Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105263 Overview
CVE-2026-105263 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in Shaarli, a self-hosted bookmarking application. The flaw affects versions up to and including 0.16.3. It resides in the MetadataController function within application/front/controller/admin/MetadataController.php, which exposes the Admin Metadata Endpoint. An authenticated attacker can manipulate the url parameter to coerce the Shaarli server into issuing arbitrary HTTP requests. The issue is fixed in version 0.16.4 through commit 8ca4de8e7c932a684481f5fbb1229fe16de1f4d2.
Critical Impact
Attackers with admin-level access can abuse the metadata endpoint to probe internal networks, access cloud metadata services, and interact with services bound to loopback or private IP ranges.
Affected Products
- Shaarli versions up to and including 0.16.3
- Component: Admin Metadata Endpoint (/admin/metadata)
- File: application/front/controller/admin/MetadataController.php
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-05 - CVE CVE-2026-105263 published to NVD
- 2026-10-05 - Last updated in NVD database
- Patch released - Shaarli v0.16.4 with commit 8ca4de8e7c932a684481f5fbb1229fe16de1f4d2
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105263
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs in Shaarli's ajaxRetrieveTitle method. The endpoint accepts a url parameter and fetches remote metadata to populate bookmark titles. The pre-patch logic only checked whether the URL scheme contained the substring http, which permitted schemes like http+unix and did not restrict the destination host. Attackers could supply URLs resolving to private, loopback, or reserved IP addresses, causing the server to issue outbound requests on their behalf. The classification maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.
Root Cause
Two deficiencies combine to produce the SSRF condition. First, scheme validation used a loose strpos check rather than an exact match against http or https. Second, no host validation was performed, so URLs pointing to RFC1918 addresses, 127.0.0.1, or cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254 were accepted. The endpoint also lacked a CSRF token check, broadening the exploitation surface for authenticated sessions.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires authenticated access with high privileges (admin). The attacker submits a crafted request to the /admin/metadata endpoint with a url parameter pointing at an internal resource. Shaarli performs the HTTP request from the server context and may return response content to the caller, enabling internal reconnaissance and potential interaction with unauthenticated internal services.
*/
public function ajaxRetrieveTitle(Request $request, Response $response): Response
{
+ $this->checkToken($request);
+
$url = $request->getParam('url');
- // Only try to extract metadata from URL with HTTP(s) scheme
- if (!empty($url) && strpos(get_url_scheme($url) ?: '', 'http') !== false) {
+ // Only try to extract metadata from URL with exact HTTP(s) scheme
+ $scheme = get_url_scheme($url);
+ if (
+ !empty($url)
+ && in_array(strtolower($scheme), ['http', 'https'], true)
+ && is_safe_url($url)
+ ) {
return $response->withJson($this->container->metadataRetriever->retrieve($url));
}
// Source: https://github.com/shaarli/Shaarli/commit/8ca4de8e7c932a684481f5fbb1229fe16de1f4d2
The companion patch introduces the is_safe_url helper, which rejects destinations resolving to private or reserved IP ranges:
+function is_safe_url($url)
+{
+ $parsed = parse_url($url);
+ if (!isset($parsed['host'])) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ $host = $parsed['host'];
+ $ip = filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) ? $host : gethostbyname($host);
+
+ return !is_private_ip($ip);
+}
// Source: https://github.com/shaarli/Shaarli/commit/8ca4de8e7c932a684481f5fbb1229fe16de1f4d2
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105263
Indicators of Compromise
- HTTP requests to /admin/metadata with a url parameter targeting internal IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16).
- Requests referencing cloud metadata hosts such as 169.254.169.254 or metadata.google.internal.
- Outbound connections from the Shaarli PHP process to internal services it does not normally access.
Detection Strategies
- Review Shaarli web server access logs for unusual query strings on the /admin/metadata endpoint.
- Inspect reverse-proxy or WAF logs for url parameters containing non-public hostnames or raw IPs.
- Correlate PHP-FPM outbound socket activity with authenticated admin sessions to spot unexpected lateral HTTP calls.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable egress filtering on the Shaarli host and alert on connections to RFC1918 or link-local destinations.
- Monitor administrative session activity and flag repeated calls to metadata-fetching endpoints.
- Capture and retain full URL parameters in web logs to support retrospective SSRF investigation.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105263
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Shaarli to version 0.16.4 or later, which includes commit 8ca4de8e7c932a684481f5fbb1229fe16de1f4d2.
- Rotate administrative credentials if the metadata endpoint logs show suspicious url parameters.
- Restrict access to the /admin/ path by source IP where feasible.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in Shaarli v0.16.4. See the GitHub Release v0.16.4 and the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-85jx-fhrf-q9w7. The patch adds a CSRF token check via checkToken, enforces strict scheme matching against http/https, and introduces the is_safe_url function in application/http/UrlUtils.php to block requests resolving to private, loopback, or reserved IP addresses.
Workarounds
- Place Shaarli behind a reverse proxy that filters requests to /admin/metadata containing internal hostnames or private IP literals.
- Configure firewall or network policy rules to block the Shaarli host from initiating connections to internal subnets and cloud metadata services.
- Limit admin accounts to trusted operators and avoid shared credentials until the upgrade is applied.
# Example egress block for Shaarli container targeting cloud metadata service
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 169.254.169.254 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

