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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-104967

CVE-2026-104967: Plane Project Management Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-104967 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in Plane that allows attackers to manipulate issues across workspaces without proper validation. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-104967 Overview

CVE-2026-104967 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference [CWE-639] vulnerability in Plane, an open-source project management tool. Versions prior to 1.4.0 contain flawed authorization logic in BulkDeleteIssuesEndpoint and SubIssuesEndpoint under apps/api/plane/app/views/issue/. Both endpoints accept issue IDs from the request body or URL without verifying that the IDs belong to the caller's workspace and project. An authenticated workspace member can destroy CycleIssue and ModuleIssue associations belonging to foreign issues, re-parent foreign issues under an attacker-selected issue, and retrieve metadata about those issues. The issue is fixed in version 1.4.0.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can tamper with and disclose metadata of issues outside their authorized workspace and project boundaries.

Affected Products

  • Plane (makeplane/plane) versions prior to 1.4.0
  • BulkDeleteIssuesEndpoint in apps/api/plane/app/views/issue/
  • SubIssuesEndpoint in apps/api/plane/app/views/issue/

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-05 - CVE-2026-104967 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-05 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-104967

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in two API endpoints that accept issue identifiers as untrusted input. The permission decorator applied to each endpoint only validates that the caller is a member or administrator of the workspace and project referenced in the URL path. It does not confirm that the supplied issue IDs actually belong to that workspace or project.

An attacker with legitimate access to any workspace can submit issue IDs from a foreign workspace or project in the request body or URL parameters. The server processes those IDs against global Issue, CycleIssue, and ModuleIssue tables, bypassing the intended tenant isolation boundary.

This is a classic broken object-level authorization flaw. The impact includes integrity loss through destruction of cycle and module associations, re-parenting of foreign issues under attacker-controlled parents, and confidentiality loss through disclosure of foreign issue metadata returned by SubIssuesEndpoint.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing scope validation between the URL-scoped permission check and the data layer. CycleIssue.objects.filter(issue_id__in=issue_ids).delete() operated on raw caller-supplied IDs. The query lacked a join or filter tying each issue back to the authenticated workspace and project.

Attack Vector

An authenticated attacker with workspace member or administrator rights sends a crafted request to BulkDeleteIssuesEndpoint or SubIssuesEndpoint within their own workspace URL. The request body or URL contains issue IDs harvested or guessed from a different workspace. The server honors the operation because the URL-level permission check passes.

python
         total_issues = len(issues)
 
         # First, delete all related cycle issues
-        CycleIssue.objects.filter(issue_id__in=issue_ids).delete()
+        CycleIssue.objects.filter(issue__in=issues).delete()
 
         # Then, delete all related module issues
-        ModuleIssue.objects.filter(issue_id__in=issue_ids).delete()
+        ModuleIssue.objects.filter(issue__in=issues).delete()
 
         # Finally, delete the issues themselves
         issues.delete()

Source: GitHub Commit ad73ca3. The patch replaces unscoped issue_id__in=issue_ids filtering with issue__in=issues, where issues is a queryset already scoped to the caller's workspace and project.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-104967

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected deletion of CycleIssue or ModuleIssue records that do not correspond to issues owned by the acting user's workspace.
  • Issues appearing with a parent that resides in a different workspace or project.
  • API requests to bulk delete or sub-issue endpoints containing issue UUIDs that do not match the workspace slug in the URL path.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit application logs for requests to BulkDeleteIssuesEndpoint and SubIssuesEndpoint where response payloads include issue IDs that do not belong to the URL-scoped workspace.
  • Compare the workspace_id of issues referenced in POST and DELETE bodies against the workspace resolved from the URL path.
  • Alert on anomalous spikes in bulk delete operations originating from a single authenticated session.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose API request logging on the Plane API tier and ship logs to a central analytics platform.
  • Track CycleIssue and ModuleIssue deletion rates per workspace and alert on cross-workspace references.
  • Review parent_id changes on Issue records to flag re-parenting events that cross workspace boundaries.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-104967

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all Plane deployments to version 1.4.0 or later.
  • Rotate API tokens for any workspace that may have been accessed by untrusted members.
  • Review audit logs for suspicious bulk delete and sub-issue re-parenting activity since the vulnerable version was deployed.

Patch Information

The fix is included in Plane 1.4.0. Upstream details are available in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6cw7-h92q-p9hg, Pull Request #9270, and Release v1.4.0. The patch scopes cascade deletes to a workspace-filtered queryset rather than operating on caller-supplied IDs directly.

Workarounds

  • No official workaround exists; upgrading to 1.4.0 is required.
  • Restrict workspace membership to trusted users until the upgrade is applied.
  • Place the Plane API behind a reverse proxy that logs request bodies for forensic review.
bash
# Upgrade Plane via Docker Compose
git fetch --tags
git checkout v1.4.0
docker compose pull
docker compose up -d

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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