Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-105163 Overview
CVE-2026-105163 is a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in crossplane-runtime affecting versions up to 2.2.2 and 2.3.2. The flaw resides in the Get function of pkg/xpkg/client.go within the ImageConfig component. A remote registry can serve different image content between the signature verification Head call and the subsequent Fetch call, allowing an unsigned image to bypass the verifier. The issue is tracked as [CWE-362] and is resolved in versions 2.2.3, 2.3.3, and 2.4.0-rc.1.
Critical Impact
A malicious or compromised OCI registry can bypass Crossplane package signature verification, enabling delivery of unsigned or tampered container images into clusters that rely on ImageConfig for supply chain integrity.
Affected Products
- Crossplane crossplane-runtime versions up to and including 2.2.2
- Crossplane crossplane-runtime versions up to and including 2.3.2
- Deployments using the ImageConfig component with image verification enabled
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-04 - CVE-2026-105163 published to NVD
- 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-105163
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is a classic TOCTOU race in the Crossplane package client. The Get function in pkg/xpkg/client.go first calls Head to resolve a tag to a digest, then calls Validate on that digest to attest the image signature. However, the subsequent Fetch call used the original tag reference rather than the pinned digest. A registry can return different bytes for the tag between these operations.
The verifier therefore attests one artifact while the runtime loads another. This defeats the trust guarantees Crossplane package signing is intended to provide. Only integrity is impacted; confidentiality and availability are not directly affected.
Root Cause
The root cause is inconsistent reference handling between verification and fetching. The signature validator was invoked against a digest-pinned reference, but the fetcher reused parsedResolvedRef, which still points to the mutable tag. The fix pins all registry operations after the digest is resolved by Head to a single digestRef.
Attack Vector
An attacker who controls or compromises a container registry serving Crossplane packages can mount this attack remotely without authentication or user interaction. Between the verifier's Head and the runtime's Fetch, the attacker swaps the content served under a tag so that signed metadata is validated while unsigned or malicious bytes are delivered to the cluster.
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "cannot get image verification config")
}
+ // Pin all subsequent registry interactions to the digest resolved by
+ // Head. Pulling by the original tag would let a registry that serves
+ // different content between Head and Fetch slip an unsigned image past
+ // the verifier (the verifier above attests `digest`, not whatever bytes
+ // the tag happens to resolve to a few milliseconds later).
+ digestRef := parsedResolvedRef.Context().Digest(digest)
+
if vc != nil {
- ref := parsedResolvedRef.Context().Digest(digest)
- if err := c.validator.Validate(ctx, ref, vc, secrets...); err != nil {
+ if err := c.validator.Validate(ctx, digestRef, vc, secrets...); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "signature verification failed")
}
applied = append(applied, ImageConfig{Name: name, Reason: ImageConfigReasonVerify})
}
- img, err := c.fetcher.Fetch(ctx, parsedResolvedRef, secrets...)
+ img, err := c.fetcher.Fetch(ctx, digestRef, secrets...)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "cannot fetch package %s", resolvedRef)
}
Source: Crossplane Commit bee99c6 — the patch introduces digestRef and routes both Validate and Fetch through the digest-pinned reference.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-105163
Indicators of Compromise
- Discrepancies between the digest observed during Crossplane signature verification and the digest of the image actually loaded in the cluster.
- Repeated tag content changes on an upstream registry serving Crossplane packages within short time windows.
- Unsigned or unexpected package layers appearing in Crossplane provider or configuration pods despite ImageConfig verification being enabled.
Detection Strategies
- Compare the digests recorded in Crossplane verification logs with digests of running package images pulled from the Kubernetes API.
- Monitor registry access logs for sequential HEAD and GET manifest requests on the same tag with differing response digests from the Crossplane controller's source address.
- Audit admitted Crossplane packages against a known-good allowlist of signed digests maintained outside the registry.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging on the Crossplane package manager and ship logs to a centralized store for correlation.
- Alert on any Crossplane package installation where the fetched image digest does not match the verified digest.
- Track versions of crossplane-runtime deployed in clusters and flag any version at or below 2.2.2 or 2.3.2.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-105163
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade crossplane-runtime to version 2.2.3, 2.3.3, or 2.4.0-rc.1 in all affected clusters.
- Inventory all Crossplane providers and configurations and confirm their package digests match verified signatures.
- Restrict Crossplane package sources to trusted registries under organizational control.
Patch Information
The fix is identified by commit bee99c6cd6ca81878acca2940a2f0a02169fc208 and merged via Crossplane Pull Request #1038. Release details are available in the Crossplane Runtime Release v2.2.3 notes and the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-mf7q-r4rv-jv94.
Workarounds
- Reference Crossplane packages by immutable digest (@sha256:...) rather than mutable tags in Provider and Configuration manifests.
- Mirror trusted packages into a controlled internal registry and block egress to third-party registries from Crossplane controllers.
- Enforce admission controls that reject Crossplane packages whose digests are not on an approved list.
# Pin Crossplane providers by digest instead of tag
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: pkg.crossplane.io/v1
kind: Provider
metadata:
name: provider-aws
spec:
package: xpkg.crossplane.io/crossplane-contrib/provider-aws@sha256:<verified-digest>
EOF
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

