Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105640 Overview
CVE-2026-105640 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Plane, an open-source project management tool. Versions prior to 1.4.0 trust email addresses returned by Gitea OAuth and by self-managed GitLab OAuth deployments where email confirmation is disabled. The application matches these unverified provider emails directly to existing local accounts, enabling account takeover (ATO). An attacker who controls an OAuth identity can set its unverified email to a victim's address and sign in as the victim without knowing the password. GitHub, GitLab.com, and Google integrations are not affected because those providers return verified email addresses. The issue is tracked under [CWE-287] Improper Authentication.
Critical Impact
Attackers can hijack any Plane account whose email matches an unverified address on a connected Gitea or self-managed GitLab instance, gaining full access to projects, issues, and workspace data.
Affected Products
- Plane (makeplane/plane) versions prior to 1.4.0
- Deployments integrated with Gitea OAuth
- Deployments integrated with self-managed GitLab OAuth where email confirmation is disabled
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-05 - CVE-2026-105640 published to NVD
- 2026-10-05 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105640
Vulnerability Analysis
Plane's OAuth adapter accepts the email claim returned by the identity provider and uses it as the primary key to locate an existing local account. For Gitea and self-managed GitLab, that email may be user-controlled and never confirmed by the provider. When a match is found, Plane issues an authenticated session for the matched local user, completing the login without any password or secondary verification.
The vulnerability allows an attacker with any Gitea account, or an account on a misconfigured self-managed GitLab, to impersonate a target Plane user. Because Plane treats the OAuth email as an identity assertion rather than a provider-verified attribute, the trust boundary between provider and application is broken.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing verification of the email_verified state on the OAuth provider response. Plane requested only the openid email profile scope from Gitea, which does not include the data needed to confirm email ownership. The adapter then performed direct email-to-account matching without checking whether the provider had authenticated ownership of the address.
Attack Vector
An attacker registers or modifies an account on a Gitea instance (or a self-managed GitLab deployment with email confirmation disabled) that Plane trusts as an OAuth provider. The attacker sets the account's email address to the victim's Plane email. The attacker then initiates OAuth login to Plane, which matches the unverified email to the victim's local account and grants a session.
# Patch excerpt: apps/api/plane/authentication/adapter/error.py
"GITHUB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5120,
"GITLAB_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5121,
"GITEA_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ERROR": 5123,
+ "OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL": 5124,
# Reset Password
"INVALID_PASSWORD_TOKEN": 5125,
"EXPIRED_PASSWORD_TOKEN": 5130,
# Patch excerpt: apps/api/plane/authentication/provider/oauth/gitea.py
class GiteaOAuthProvider(OauthAdapter):
provider = "gitea"
- scope = "openid email profile"
+ scope = "openid email profile read:user"
Source: GitHub Commit b91b61c. The patch introduces a new OAUTH_PROVIDER_UNVERIFIED_EMAIL error code and expands the Gitea OAuth scope to read:user so the adapter can inspect email verification state and reject unverified addresses.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105640
Indicators of Compromise
- Successful OAuth logins to Plane from Gitea or self-managed GitLab providers for users who historically authenticated with a different method.
- Multiple OAuth sign-in events for the same Plane account originating from distinct provider subject identifiers.
- Workspace, project, or issue modifications performed shortly after an unexpected OAuth session is established.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate Plane authentication logs with the identity-provider subject (sub) claim and flag cases where the same local account is linked to new or changing OAuth subjects.
- Alert on OAuth logins from Gitea instances or self-managed GitLab deployments where the provider is not configured to enforce email confirmation.
- Review database records that map OAuth identities to local users for duplicate emails across provider accounts.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Plane API and authentication logs to a centralized analytics pipeline for session and provider correlation.
- Monitor Gitea and self-managed GitLab administrative events for email changes immediately followed by OAuth authorization requests to Plane.
- Track upgrade status of all Plane instances and alert on any still running versions below 1.4.0.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105640
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Plane to version 1.4.0 or later across all self-hosted instances.
- Audit existing Plane accounts for unexpected OAuth identity links from Gitea or self-managed GitLab providers and revoke suspicious sessions.
- Force password resets and session invalidation for workspaces that integrate with affected providers.
Patch Information
The fix is included in Plane Release v1.4.0 and implemented in Pull Request #9289. The patch rejects OAuth logins whose provider email is not verified and is detailed in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-7j95-vh8g-f365.
Workarounds
- Disable the Gitea OAuth provider in Plane until the upgrade is applied.
- On self-managed GitLab deployments used as a Plane OAuth provider, enable email confirmation so unverified addresses cannot be used for login.
- Restrict OAuth sign-in to providers that return verified emails, such as GitHub, GitLab.com, and Google.
# Example: upgrade Plane via Docker Compose
git fetch --tags
git checkout v1.4.0
docker compose pull
docker compose up -d
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

