Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-102503 Overview
CVE-2026-102503 is an authentication and authorization bypass in Google OSS Agent Mesh (SAM), affecting versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.2. The flaw resides in the /libp2p-http ingress server implemented by StartIngressServer in cmd/sam-node/node.go. The ingress routes requests directly to backend service handlers without verifying a Biscuit token or mesh enrollment, bypassing the Biscuit capability policy enforced on the parallel MCP (Model Context Protocol) stream handler. An unauthenticated remote libp2p peer can invoke arbitrary registered backend services, including command/stdio-backed MCP servers, Agent-to-Agent (A2A) endpoints, and inference endpoints. The weakness is tracked as [CWE-306] Missing Authentication for Critical Function and [CWE-862] Missing Authorization.
Critical Impact
An unauthenticated remote peer on the libp2p network can bypass Biscuit capability policy and invoke any registered backend service, including MCP, A2A, and inference endpoints, leading to full compromise of mesh-exposed functionality.
Affected Products
- Google OSS Agent Mesh (SAM) version 0.1.0-alpha.1
- Google OSS Agent Mesh (SAM) version 0.1.0-alpha.2
- Fixed in Google OSS Agent Mesh (SAM) version 0.1.0-alpha.3
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-102503 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102503
Vulnerability Analysis
SAM exposes backend services over two parallel transports on the libp2p mesh. The MCP protocol stream handler enforces WithBiscuitAuth and Authorize checks before dispatching requests. The /libp2p-http ingress server, started by StartIngressServer in cmd/sam-node/node.go, does not. HTTP-style requests arriving over the libp2p transport are routed directly to backend service handlers without any Biscuit token validation or mesh enrollment verification.
Because both transports resolve to the same backend handlers, an attacker who can reach a SAM node over libp2p can select the unauthenticated path and invoke services the Biscuit policy would otherwise deny. Registered targets include stdio-backed MCP servers that execute local commands, A2A agent endpoints, and model inference backends.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authentication (CWE-306) and missing authorization (CWE-862) on a critical ingress path. Security controls were applied only to the MCP stream handler. The /libp2p-http ingress was added as a parallel datapath without replicating the Biscuit capability check or verifying that the calling peer is enrolled in the mesh.
Attack Vector
The attack is network-based and requires no privileges or user interaction. An attacker establishes a libp2p connection to a vulnerable SAM node and issues HTTP requests to the /libp2p-http endpoint targeting a registered service. The node dispatches the request to the backend handler without checking authorization, enabling arbitrary tool invocation, agent interaction, or inference abuse.
// Patch excerpt from api/types.go
const AuthProtocolID protocol.ID = "/sam/auth/1.0.0"
// CatalogTarget is the special target service name used to retrieve tool catalogs from remote nodes.
-const CatalogTarget = "/sam/catalog"
+const CatalogTarget = "sam.catalog"
// DefaultServiceType is the default type for services without a namespace.
const DefaultServiceType = "system"
// Source: https://github.com/google/sam/commit/433bc99d2a2c10071167bf22acc2c930a12e64e1
The patch also introduces strict service-name validation in api/validation.go through ValidateServiceFormat, enforcing a type:value structure and rejecting malformed targets that previously could be routed through the unauthenticated ingress.
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-102503
Indicators of Compromise
- Inbound libp2p connections to SAM nodes from peers that are not members of the enrolled mesh identity set.
- Backend service invocations (MCP tool calls, A2A messages, inference requests) with no preceding Biscuit token validation event in node logs.
- Unexpected process execution from stdio-backed MCP servers, especially shell or command invocations tied to /libp2p-http request handling.
Detection Strategies
- Audit SAM node logs for requests served by StartIngressServer on the /libp2p-http path and correlate against the Biscuit authorization event stream.
- Compare the set of invoked backend services with the policy-permitted service set per peer; discrepancies indicate bypass.
- Monitor child processes spawned by SAM nodes for anomalous command lines originating from MCP stdio backends.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging on libp2p ingress and ship logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
- Alert on any /libp2p-http request handled on SAM versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 or 0.1.0-alpha.2 until upgrade is complete.
- Track outbound inference and A2A traffic volumes for sudden spikes that could indicate abuse of unauthenticated endpoints.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102503
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade all SAM nodes to version 0.1.0-alpha.3 or later, which adds Biscuit enforcement to the /libp2p-http ingress and introduces ValidateServiceFormat.
- Isolate affected SAM nodes from untrusted networks until the upgrade is applied.
- Rotate any Biscuit root keys and mesh enrollment credentials that may have been exposed through unauthenticated service invocation.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in the GitHub Release v0.1.0-alpha.3 and detailed in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-r6hp-67wp-c7jx. The code change is available in the GitHub Commit Reference, which closes the HTTP datapath ingress gap and addresses an associated proxy token leak.
Workarounds
- Disable the /libp2p-http ingress on affected nodes if operationally feasible until the upgrade is applied.
- Restrict libp2p peer connectivity through network ACLs or peer allow-lists so only trusted, enrolled nodes can reach the ingress port.
- Remove command/stdio-backed MCP server registrations from exposed nodes to reduce the blast radius of any successful bypass.
# Upgrade SAM to the patched release
git clone https://github.com/google/sam.git
cd sam
git checkout v0.1.0-alpha.3
go build ./cmd/sam-node
# Verify the running binary reports the patched version before re-enabling ingress
./sam-node --version
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

