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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-104988

CVE-2026-104988: Dogtag PKI Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-104988 is an authentication bypass flaw in Dogtag PKI that allows authenticated EST users to obtain CA-signed certificates with arbitrary subject names. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-104988 Overview

CVE-2026-104988 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Dogtag PKI (pki-core), the open-source certificate authority used in Red Hat Certificate System. The flaw resides in the CMCAuthForEST authentication plugin, which fails open when an Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) fullcmc enrollment request is submitted via BasicAuth without an end-user TLS client certificate. The SSL_CLIENT_CERT session attribute retains the EST subsystem's own agent certificate. Downstream authorization checks then treat the request as agent-privileged. An authenticated EST user can abuse this to obtain CA-signed certificates with arbitrary subject names.

Critical Impact

Any authenticated EST user can issue CA-signed certificates with attacker-chosen subject names, enabling impersonation of arbitrary identities across systems that trust the CA.

Affected Products

  • Dogtag PKI (pki-core)
  • Red Hat Certificate System deployments exposing the EST subsystem
  • Installations using the CMCAuthForEST authentication plugin with BasicAuth

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-02 - CVE-2026-104988 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-104988

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is an authentication bypass [CWE-290] in the CMCAuthForEST plugin that handles EST enrollment flows in Dogtag PKI. EST (RFC 7030) supports two authentication modes: TLS client certificates and HTTP BasicAuth. When a client submits a fullcmc request using BasicAuth, the plugin does not require an end-user TLS client certificate for the request to proceed. The server session reuses the EST subsystem's agent certificate in the SSL_CLIENT_CERT attribute.

Downstream authorization logic reads SSL_CLIENT_CERT to determine the principal performing the request. Because the attribute now contains the agent certificate rather than an end-user certificate, authorization treats the BasicAuth user as if they were an agent. Agent privileges in Dogtag PKI include the ability to approve certificate signing requests and issue certificates with arbitrary distinguished names.

An attacker who has valid EST BasicAuth credentials can submit a crafted fullcmc enrollment request and receive a CA-signed certificate for any subject, including identities belonging to other users, services, or infrastructure components.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper authentication state handling in CMCAuthForEST. The plugin does not clear or validate SSL_CLIENT_CERT when BasicAuth is used in place of mutual TLS. The retained agent certificate causes a privilege confusion between the authenticated BasicAuth principal and the subsystem's own identity.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the EST enrollment endpoint and valid BasicAuth credentials for an EST user account. The attacker submits a fullcmc enrollment request over HTTPS using BasicAuth and omits the end-user TLS client certificate. The CA processes the request under agent authority and returns a signed certificate whose subject fields are controlled by the attacker. The resulting certificate can be used to impersonate arbitrary principals in any PKI-dependent system that trusts the issuing CA, including VPNs, TLS servers, SSH certificate deployments, and code-signing workflows.

See the Red Hat CVE-2026-104988 Advisory and Red Hat Bugzilla Entry #2545316 for upstream technical analysis.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-104988

Indicators of Compromise

  • EST fullcmc enrollment requests authenticated via BasicAuth where no end-user client certificate was negotiated during the TLS handshake.
  • Issued certificates whose subject distinguished names do not match the BasicAuth username on the request.
  • Audit log entries where the authenticated principal differs from the subject of the issued certificate.
  • Unexpected certificates signed by the CA for high-value identities such as administrators, service accounts, or infrastructure hosts.

Detection Strategies

  • Review Dogtag PKI transaction and audit logs for fullcmc enrollment requests that used BasicAuth rather than mutual TLS.
  • Correlate EST authentication events with the subject of each issued certificate to identify mismatches.
  • Baseline normal EST enrollment behavior per user account and alert on deviations in issued subject names.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Dogtag PKI audit logs to a centralized SIEM and build detections on CMCAuthForEST plugin events.
  • Monitor for certificates issued with privileged subject fields, including CA agent, admin, and system account identities.
  • Alert on any certificate issuance where the authenticated user does not match the certificate subject.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-104988

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply vendor patches referenced in the Red Hat CVE-2026-104988 Advisory as soon as updated pki-core packages are available.
  • Audit recently issued certificates for unexpected subject names and revoke any suspicious entries.
  • Rotate EST BasicAuth credentials and review which accounts have access to the EST enrollment endpoint.

Patch Information

Red Hat tracks the fix in Red Hat Bugzilla Entry #2545316. Administrators should install updated pki-core packages from their distribution vendor once released and restart the CA subsystem to load the fixed authentication plugin.

Workarounds

  • Disable the EST subsystem on the CA until patched packages are deployed if EST enrollment is not business-critical.
  • Require mutual TLS for EST enrollment and disable BasicAuth on the EST endpoint via the Dogtag configuration.
  • Restrict network access to the EST enrollment endpoint to trusted enrollment proxies and management networks.
  • Reduce the privileges and scope of EST user accounts to limit the impact of any compromised credential.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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