Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105931 Overview
CVE-2026-105931 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in the Apache Pulsar broker's transaction administration REST API served under /admin/v3/transactions. The read endpoints verify that a request is authenticated and that the broker serves the requested topic or transaction coordinator. They do not verify that the caller is permitted to access the target tenant, namespace, or topic. Any authenticated user, including one granted no permissions, can read transaction coordinator data and transaction metadata belonging to other tenants. The issue affects Apache Pulsar from 2.8.0 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5.
Critical Impact
Authenticated low-privilege users can enumerate cross-tenant transaction metadata, including topic names, subscription names, and the principals that opened transactions.
Affected Products
- Apache Pulsar 2.8.0 through versions prior to 4.0.14
- Apache Pulsar 4.1.0 through versions prior to 4.2.5
- Apache Pulsar deployments with transactionCoordinatorEnabled set to true
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-105931 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105931
Vulnerability Analysis
The Apache Pulsar broker exposes transaction administration endpoints under /admin/v3/transactions. When authentication and authorization are enabled, the read endpoints enforce only two conditions: the request must be authenticated, and the broker must serve the requested topic or transaction coordinator. They do not call the authorization provider to validate tenant, namespace, or topic access rights.
An authenticated principal with no granted permissions can therefore query transaction state belonging to arbitrary tenants served by the broker. Exposed data includes the list of transaction coordinators and their broker service URLs, coordinator statistics and internal statistics, transaction metadata containing topic names, subscription names, and the opening principal, the list of long-running transactions on a coordinator, transaction buffer and pending acknowledgement statistics for any topic and subscription, and whether a specific message position of a subscription is held in a pending transactional acknowledgement.
State-modifying endpoints, including those that abort a transaction or scale the transaction coordinators, correctly require super-user access and are not affected. The flaw is limited to disclosure. It does not permit reading message contents, modifying or aborting transactions, or changing configuration.
Root Cause
The broker's transaction admin handlers omit the authorization check that other Pulsar admin surfaces perform against the target tenant, namespace, or topic. This is a classic missing-authorization defect [CWE-862]: authentication is validated but access control is not consulted before data is returned.
Attack Vector
An attacker needs a valid authenticated identity on the Pulsar cluster, such as a client token for an unrelated tenant. The attacker issues HTTP GET requests to transaction read endpoints under /admin/v3/transactions on the broker that serves the targeted topic or coordinator. The broker returns transaction metadata and statistics without checking tenant membership. When transactionCoordinatorEnabled is false (the default), the endpoints return no transaction data; one endpoint's error response can still reveal whether a named topic exists in another tenant.
No verified public exploit code is available. See the Apache Pulsar CVE-2026-105931 advisory and the Apache Mailing List Thread for authoritative details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105931
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to paths beginning with /admin/v3/transactions/ from client principals that do not own the referenced tenant or topic.
- Repeated transaction coordinator enumeration requests such as GET /admin/v3/transactions/coordinators from non-administrative identities.
- Access to transactionInBufferStats, transactionInPendingAckStats, or transactionMetadata endpoints referencing topics outside the caller's tenant namespace.
Detection Strategies
- Enable broker access logging and alert on /admin/v3/transactions requests whose authenticated principal does not match the tenant in the request path.
- Correlate broker admin HTTP logs against the tenant-to-principal mapping maintained by your Pulsar authorization provider.
- Baseline normal administrative traffic to transaction endpoints and flag unexpected source identities or source IP ranges.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Pulsar broker access logs to a centralized log platform and retain for cross-tenant abuse investigations.
- Monitor the rate of 2xx responses on /admin/v3/transactions endpoints segmented by principal and tenant.
- Alert on broker admin HTTP traffic originating from client networks rather than the designated administrative network segment.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105931
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade 4.0.x deployments to Apache Pulsar 4.0.14 or later.
- Upgrade 4.1.x and 4.2.x deployments to Apache Pulsar 4.2.5 or later.
- Inventory all tokens and principals authorized against affected brokers and rotate credentials that may have been used to probe transaction endpoints.
- Restrict network reachability to broker admin HTTP ports so only trusted administrative clients can reach /admin/v3/transactions.
Patch Information
Apache Pulsar fixed the missing authorization checks in versions 4.0.14 and 4.2.5. The currently supported release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x; the 5.0.x line also contains the fix. Review the Apache Pulsar CVE-2026-105931 advisory and the project's release policy before planning the upgrade.
Workarounds
- Set transactionCoordinatorEnabled=false in broker.conf if Pulsar transactions are not in use; this suppresses transaction data from the vulnerable endpoints.
- Place broker admin HTTP endpoints behind a network boundary or reverse proxy that limits access to administrative identities and source ranges.
- Issue short-lived, tenant-scoped authentication tokens so that compromised or misused credentials have limited reach across tenants.
# Configuration example: disable transaction support where not required
# broker.conf
transactionCoordinatorEnabled=false
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

