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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105766

CVE-2026-105766: Nginx Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-105766 is an information disclosure flaw in Nginx configuration that exposes HTTPS traffic to plaintext HTTP redirects. This post covers technical details, affected configurations, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105766 Overview

CVE-2026-105766 affects Chainguard Academy (edu), the documentation site operated by Chainguard. The flaw resides in nginx.conf and stems from the use of the backend-facing $scheme variable in a trailing-slash directory redirect. Because TLS terminates at the load balancer in front of Nginx, the $scheme variable resolves to http rather than https. When a client requests a slashless directory path over HTTPS, Nginx returns a 301 response that redirects the client to a plaintext http:// URL. An on-path network attacker can then read or modify the documentation content delivered to the victim.

Critical Impact

Clients that do not enforce HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), such as command-line HTTP clients and automation scripts that follow redirects, can be downgraded to plaintext and intercepted on the network path.

Affected Products

  • Chainguard Academy (edu) repository chainguard-dev/edu
  • Commits from 0b75ff98057f69b044a3e7194e428066ac5ad0d4 up to (but not including) 93dc0e50739c225f5aee2e803800a47fc0feb906
  • Non-HSTS clients consuming the site (CLI HTTP clients, scripts following redirects)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-05 - CVE-2026-105766 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105766

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is a cleartext transmission issue classified as [CWE-319]. The Chainguard Academy site runs behind a load balancer that terminates TLS before forwarding requests to Nginx. In this topology, the Nginx $scheme variable reflects the backend-facing connection scheme (http), not the client-facing scheme (https). When Nginx issues a 301 directory redirect built from $scheme, the resulting Location header points to an http:// URL. A client that follows the redirect without enforcing HSTS will downgrade to plaintext for the follow-up request.

Browsers that honor the HSTS preload list are not exposed, because .dev is a preloaded top-level domain and the browser rewrites http:// to https:// before issuing the request. Non-browser clients, such as curl, wget, package installers, or CI/CD scripts, typically do not consult the preload list and will issue the downgraded request as directed.

Root Cause

The root cause is the use of $scheme in a redirect generated behind a TLS-terminating proxy. $scheme is populated from the connection Nginx itself receives, not from the original client request. Without consulting a forwarded header such as X-Forwarded-Proto, Nginx cannot reconstruct the client's original scheme and emits a plaintext redirect.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires an on-path network attacker between the victim and the load balancer, plus a victim client that does not enforce HSTS. The attacker waits for the victim to request a slashless directory path (for example https://edu.chainguard.dev/some/path), observes the 301 response pointing to http://edu.chainguard.dev/some/path/, and intercepts or modifies the subsequent plaintext request. The attacker can then rewrite documentation content, inject malicious commands into copy-paste instructions, or harvest request metadata.

The upstream fix in commit 93dc0e50739c225f5aee2e803800a47fc0feb906 addresses adjacent redirect handling in nginx.conf and layouts/index.aliases. A representative excerpt of the patched redirect map logic is below:

text
+    # Key the redirect map on the request path with the query string removed.
+    # $request_uri carries the query, and nearly every rule below ends in $1,
+    # so matching $request_uri put the query inside $redirect_url -- and the
+    # rewrite that applies the map appends the request arguments again,
+    # emitting "?utm_source=x?utm_source=x" (DOCS-187). A query-free key keeps
+    # $redirect_url query-free, so the append becomes the only source of a
+    # query on the Location, and it lands exactly once.
+    map $request_uri $request_path {
+        "~^(?<path_without_query>[^?]*)" $path_without_query;
+    }
+
     # add URLs after the `default` line that are moved and aren't redirecting via Hugo aliases
-    map $request_uri $redirect_url {
+    map $request_path $redirect_url {
         default "";

Source: GitHub Commit 93dc0e5

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105766

Indicators of Compromise

  • 301 responses from edu.chainguard.dev whose Location header begins with http:// instead of https://.
  • Outbound plaintext HTTP requests from automation or CI runners to edu.chainguard.dev immediately following an HTTPS request to the same host.
  • Unexpected content differences in documentation payloads retrieved by non-browser clients compared to the canonical HTTPS source.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect HTTP response headers at egress proxies for 301 redirects that downgrade scheme from https to http on known documentation hosts.
  • Compare build and CI logs for curl/wget invocations against edu.chainguard.dev that resolve to http:// after redirect following.
  • Alert on TLS-to-plaintext transitions in network session metadata when the originating hostname is on a preload-listed TLD.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable network telemetry collection for CI/CD runners and developer workstations that regularly fetch external documentation.
  • Centralize egress HTTP logs so plaintext requests to .dev hosts can be queried and reviewed over time.
  • Track script and installer commands that pipe remote content directly into shells (for example curl | sh) and flag any that resolve through an http:// hop.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105766

Immediate Actions Required

  • Pull the latest chainguard-dev/edu content at or after commit 93dc0e50739c225f5aee2e803800a47fc0feb906 if operating a fork or mirror.
  • Audit CI/CD pipelines, container builds, and scripts that fetch resources from edu.chainguard.dev without HSTS enforcement and force https:// URLs explicitly.
  • Configure HTTP clients used in automation to refuse plaintext redirects (for example curl --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https').

Patch Information

The issue is addressed in commit 93dc0e50739c225f5aee2e803800a47fc0feb906 of the chainguard-dev/edu repository. Review GitHub Pull Request 3989 for the full discussion and the patch commit for the applied changes to nginx.conf and layouts/index.aliases.

Workarounds

  • Replace $scheme in redirect directives with a literal https or with a value derived from the X-Forwarded-Proto header set by the load balancer.
  • Always request trailing-slash directory URLs directly from automation to avoid triggering the 301 redirect.
  • Pin clients to HTTPS-only mode and reject any redirect that changes scheme from https to http.
bash
# Nginx configuration example: derive client scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto
map $http_x_forwarded_proto $client_scheme {
    default $scheme;
    https   https;
}

server {
    listen 8080;
    server_name edu.chainguard.dev;

    # Issue trailing-slash directory redirects using the client-facing scheme
    location ~ ^(?<dir>/.+[^/])$ {
        if (-d $document_root$dir) {
            return 301 $client_scheme://$host$dir/;
        }
    }
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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