Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105635 Overview
Plane is an open-source project management tool affected by an information disclosure vulnerability prior to version 1.4.0. The ProjectJoinEndpoint at GET /api/workspaces/{slug}/projects/{project_id}/join/{pk}/ uses permission_classes = [AllowAny] and returns the full ProjectMemberInvite record to unauthenticated callers. The exposed data includes the invitee's email, acceptance token, and role. The corresponding POST endpoint validates only the submitted email against project_invite.email and does not check the invitation token. An attacker who knows the invitation UUID can discover the invited email, register an account with that email, and accept the invitation without ever receiving the original invite.
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can hijack project invitations and gain unauthorized access to private workspaces by registering accounts under disclosed invitee emails.
Affected Products
- Plane open-source project management tool, versions prior to 1.4.0
- ProjectJoinEndpoint API handler in the Plane backend
- ProjectMemberInviteSerializer used for the public GET invite endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-05 - CVE CVE-2026-105635 published to NVD
- 2026-10-05 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105635
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is an Information Exposure flaw [CWE-200] in Plane's project invitation workflow. The ProjectJoinEndpoint was configured with permission_classes = [AllowAny], permitting unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to retrieve the complete ProjectMemberInvite record for any known invitation UUID. The serializer returned every model field, including the invitee's email address, the acceptance token, and the assigned project role.
The POST handler used to accept an invite compounded the problem. It compared the submitted email against the invite's stored email but never validated the invitation token. An attacker who enumerated or obtained an invite UUID could read the invitee's email, create an account with that email, and submit the POST to join the project. The legitimate invitee never had to interact with the system.
Root Cause
Two coinciding design flaws cause the issue. First, the public GET endpoint used a serializer that exposed sensitive fields (email, token) rather than a safe read-only serializer. Second, the POST acceptance flow treated the submitted email as sufficient proof of identity instead of requiring the server-generated token bound to the invitation.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-based and requires no prior authentication. An attacker needs only a valid invitation UUID, which may be obtained through enumeration, log exposure, link leakage, or guessing patterns. With the UUID, the attacker calls the public GET endpoint to retrieve the invitee's email, registers an account using that email, then calls the POST endpoint to accept the invite and gain project access with the pre-assigned role.
# Patch excerpt: apps/api/plane/app/serializers/__init__.py
ProjectDetailSerializer,
ProjectMemberSerializer,
ProjectMemberInviteSerializer,
+ ProjectMemberInvitePublicSerializer,
ProjectIdentifierSerializer,
ProjectLiteSerializer,
ProjectMemberLiteSerializer,
# Patch excerpt: apps/api/plane/app/serializers/project.py
fields = "__all__"
+class ProjectMemberInvitePublicSerializer(BaseSerializer):
+ """Safe read-only serializer for the public project invite GET endpoint.
+
+ Intentionally excludes ``email`` and ``token`` so that an unauthenticated
+ caller cannot retrieve the invitee's email address or the acceptance token
+ (GHSA-2r58-hgv7-635q).
+ """
+
+ project = ProjectLiteSerializer(read_only=True)
+ workspace = WorkspaceLiteSerializer(read_only=True)
+
+ class Meta:
+ model = ProjectMemberInvite
+ fields = [
+ "id",
+ "project",
+ "workspace",
+ "role",
+ "message",
+ "accepted",
+ "responded_at",
+ ]
+ read_only_fields = fields
+
+
class ProjectIdentifierSerializer(BaseSerializer):
class Meta:
Source: GitHub Commit 4b52dce
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105635
Indicators of Compromise
- Unauthenticated GET requests to /api/workspaces/{slug}/projects/{project_id}/join/{pk}/ from unexpected source IPs.
- New user registrations with email addresses that match pending ProjectMemberInvite records, followed quickly by a POST to the same join endpoint.
- Project membership events where the accepting account was created minutes before invite acceptance and lacks prior workspace activity.
Detection Strategies
- Review web server and reverse proxy logs for high-volume or sequential UUID enumeration against the /join/ path on Plane versions prior to 1.4.0.
- Correlate account-registration events with invitation-acceptance events in Plane audit logs and alert on short time deltas between the two.
- Hunt for anomalous access to private projects from newly created accounts that did not originate from an organizationally approved invitation workflow.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose request logging on the Plane API tier and ship logs to a centralized analytics platform for retention and query.
- Monitor outbound mail queues for invitation emails that were never delivered to the stated recipient, which can indicate hijacked invite flows.
- Add alerting for repeated 200-OK responses to unauthenticated /join/ GET requests, which is unexpected after upgrading to 1.4.0.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105635
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Plane to version 1.4.0 or later, which replaces the public serializer with ProjectMemberInvitePublicSerializer and removes email and token from the anonymous response.
- Invalidate all outstanding ProjectMemberInvite records issued prior to the upgrade and reissue invitations with fresh tokens.
- Audit workspace and project memberships to identify accounts that joined via the vulnerable flow and remove unauthorized members.
Patch Information
The fix is included in Plane v1.4.0. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2r58-hgv7-635q, the GitHub Pull Request #9305, and the GitHub Release v1.4.0 for the complete patch set. The remediation introduces a dedicated safe serializer and enforces token validation on invite acceptance.
Workarounds
- If an immediate upgrade is not possible, place the Plane API behind an authenticating reverse proxy that blocks unauthenticated access to the /join/ path.
- Restrict network reachability of the Plane instance to trusted corporate ranges or VPN clients until the patch is applied.
- Shorten invitation lifetime and manually track outstanding invitations so unexpected acceptances can be identified quickly.
# Example reverse-proxy rule to block unauthenticated GETs to the invite endpoint
# nginx snippet
location ~ ^/api/workspaces/[^/]+/projects/[^/]+/join/[^/]+/$ {
if ($http_authorization = "") {
return 401;
}
proxy_pass http://plane_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

