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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-102720

CVE-2026-102720: DHCP Client Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

CVE-2026-102720 is a buffer overflow flaw in DHCP client software that allows malicious DHCP servers to cause out-of-bounds memory reads. This post covers the technical details, exploitation methods, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-102720 Overview

CVE-2026-102720 is an out-of-bounds read vulnerability [CWE-125] in the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo DHCP client. The flaw resides in the option-walking logic of _nx_dhcp_search_buffer inside addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c. A malicious DHCP server, or any host on the local link that answers a DISCOVER first, can craft a single OFFER packet that causes the client to read approximately one kilobyte past the end of the received message. The disclosed bytes are then used to configure the network interface, making them observable to the attacker. Because the read runs on every boot while the client is unconfigured, exposure is unavoidable in any environment reachable by a hostile DHCP responder.

Critical Impact

An adjacent-network attacker can leak up to a kilobyte of adjacent heap memory from an unconfigured DHCP client during boot, with the leaked bytes propagating into interface configuration.

Affected Products

  • Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo — DHCP client component (addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c)
  • Embedded and IoT devices that link the NetX Duo DHCP client add-on
  • Firmware images that boot into a DHCP-configured network interface using NetX Duo

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-29 - CVE-2026-102720 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-102720

Vulnerability Analysis

The DHCP client walks TLV (type-length-value) options in a received message using a pointer (data) and a parallel offset counter (i). Each TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes on the wire: one type byte, one length byte, and size value bytes. During the walk, data is advanced by size + 2 bytes, but i is advanced by only size + 1. The bound check i < length - 1 uses only the offset counter, so the counter drifts one byte behind the true read position on every skipped option.

After enough skipped options, the offset check still passes while data has already crossed the end of the received buffer. The subsequent read of the next type and length bytes then comes from adjacent heap memory. AddressSanitizer confirms a heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 originating in _nx_dhcp_search_buffer at line 7541 and reached through _nx_dhcp_get_option_value at line 7082, located 164 bytes past a 1648-byte region.

Root Cause

The root cause is a counter-versus-pointer desynchronization in the option-walk loop at addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538 and :7572. The offset increment omits the type byte, so the loop's only bounds check does not reflect how far data has actually advanced. A single crafted OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options accumulates enough drift to push the read beyond the message end.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires adjacent-network access. Any host on the LAN that wins the race to answer a DHCP DISCOVER can deliver the malicious OFFER. No authentication or user interaction is required. Because the values parsed from the runaway read are used to configure the interface, portions of adjacent heap memory become observable to the attacker through the resulting network configuration. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-8hj5-p46x-5h28 for the vendor's technical write-up.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-102720

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected DHCP OFFER packets containing unusually long sequences of skippable options with valid length fields but no meaningful value payload.
  • DHCP clients on ThreadX-based devices logging option-parsing anomalies or transitioning into REQUESTING with malformed configuration data.
  • Multiple DHCP servers responding on a segment where only one authorized server should exist.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect DHCP traffic on the wire and flag OFFER messages whose option list nears or exceeds the 1500-byte MTU with a high ratio of unknown option codes.
  • Instrument firmware builds with AddressSanitizer or equivalent memory diagnostics during testing to reproduce the heap-buffer-overflow READ signature in _nx_dhcp_search_buffer.
  • Correlate boot-time network configuration anomalies with the presence of unauthorized DHCP responders on the same broadcast domain.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable DHCP snooping on managed switches to restrict which ports may source DHCP server traffic.
  • Log and alert on the appearance of new DHCP server MAC addresses within monitored VLANs.
  • Capture and archive DHCP exchanges from embedded devices during commissioning so malformed OFFERs can be retrospectively identified.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102720

Immediate Actions Required

  • Inventory firmware and products that ship the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo DHCP client add-on and prioritize remediation for devices exposed to untrusted networks.
  • Apply the upstream fix that advances the offset counter by size + 2 or derives the bound from the data pointer instead of a second counter.
  • Restrict DHCP traffic to authorized servers using DHCP snooping and port-based access control on network infrastructure.

Patch Information

Refer to the Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo Security Advisory GHSA-8hj5-p46x-5h28 for the corrected version of nxd_dhcp_client.c. The fix aligns the offset counter increment with the pointer advance so the i < length - 1 bound reflects the actual read position. Rebuild affected firmware against the patched NetX Duo sources and redeploy to all affected devices.

Workarounds

  • Segment embedded devices onto network segments where only trusted DHCP servers can respond, using VLAN isolation and DHCP snooping.
  • Where feasible, configure static IP addresses on affected devices to avoid invoking the vulnerable DHCP client code path during boot.
  • Deploy rogue-DHCP detection on the LAN to alert on unauthorized OFFER responses before they reach embedded clients.
bash
# Configuration example: enable DHCP snooping on a Cisco IOS switch
configure terminal
ip dhcp snooping
ip dhcp snooping vlan 10
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
  ip dhcp snooping trust
exit

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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