Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-102762

CVE-2026-102762: NetX Duo MQTT Client DOS Vulnerability

CVE-2026-102762 is a denial of service vulnerability in NetX Duo MQTT client caused by packet leaks from malformed PUBLISH messages. This exhausts network resources and halts inbound traffic. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-102762 Overview

CVE-2026-102762 is a memory leak vulnerability [CWE-401] in the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) client. The client fails to release network packets that carry malformed PUBLISH messages. Each malformed message consumes one packet, or one chain of packets, from the network driver's receive pool without returning it. A remote peer that sends a few dozen malformed PUBLISH messages can exhaust the pool and halt all inbound network traffic on the affected device until reboot.

Critical Impact

Remote attackers can trigger a full denial of service against MQTT-enabled embedded and IoT devices with a small volume of malformed messages, requiring a hardware reboot to restore network functionality.

Affected Products

  • Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo MQTT client
  • Embedded and IoT devices using NetX Duo networking stack
  • Real-time operating system deployments relying on NetX Duo for MQTT connectivity

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-29 - CVE-2026-102762 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-102762

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the MQTT client packet handling logic within NetX Duo. When the client receives a PUBLISH message that fails validation, the parsing routine discards the message but never releases the underlying network packet back to the driver's receive pool.

Network stacks in resource-constrained embedded systems allocate a fixed pool of packet buffers at boot. Every leaked packet permanently reduces this pool. Once the pool is depleted, the driver cannot allocate buffers for incoming frames and drops all further inbound traffic.

The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction. However, the attacker must be able to deliver MQTT traffic to the client, typically as a broker or a peer on the same network path.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing packet release call in the malformed-message error path of the MQTT PUBLISH handler. The code correctly detects the malformed input and aborts processing but omits the corresponding nx_packet_release operation before returning. This classifies as a Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime [CWE-401].

Attack Vector

An attacker positioned to send MQTT traffic to the client sends successive malformed PUBLISH messages. Each message must be well-formed enough at the TCP and MQTT framing layers to reach the PUBLISH handler, but malformed at the payload validation stage.

The pool size determines the number of messages required. Embedded devices typically maintain small receive pools, so a few dozen malformed messages are sufficient to exhaust available packets. Once exhausted, the device stops receiving network traffic and requires a reboot to recover.

Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9v23-qwp9-2q3h for authoritative technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102762

Indicators of Compromise

  • Sudden loss of inbound network connectivity on a NetX Duo device while outbound traffic may still function briefly
  • Repeated MQTT PUBLISH messages from a single peer that fail broker-side or client-side validation
  • Device network responsiveness restored only after a hardware or software reboot
  • Receive pool exhaustion counters or driver-level allocation failures in device telemetry

Detection Strategies

  • Monitor network packet pool utilization on NetX Duo devices for steady, unrecoverable declines
  • Inspect MQTT broker logs for high volumes of malformed PUBLISH messages targeting specific clients
  • Correlate device unreachability events with preceding MQTT traffic patterns from untrusted peers

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Instrument firmware to expose receive pool free-count metrics through logging or telemetry endpoints
  • Alert on any downward trend in the packet pool that does not recover after connection close
  • Track MQTT client disconnect and reconnect frequency as a proxy for resource-exhaustion recovery attempts

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102762

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict MQTT client connections to trusted brokers only, using firewall rules or network segmentation
  • Enforce mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication between clients and brokers to prevent unauthenticated peers from sending traffic
  • Inventory all devices running the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo stack and identify those with MQTT enabled
  • Monitor upstream Eclipse ThreadX repositories for the patched NetX Duo release addressing GHSA-9v23-qwp9-2q3h

Patch Information

Eclipse ThreadX has published details of the vulnerability in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-9v23-qwp9-2q3h. Consult the advisory for the fixed version and apply the update to the NetX Duo source tree used in your firmware build. Rebuild and redeploy affected device firmware after integrating the fix.

Workarounds

  • Place MQTT brokers behind strict allow-lists to block untrusted peers from delivering messages to embedded clients
  • Increase the size of the network driver's receive packet pool to raise the exploitation threshold, recognizing this is a partial mitigation only
  • Implement watchdog-based automatic reboot on prolonged loss of network responsiveness to reduce recovery time
  • Terminate MQTT sessions from peers that repeatedly send malformed PUBLISH messages
bash
# Example: restrict outbound MQTT to a single trusted broker (Linux gateway upstream of NetX Duo devices)
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 8883 -d trusted-broker.example.com -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 1883 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 8883 -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.