Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-102740 Overview
CVE-2026-102740 affects the AsyncHttpClient library, a Java client for executing HTTP requests and asynchronously processing responses. The PropertiesBasedResumableProcessor component writes resumable download state to a predictable shared path at $java.io.tmpdir/ahc/ResumableAsyncHandler.properties using default permissions and link-following file operations. A local user with write access to that directory can plant a symbolic link that the client follows when persisting state, truncating and overwriting any file writable by the client process. The flaw is classified as a UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following issue [CWE-61].
Critical Impact
A local attacker can leverage symlink following to overwrite arbitrary files writable by the AsyncHttpClient process, and can read download URLs that may contain embedded credentials or query tokens.
Affected Products
- AsyncHttpClient versions 2.0.0 through 2.16.0
- AsyncHttpClient 3.x versions prior to 3.0.12
- Java applications using ResumableAsyncHandler to decorate another AsyncHandler
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-102740 published to NVD
- 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102740
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in PropertiesBasedResumableProcessor, which persists resumable download state to a shared, predictable filesystem path. The processor writes to $java.io.tmpdir/ahc/ResumableAsyncHandler.properties with default file permissions and performs file operations that follow symbolic links. Two distinct attack outcomes exist. First, any local user who can read the shared store can view download URLs, which may embed user information or query tokens. Second, a local user who can write within or pre-create the directory can plant a symlink that the client follows during state persistence. Note that this filesystem path is only used when ResumableAsyncHandler decorates another AsyncHandler. The no-argument constructors use a no-op processor and are unaffected.
Root Cause
The root cause is a combination of a predictable shared temporary path, default (world-readable) permissions, and link-following I/O operations. The processor did not create the index store with restrictive owner-only permissions, and did not use LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS or StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW semantics when writing state. This matches the [CWE-61] UNIX Symbolic Link Following pattern.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local access and low privileges but high attack complexity, since the attacker must win a race or pre-create the shared directory before the AsyncHttpClient process initializes it. Once the symlink is in place, the client process truncates and overwrites the symlink target with properties-file content. The target must be writable by the client process user, enabling corruption of configuration files, log files, or other process-owned data.
// Patch excerpt: PropertiesBasedResumableProcessor.java
import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
import java.io.File;
-import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
import java.io.OutputStream;
+import java.nio.channels.Channels;
+import java.nio.file.FileSystems;
import java.nio.file.Files;
+import java.nio.file.LinkOption;
+import java.nio.file.NoSuchFileException;
+import java.nio.file.Path;
+import java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption;
+import java.nio.file.attribute.FileAttribute;
+import java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions;
+import java.util.EnumSet;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Scanner;
+import java.util.Set;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
import static java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets.UTF_8;
+import static java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW;
+import static java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption.WRITE;
import static org.asynchttpclient.util.MiscUtils.closeSilently;
Source: AsyncHttpClient commit 0422e11c. The fix adopts CREATE_NEW open semantics, LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS, and PosixFilePermissions to create the index store with owner-only permissions.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102740
Indicators of Compromise
- Presence of a symbolic link at $java.io.tmpdir/ahc/ResumableAsyncHandler.properties pointing to a sensitive file outside the AHC directory.
- Unexpected truncation or replacement of files writable by the Java process user with properties-file content containing URL-like keys.
- Non-service user accounts creating or owning the $java.io.tmpdir/ahc/ directory before the Java application starts.
Detection Strategies
- Inventory Java applications and build dependency manifests to identify AsyncHttpClient versions below 2.16.1 or 3.0.12.
- Audit filesystem telemetry for symlink() and link() syscalls targeting paths under $TMPDIR/ahc/ by non-service users.
- Monitor for write operations by the Java process to paths resolved through symbolic links outside $TMPDIR/ahc/.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable file integrity monitoring on /tmp/ahc/ and any configured java.io.tmpdir location used by AsyncHttpClient consumers.
- Alert on process-level file writes that resolve to targets outside their expected working directories.
- Capture and review access events on the ResumableAsyncHandler.properties file, which may expose URLs containing credentials or tokens.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102740
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade AsyncHttpClient to version 2.16.1 or 3.0.12 or later across all affected Java applications.
- Audit existing $java.io.tmpdir/ahc/ directories for pre-existing symbolic links and remove any that are present.
- Restrict the permissions of the system temporary directory so that only trusted users can create entries within it.
Patch Information
The issue is fixed in AsyncHttpClient 2.16.1 and 3.0.12. The patch rewrites the resumable index store creation path to use StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW, LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS, and POSIX owner-only file permissions via PosixFilePermissions. Refer to GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cf59-3jcr-vfhw, AsyncHttpClient Pull Request 2281, release 2.16.1, and release 3.0.12.
Workarounds
- Instantiate ResumableAsyncHandler using the no-argument constructor, which uses a no-op processor and is not affected.
- Override java.io.tmpdir to a per-user directory with mode 0700 so other local users cannot pre-create ahc/ or plant symlinks.
- Run Java applications under a dedicated service account with minimal filesystem write permissions to limit the impact of symlink-based overwrites.
# Harden the system temp path used by the Java process
mkdir -m 700 -p /var/lib/myapp/tmp
chown myapp:myapp /var/lib/myapp/tmp
java -Djava.io.tmpdir=/var/lib/myapp/tmp -jar myapp.jar
# Remove any pre-existing attacker-controlled state
rm -rf /tmp/ahc
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

