filters, handlers, queues, and listeners. Each of those keys is resolved and called by the standard library during logging setup, giving an attacker a direct path to execute code of their choice within the application process.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing enforcement of Hydra's target policy on logging configuration import paths. The patched code in hydra/core/utils.py replaces the direct logging.config.dictConfig(conf) call with a new configure_logging(conf) wrapper. The wrapper lives in hydra/_internal/logging_config.py and consults hydra/_internal/target_policy.py to validate every importable target referenced by the logging dictionary before invocation.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access and user interaction to launch an application whose Hydra configuration an attacker can influence, for example through a malicious config file, overlay, or command-line override. Once the application boots and configures logging, any class named in the logging dictionary is imported and called. The attacker chooses a class whose constructor executes the desired payload.

python
# Patch excerpt: hydra/core/utils.py
            log_config, resolve=True
         )
         if conf["root"] is not None:
-            logging.config.dictConfig(conf)
+            # Imported lazily because target policy resolution imports core.utils.
+            from hydra._internal.logging_config import configure_logging
+
+            configure_logging(conf)
     else:
         # default logging to stdout
         root = logging.getLogger()

Source: GitHub Commit ff3e4db

python
# Patch excerpt: hydra/_internal/core_plugins/basic_launcher.py
         assert self.config is not None
         assert self.task_function is not None
 
-        configure_log(self.config.hydra.hydra_logging, self.config.hydra.verbose)
+        configure_log(
+            self.config.hydra.hydra_logging,
+            self.config.hydra.verbose,
+            target_whitelist=self.hydra_context.target_whitelist,
+        )
         sweep_dir = self.config.hydra.sweep.dir
         Path(str(sweep_dir)).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         log.info(f"Launching {len(job_overrides)} jobs locally")

Source: GitHub Commit 76bfc30

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-106441

Indicators of Compromise

  • Hydra logging configuration containing a class or () key that references modules outside the application's expected import tree.
  • Unexpected child processes or network connections initiated during application startup, before the first task function runs.
  • Logging handler, filter, or queue factory references pointing to generic callables such as os.system, subprocess.Popen, or builtins.exec.

Detection Strategies

  • Statically scan YAML and dictionary configurations under hydra.hydra_logging for class, (), handlers, filters, queue, and listener keys that resolve outside an approved allowlist.
  • Audit application startup logs for configure_log invocations that precede target policy enforcement in versions prior to 1.3.6.
  • Compare resolved logging configuration against the target_whitelist enforced by hydra/_internal/target_policy.py after upgrading.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Instrument Python application starts to record all imports performed during logging.config.dictConfig() resolution.
  • Alert on Hydra-driven processes that spawn shells, interpreters, or outbound network traffic during initialization.
  • Track configuration file provenance; flag Hydra configs loaded from writable or user-controlled paths.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106441

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Hydra to version 1.3.6 or 1.4.0.dev9 or later across all environments that run Hydra-based applications.
  • Inventory all sources of Hydra configuration, including defaults, overlays, and command-line overrides, and restrict write access to trusted users.
  • Review existing hydra_logging sections for any class or factory references and remove unknown entries before upgrading.

Patch Information

The fix is distributed in Hydra 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev9. The patches route logging configuration through a new configure_logging function that enforces Hydra's target_whitelist on handler classes and on formatter, filter, handler, queue, and listener factories. See GitHub Pull Request #3420 and GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-c3wx-c55w-pxjq for full details.

Workarounds

  • Treat Hydra configuration as code and load it only from read-only, trusted locations until the patched version is deployed.
  • Disable or remove the hydra.hydra_logging section where custom logging is not required, allowing Hydra to fall back to default stdout logging.
  • Run Hydra applications under least-privilege service accounts to limit the blast radius of any class invoked through logging configuration.
bash
# Upgrade Hydra to a patched release
pip install --upgrade "hydra-core>=1.3.6"

# Or install the 1.4 pre-release line
pip install --upgrade --pre "hydra-core>=1.4.0.dev9"

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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