Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-106103 Overview
CVE-2026-106103 is a path traversal vulnerability [CWE-22] in the Quasar Framework's @quasar/icongenie package. Versions prior to 6.1.1 fail to constrain file paths supplied through user profile objects. The icongenie generate --profile command accepts folder and name values that are joined with the application directory without validation. An attacker who convinces a developer to run a crafted profile can write or overwrite files anywhere the user has write access.
Critical Impact
A malicious profile can overwrite shell startup files, build scripts, or executable configuration on the developer's workstation, leading to local code execution within the developer's context.
Affected Products
- @quasar/icongenie versions prior to 6.1.1
- Quasar Framework projects using the icongenie asset generator
- Developer workstations executing untrusted profile files
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-06 - CVE-2026-106103 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
- Fix released - @quasar/icongenie v6.1.1 published with path containment checks
Technical Details for CVE-2026-106103
Vulnerability Analysis
The icongenie tool generates application icons and splash screens for Quasar projects. The generate --profile subcommand reads a JSON profile that specifies asset folder and name fields. Prior to version 6.1.1, icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js used path.join(appDir, folder, name) to build the output path. The companion validator icongenie/lib/utils/validate-profile-object.js only enforced that these fields were non-empty strings. No check confirmed the resolved path remained inside the Quasar project directory.
Because path.join resolves .. segments, a profile containing values such as folder: "../../" and name: ".bashrc" resolves outside appDir. The tool then writes generated image bytes to that location, overwriting arbitrary user-writable files.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing containment validation on user-controlled path components. The validator checked type and length but did not call path.relative or verify the resolved path against the project root before writing.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local execution with user interaction. An attacker distributes a crafted icongenie profile through a repository, template, gist, or supply-chain channel. When a developer runs icongenie generate --profile <malicious.json>, the tool writes attacker-chosen bytes to attacker-chosen paths. Overwriting ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, npm lifecycle scripts, or CI runner configuration yields code execution the next time those files are sourced.
// Patch from icongenie/lib/utils/get-assets-files.js
-import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { existsSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path'
import { appDir } from './app-paths.js'
+import { fatal } from './logger.js'
const tagRegex = /\{(.*?)\}/g
+const realAppDir = realpathSync(appDir)
+
+function isOutside(base, target) {
+ const path = relative(base, target)
+ return path === '..' || path.startsWith(`..${sep}`) || isAbsolute(path)
+}
+
+function getAssetPath(folder, name) {
+ const absoluteName = resolve(appDir, folder, name)
+ const relativeName = relative(appDir, absoluteName)
+
+ if (relativeName === '' || isOutside(appDir, absoluteName)) {
+ fatal(
+ `Profile asset must be inside the project folder: "${folder}/${name}"`
+ )
+ }
Source: GitHub Commit 87c89a8
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-106103
Indicators of Compromise
- Profile JSON files containing folder or name values with .., absolute paths, or path separators pointing outside the project
- Unexpected modifications to shell startup files such as .bashrc, .zshrc, .profile, or .npmrc shortly after an icongenie generate run
- Image-format bytes (PNG, SVG headers) appearing inside executable or configuration files
- Installed @quasar/icongenie versions below 6.1.1 in package.json or package-lock.json
Detection Strategies
- Scan repositories and developer machines for @quasar/icongenie versions earlier than 6.1.1 using software composition analysis tools
- Parse icongenie profile files in source control and flag any folder or name field containing .., /, \, or absolute path prefixes
- Monitor file integrity on common developer dotfiles and shell initialization scripts
Monitoring Recommendations
- Audit CI/CD pipelines that invoke icongenie generate --profile with externally sourced profiles
- Enable endpoint telemetry on write events to home directory configuration files initiated by Node.js processes
- Review developer workstation process trees for node invocations writing outside the current project directory
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106103
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade @quasar/icongenie to version 6.1.1 or later in all projects and lockfiles
- Audit any icongenie profile files sourced from third parties, templates, or forks before executing them
- Rotate credentials and inspect dotfiles on any developer machine that ran untrusted profiles with vulnerable versions
Patch Information
The fix is published in @quasar/icongenie v6.1.1. The patch introduces getAssetPath with path.relative and isAbsolute checks that reject any resolved path outside appDir. See GHSA-wmpw-j6qv-mw88 for the full advisory.
Workarounds
- Avoid running icongenie generate --profile with profiles from untrusted sources until the upgrade is applied
- Execute icongenie inside a container or sandbox with no write access to home directory or system paths
- Manually validate profile folder and name fields to confirm they contain no .. segments or absolute paths
# Upgrade to the patched version
npm install --save-dev @quasar/icongenie@^6.1.1
# Verify installed version
npm ls @quasar/icongenie
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

