Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-102759 Overview
CVE-2026-102759 is an integrity flaw in Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo's NetX Secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementation. The _nx_secure_verify_mac function treats a decrypted application-data record whose length equals the negotiated message authentication code (MAC) size as valid. The function returns success and advances the receive sequence number without generating or comparing the MAC.
Empty TLS application-data records are legal on the wire. TLS 1.0 implementations routinely emit them as a mitigation for the Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS (BEAST) attack. The vulnerability is classified under [CWE-354: Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value].
Critical Impact
A network-positioned attacker can inject unauthenticated empty application-data records into an established TLS session and desynchronize sequence numbers without triggering MAC verification failures.
Affected Products
- Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo (NetX Secure TLS component)
- Embedded and Internet of Things (IoT) devices running affected NetX Secure TLS builds
- Products linking the vulnerable _nx_secure_verify_mac code path
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-29 - CVE-2026-102759 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102759
Vulnerability Analysis
The defect lives in _nx_secure_verify_mac, the routine responsible for validating the MAC appended to each decrypted TLS record. When a record's plaintext length matches the negotiated MAC size, the function short-circuits and returns success. The receive sequence number advances, yet no MAC value is generated from the record contents or compared against a received tag.
The TLS specification permits zero-length application-data records. TLS 1.0 peers frequently transmit these empty records before real payloads to mitigate BEAST, so the code path is reachable in normal traffic. Because the parser never enforces authenticity for that specific length, the receiver accepts attacker-forged records that were never protected by the session keys.
Root Cause
The root cause is a length-based bypass of integrity verification. The function conflates "record length equals MAC length" with "record has been authenticated," skipping the constant-time MAC comparison required by RFC 5246. No authentication tag is derived from the record header, sequence number, or ciphertext, which violates the record-layer authenticity guarantees expected by TLS applications.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a network attacker capable of injecting or modifying TLS records between two NetX Secure peers. The attacker crafts a record whose decrypted length equals the MAC size for the negotiated cipher suite. Upon receipt, the NetX Secure endpoint accepts the record, increments its sequence counter, and delivers an empty payload to the application layer.
The practical impact is limited to injecting empty records, which does not directly leak plaintext. However, the sequence-number desynchronization and lack of authentication enable downgrade or denial-of-service scenarios against session state. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-m7j3-vh25-xc8p for maintainer analysis.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102759
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected TLS application-data records with plaintext length exactly equal to the negotiated MAC size (for example, 20 bytes for HMAC-SHA1, 32 bytes for HMAC-SHA256)
- TLS sessions between NetX Secure endpoints where receive sequence numbers advance without corresponding application deliveries
- Repeated empty application-data records that do not correlate with legitimate TLS 1.0 BEAST-mitigation patterns
Detection Strategies
- Deploy network intrusion detection signatures that flag TLS records whose ciphertext length equals MAC_size when originating from unexpected peers
- Correlate firmware and software inventory data with the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo advisory to identify vulnerable devices
- Instrument application-layer logging on embedded devices to record TLS record counts and detect anomalous empty-record volume
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor TLS handshake logs for negotiated cipher suites that use HMAC constructions, which are the primary attack surface
- Track packet-capture samples on segments hosting NetX Secure clients or servers for post-handshake anomalies
- Alert on firmware versions of Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo that predate the security fix referenced in GHSA-m7j3-vh25-xc8p
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102759
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all products and firmware images that embed Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo NetX Secure TLS
- Apply the fixed NetX Duo release identified in the Eclipse ThreadX security advisory as soon as the vendor publishes it
- Restrict TLS peers of embedded NetX Secure endpoints to trusted network segments until patches are deployed
Patch Information
Refer to the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo Security Advisory GHSA-m7j3-vh25-xc8p for the fixed version and commit references. Downstream vendors integrating NetX Duo should rebuild firmware images against the patched sources and re-sign device images per their secure boot process.
Workarounds
- Disable cipher suites that use MAC-then-encrypt HMAC constructions where possible, favoring Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) suites such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305
- Terminate TLS at a hardened reverse proxy in front of NetX Secure endpoints until firmware updates ship
- Enforce network segmentation and mutual TLS to limit which peers can reach vulnerable devices
# Configuration example: prefer AEAD cipher suites at a terminating proxy
# (nginx example fronting NetX Secure devices)
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_ciphers 'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384';
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

