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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-105240

CVE-2026-105240: Apache log4net Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-105240 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Apache log4net on Windows systems using OutputDebugStringAppender. NUL characters can truncate log records, hiding critical data. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-105240 Overview

CVE-2026-105240 is an Improper Neutralization of Null Byte or NUL Character vulnerability [CWE-158] in the OutputDebugStringAppender of Apache log4net. The OutputDebugStringW Windows API accepts a null-terminated string, so a NUL byte embedded in logged content truncates the debug output record at that point. Any party whose data reaches a log message can hide exception text, trailing fields, or other layout-rendered content that follows the NUL character. The flaw affects Apache log4net versions 1.2.9 through versions earlier than 3.5.0, and only on Windows deployments that use OutputDebugStringAppender.

Critical Impact

Attackers who control any portion of logged input can suppress subsequent log content, concealing attack traces, exception details, or audit fields written to the Windows debug output stream.

Affected Products

  • Apache log4net 1.2.9 through versions earlier than 3.5.0
  • Windows-based applications using OutputDebugStringAppender
  • .NET applications relying on log4net for debug output logging

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE CVE-2026-105240 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-07 - Openwall OSS Security advisory published
  • 2026-10-07 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-105240

Vulnerability Analysis

The OutputDebugStringAppender forwards rendered log content to the Windows OutputDebugStringW API. This native function expects a null-terminated wide string and stops reading at the first NUL character it encounters. When attacker-influenced data containing a \0 byte reaches the appender, the Windows debug output record ends at that boundary. All subsequent content produced by the layout, including exception stack traces and trailing structured fields, is silently dropped from the record.

This integrity failure allows log tampering without triggering parser errors or appender exceptions. The log appears to render successfully from the application's perspective, while the receiving debug monitor records only the truncated prefix.

Root Cause

The appender passed rendered content directly to OutputDebugStringW without neutralizing embedded NUL characters. A sibling appender, LocalSyslogAppender, already performed this escaping for the same reason, but the logic was not shared across the two sinks that write to null-terminated string APIs.

Attack Vector

An attacker needs only to supply data that eventually reaches a log statement rendered by OutputDebugStringAppender. Common vectors include HTTP request headers, usernames, query parameters, or any user-controlled field logged for diagnostic purposes. By inserting a NUL byte at a chosen offset, the attacker controls the truncation point and hides whatever the layout would render afterward.

text
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<entry xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
+       xmlns="https://logging.apache.org/xml/ns"
+       xsi:schemaLocation="https://logging.apache.org/xml/ns https://logging.apache.org/xml/ns/log4j-changelog-0.xsd"
+       type="fixed">
+  <issue id="315" link="https://github.com/apache/logging-log4net/pull/315"/>
+  <description format="asciidoc">
+    escape NUL characters in `OutputDebugStringAppender` content. `OutputDebugStringW` takes a null
+ terminated string, so a NUL in logged content ended the record there and silently dropped whatever
+ the layout rendered after it, exception text and trailing fields included (CWE-158). The escape
+ `LocalSyslogAppender` already applied is now shared between the two (audit da18b6fd-f009)
+  </description>
+</entry>

Source: Apache logging-log4net commit 6046fe9

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105240

Indicators of Compromise

  • Debug output records that terminate abruptly without expected trailing fields or exception stack traces present in the application's internal log state.
  • Log entries containing user-supplied data where the recorded content is substantially shorter than the configured layout pattern suggests.
  • Discrepancies between application-level log statements and the records captured by Windows debug monitors such as DebugView.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit application dependencies for Apache log4net versions between 1.2.9 and 3.5.0 and identify configurations that enable OutputDebugStringAppender.
  • Inspect log inputs for embedded NUL (\\x00) bytes in fields that feed logging calls, particularly HTTP headers and form inputs.
  • Compare rendered output across multiple appenders configured on the same logger to flag truncation unique to the Windows debug sink.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor Windows debug output streams for records lacking expected delimiter patterns or layout-defined terminators.
  • Enable integrity checks on logging pipelines by cross-referencing debug output with file or syslog appenders writing the same events.
  • Alert on application input containing control characters in fields known to reach logging frameworks.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105240

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Apache log4net to version 3.5.0 or later, which escapes NUL characters in OutputDebugStringAppender content.
  • Inventory Windows applications and services that bundle vulnerable log4net versions and prioritize those relying on OutputDebugStringAppender for diagnostic or audit logging.
  • Validate that any custom appenders writing to null-terminated string APIs apply equivalent escaping.

Patch Information

The fix was delivered in Apache log4net 3.5.0 through pull request #315. The patch introduces a shared NativeStringEscape helper that replaces NUL characters with a visible \0 escape sequence. Both OutputDebugStringAppender and LocalSyslogAppender now route rendered content through this escape routine. See the GitHub commit details for the complete implementation and the Openwall OSS Security update for the public advisory.

Workarounds

  • Replace OutputDebugStringAppender with an alternative appender such as FileAppender or RollingFileAppender until the upgrade is deployed.
  • Sanitize log inputs by stripping or escaping NUL bytes in application code before passing values to logging calls.
  • Disable debug output logging in production environments where it is not required for operational monitoring.
bash
# Verify installed log4net version in a .NET project
dotnet list package | grep -i log4net

# Upgrade to the patched release
dotnet add package log4net --version 3.5.0

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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