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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-106037

CVE-2026-106037: Mooncake Store REST Service Auth Bypass

CVE-2026-106037 is an authentication bypass flaw in Mooncake Store REST service that allows unauthenticated attackers to access cached data, inject or delete objects, and mount segments. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-106037 Overview

CVE-2026-106037 is a missing authentication vulnerability [CWE-306] in Mooncake, an open-source key-value (KV) cache store used in large language model (LLM) inference pipelines. Versions up to and including 0.3.13.post1 expose the Store REST service on 0.0.0.0 without any authentication on any route. Unauthenticated remote attackers can invoke sensitive endpoints such as /api/get, /api/put, /api/remove_all, and /api/mount. These calls allow reading cached KV data containing user prompts, injecting or deleting cached objects, and mounting attacker-controlled memory segments.

Critical Impact

Any network-reachable attacker can read cached LLM prompts, tamper with cached objects, and mount attacker-described segments against the Mooncake Store service.

Affected Products

  • Mooncake KV cache store, all releases up to and including 0.3.13.post1
  • Deployments exposing the mooncake_store_service REST interface on reachable network interfaces
  • LLM inference stacks relying on Mooncake for distributed KV caching

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE CVE-2026-106037 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-106037

Vulnerability Analysis

Mooncake ships a Python-based Store REST service (mooncake_store_service.py) that binds to 0.0.0.0 by default. The service registers routes such as /api/get, /api/put, /api/remove_all, and /api/mount without authentication, authorization, or transport-level protection. As a result, any client that can reach the listening port can issue arbitrary cache operations.

Because Mooncake stores KV cache fragments containing LLM user prompts and model state, read access directly exposes sensitive prompt data. Write and delete access lets attackers poison inference results or wipe cached state and degrade service. The /api/mount route accepts attacker-described memory segments, extending the impact beyond simple data access into memory-layout manipulation of the running service.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authentication control on an administrative data-plane API. The service treats network reachability as sufficient authority to perform cache operations, which maps directly to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function). No API key, mutual TLS, or network ACL is enforced in the default configuration.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only network access to the Store service port. An attacker sends standard HTTP requests to the exposed REST routes:

  • GET /api/get to retrieve cached KV entries, including fragments of user prompts.
  • POST /api/put to inject attacker-controlled objects into the cache.
  • POST /api/remove_all to delete cached objects and disrupt inference.
  • POST /api/mount to register attacker-described segments with the service.

Full exploitation details and vulnerable route definitions are documented in the VulnCheck Mooncake Security Advisory and the Mooncake source reference.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-106037

Indicators of Compromise

  • Inbound HTTP requests to /api/get, /api/put, /api/remove_all, or /api/mount from unexpected source addresses.
  • Mooncake Store processes bound to 0.0.0.0 on externally reachable interfaces instead of a loopback or private management interface.
  • Unexplained cache misses, deletions, or sudden drops in cache hit rate on Mooncake-backed inference nodes.
  • New or unexpected mounted segments reported by the Mooncake Store service.

Detection Strategies

  • Inventory Mooncake deployments and identify any installations at or below version 0.3.13.post1.
  • Scan internal networks for listeners matching the Mooncake Store REST port and verify bind address.
  • Enable access logging on the Store service and alert on calls to write and administrative routes from non-approved clients.
  • Correlate LLM inference anomalies (unexpected outputs, cache poisoning signals) with Mooncake API activity in a central data lake.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Mooncake Store access logs and host network telemetry to a central SIEM for continuous review.
  • Baseline normal /api/* call patterns per source host and alert on deviations, especially write and mount operations.
  • Monitor host-level listening sockets to detect regression to a 0.0.0.0 bind after remediation.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-106037

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network reachability of the Mooncake Store REST port to trusted inference-plane hosts using host firewalls, security groups, or network policies.
  • Rebind the service to a loopback or private management interface instead of 0.0.0.0 where deployment allows.
  • Rotate or invalidate any user prompt data and cached secrets that may have been exposed through /api/get.
  • Audit recent Mooncake access logs for unauthorized /api/put, /api/remove_all, and /api/mount activity.

Patch Information

At publication, the advisory covers Mooncake versions up to and including 0.3.13.post1. Monitor the GitHub Mooncake Repository and tracking discussion in Mooncake Issue #4476 for an authenticated release and upgrade when a fixed version is published.

Workarounds

  • Place Mooncake Store behind an authenticating reverse proxy that enforces mutual TLS or API-key validation on every route.
  • Apply strict network segmentation so only inference workers can reach the Store service port.
  • Disable or block the /api/mount and /api/remove_all routes at the proxy layer if they are not required by the deployment.
  • Treat Mooncake nodes as sensitive data stores and apply the same access controls used for other prompt and model-state repositories.
bash
# Example: restrict Mooncake Store to loopback and allowlist inference workers
# 1) Bind the service to localhost instead of 0.0.0.0 (adjust to your launcher)
export MOONCAKE_STORE_HOST=127.0.0.1

# 2) Block external access to the Store port at the host firewall (example port 8080)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8080 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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