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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105964

CVE-2026-105964: Gitea Actions Artifact DoS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-105964 is a denial of service vulnerability in Gitea Actions artifact v4 handlers that allows attackers to exhaust server memory by sending oversized requests. This article covers the technical details, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105964 Overview

CVE-2026-105964 is a memory exhaustion vulnerability in the Gitea Actions artifact v4 (Twirp) handlers. The handlers read the entire HTTP request body into memory without enforcing a size limit [CWE-770]. An authenticated user who can run a workflow and obtain the runner token for that run can send an oversized request to the artifact service. The oversized request exhausts server memory and terminates the Gitea process, resulting in denial of service. The fix caps the artifact request body at 1 MiB. The issue is tracked under GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6f9g-7jgm-m5ph and resolved in Gitea v28.2.0.

Critical Impact

An attacker with a valid runner token can crash the Gitea server through a single oversized artifact upload, interrupting all repository, CI, and API operations.

Affected Products

  • Gitea Actions artifact v4 (Twirp) handlers
  • Gitea versions prior to v28.2.0
  • Self-hosted Gitea instances with Actions enabled

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-105964 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105964

Vulnerability Analysis

Gitea Actions provides a CI/CD runner system compatible with GitHub Actions. The artifact v4 API uses the Twirp RPC framework to accept uploads from runners during workflow execution. The vulnerable handlers call a body-reading routine that buffers the full request payload into memory before validating or processing it. No MaxBytesReader or equivalent streaming limit guards the read path.

The practical consequence is that a workflow participant can allocate arbitrary amounts of server memory with a single request. When the process exceeds available RAM, the Go runtime aborts and the Gitea daemon terminates. The outage affects not only Actions, but the Git server, web UI, and REST API hosted by the same process.

The fix in pull requests #39818 and #39822 introduces a 1 MiB cap on artifact request bodies, aligning the Twirp handlers with the size constraints already applied to other Gitea endpoints.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing enforcement of resource limits on an untrusted input stream [CWE-770]. The artifact v4 Twirp handlers trusted that runner clients would send well-formed, reasonably sized payloads. No upper bound on body length was declared at the HTTP layer or inside the Twirp dispatch logic. Because Go slices grow dynamically to accommodate the read, memory consumption scaled linearly with attacker-controlled request size.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Gitea instance and permission to execute a workflow in any repository hosted on it. An attacker extracts the per-run runner token issued to that workflow and sends an oversized POST request to one of the artifact v4 Twirp endpoints. The server attempts to buffer the body, exhausts memory, and the Gitea process is killed by the operating system or the Go runtime. The attack does not require any special privileges beyond workflow execution and does not grant code execution or data disclosure.

No verified proof-of-concept code is published. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6f9g-7jgm-m5ph for the vendor description.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105964

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected termination or OOM-kill events for the gitea process in system logs (dmesg, journalctl).
  • Spikes in resident memory usage immediately preceding a crash, correlated with inbound traffic to artifact v4 Twirp routes.
  • HTTP requests to /twirp/github.actions.results.api.v1.ArtifactService/* endpoints with Content-Length values far above typical artifact upload sizes.

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor reverse proxy or ingress logs for requests to the Actions artifact service with abnormally large Content-Length headers originating from runner IPs.
  • Alert on repeated gitea process restarts within a short window, which is characteristic of resource-exhaustion abuse.
  • Correlate workflow run initiation events with subsequent artifact service traffic to attribute oversized uploads to a specific user and run.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable host-level memory and OOM telemetry on Gitea servers and forward it to a central logging platform.
  • Track Gitea availability with external health checks to surface short outages caused by process restarts.
  • Review audit logs for workflow executions by newly created or low-reputation accounts on public or multi-tenant instances.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105964

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Gitea to v28.2.0 or later, which enforces the 1 MiB artifact body limit introduced in pull requests #39818 and #39822.
  • Restrict workflow execution to trusted users on internet-exposed instances until the upgrade is complete.
  • Place a reverse proxy in front of Gitea and enforce a request body size limit on Actions artifact routes.

Patch Information

The vendor fix is available in Gitea Release v28.2.0. The changes are described in the Gitea 28.2.0 release announcement and implemented in Pull Request #39818 and Pull Request #39822. Administrators of self-hosted Gitea deployments should plan an immediate upgrade and validate that Actions workflows still complete successfully after applying the body-size cap.

Workarounds

  • Disable Gitea Actions in app.ini ([actions] ENABLED = false) if an immediate upgrade is not feasible.
  • Configure an upstream reverse proxy (NGINX, HAProxy, Traefik) to enforce client_max_body_size or equivalent limits on /twirp/github.actions.results.api.v1.* paths.
  • Limit workflow execution to a vetted set of users and repositories to reduce the pool of accounts that can obtain a runner token.
bash
# NGINX reverse proxy limit for Gitea Actions artifact Twirp endpoints
location /twirp/github.actions.results.api.v1. {
    client_max_body_size 1m;
    proxy_pass http://gitea_upstream;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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