Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105639 Overview
Plane is an open-source project management tool affected by a pre-authentication invitation hijack flaw in versions prior to 1.4.0. The signup flow creates a logged-in User row for any submitted email without an out-of-band ownership check. The authenticated session can then call GET /api/users/me/workspaces/invitations/, which returns every WorkspaceMemberInvite matching request.user.email. The WorkSpaceMemberInviteSerializer used fields = "all", exposing the acceptance token that protects the invite join endpoint. An attacker who knows a target's email address can register that address, enumerate pending invitations, and join a workspace at the invited role.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can hijack pending workspace invitations and join target workspaces at the invited role, including privileged roles, by registering an account with a victim's email address.
Affected Products
- Plane (makeplane/plane) versions prior to 1.4.0
- Self-hosted Plane deployments exposing the signup and workspace invitation endpoints
- Plane instances relying on WorkSpaceMemberInviteSerializer with fields = "all"
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-05 - CVE CVE-2026-105639 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105639
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is an information disclosure and broken access control issue classified as [CWE-200]. Plane's registration flow does not verify ownership of the email address submitted at signup. The newly created account receives an authenticated session immediately. The authenticated endpoint GET /api/users/me/workspaces/invitations/ queries pending invitations by matching request.user.email against WorkspaceMemberInvite.email.
Because User.email is defined with unique=True, each email can only exist on a single account. An attacker who registers first binds that email to an account they control. The response serializer exposes every field on the invitation record, including the token used to authorize the invitation join endpoint. The attacker then POSTs the token to accept the invitation and joins the target workspace at the role the inviter assigned.
Root Cause
Two defects compose the vulnerability. First, signup lacks any out-of-band email verification such as a confirmation link or one-time code before issuing a session. Second, WorkSpaceMemberInviteSerializer uses fields = "all", exposing fields that should remain server-side. The combination allows pre-auth enumeration and acceptance of invitations addressed to another user.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-reachable, requires no privileges, and no user interaction. An attacker needs only the victim's email address and must register before the victim does. After signup, the attacker calls the invitations list endpoint, extracts the token, and submits it to the invitation join endpoint.
# Patched serializer from apps/api/plane/app/serializers/workspace.py
class WorkSpaceMemberInvitePublicSerializer(BaseSerializer):
"""Safe read-only serializer for the public workspace invite GET endpoint.
Intentionally excludes ``token`` and ``invite_link`` so that an
unauthenticated caller cannot retrieve the acceptance token and use it to
hijack an invitation (GHSA-86mg-259g-pwgg / GHSA-gf48-p6jp-cwc4).
"""
workspace = WorkspaceLiteSerializer(read_only=True)
class Meta:
model = WorkspaceMemberInvite
fields = [
"id",
"email",
"workspace",
"role",
"message",
"accepted",
"responded_at",
"created_at",
"updated_at",
"created_by",
]
read_only_fields = fields
Source: GitHub Commit 6220ba9
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-105639
Indicators of Compromise
- New account registrations followed within seconds by requests to GET /api/users/me/workspaces/invitations/ from the same session.
- Invitation acceptance events where the accepting account was created after the invitation created_at timestamp.
- Workspace member additions whose associated user account has no prior activity history.
Detection Strategies
- Correlate signup events with invitation acceptance events on the same session or IP within a short time window.
- Query the WorkspaceMemberInvite table for invitations marked accepted=True where the accepting user's date_joined is after the invite's created_at.
- Review web server access logs for sequences of POST /api/auth/sign-up, GET /api/users/me/workspaces/invitations/, and the invite accept endpoint from a single client.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on bulk enumeration of the invitations endpoint across multiple newly created accounts.
- Monitor for role changes and workspace membership additions attributed to accounts with minimal activity.
- Ingest Plane application logs into a centralized SIEM or data lake to retain signup, invite, and workspace membership events for forensic analysis.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105639
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Plane to version 1.4.0 or later, which replaces WorkSpaceMemberInviteSerializer with WorkSpaceMemberInvitePublicSerializer that omits token and invite_link.
- Audit existing workspace memberships for accounts added via invitation acceptance since the invites were issued and revoke any suspicious memberships.
- Invalidate pending workspace invitations and reissue them after upgrading.
Patch Information
The fix is included in Plane v1.4.0 via pull request #9297 and commit 6220ba9. Details are documented in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4vj8-p63v-8p24.
Workarounds
- Restrict access to the Plane signup endpoint using an upstream reverse proxy or WAF until the patched version is deployed.
- Require administrator approval or email verification before new accounts can enumerate workspace invitations.
- Rotate or revoke any pending invitation tokens issued before the upgrade.
# Verify Plane version and upgrade using the official release tag
docker pull makeplane/plane:v1.4.0
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

