CVE-2026-102241 Overview
CVE-2026-102241 affects the Netcore NAP930 router running firmware version 0.1.241010.141410. The flaw resides in the /lib/functions/backup_common.sh shell script within the Backup/Restore component. The aes_pass argument uses a hard-coded cryptographic key [CWE-320], allowing anyone with knowledge of the embedded key to decrypt backup archives generated by affected devices.
The issue has been publicly disclosed with proof-of-concept material available, and the vendor did not respond to disclosure attempts. Exploitation requires network access and high privileges on the device, limiting practical impact to authenticated scenarios or intercepted backup files.
Critical Impact
An attacker who obtains an encrypted backup file can recover its plaintext contents using the hard-coded AES key embedded in the router firmware.
Affected Products
- Netcore NAP930 router
- Firmware version 0.1.241010.141410
- Backup/Restore component (/lib/functions/backup_common.sh)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-29 - CVE-2026-102241 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-09-29 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-102241
Vulnerability Analysis
The Netcore NAP930 firmware ships with a fixed AES password stored in the backup_common.sh helper script. When the router generates a configuration backup, the script passes the static aes_pass value to the encryption routine that protects the archive. Because the key is compiled into every device running the same firmware, the confidentiality of any backup depends on the secrecy of a value already published in the firmware image.
An attacker who extracts the firmware, purchases an identical device, or reads the disclosed proof-of-concept can derive the same key. Any backup file exfiltrated through phishing, insecure storage, interception during transfer, or lateral movement can then be decrypted offline. Recovered contents typically include Wi-Fi credentials, administrative passwords, port-forwarding rules, and other router state that supports follow-on attacks against the local network.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of a hard-coded cryptographic key [CWE-320] in a shell script bundled with the firmware. There is no per-device key derivation, no user-supplied passphrase, and no key rotation mechanism. All NAP930 units running firmware 0.1.241010.141410 share the identical encryption secret.
Attack Vector
Remote exploitation requires access to a backup archive produced by the affected firmware. The CVSS v4.0 vector indicates network-based attack with high privileges required, meaning the practical scenarios involve an authenticated user exporting a backup that is later stolen, an attacker recovering backups from cloud storage or email, or interception of unencrypted transport channels used to move the archive. Once the file is in hand, decryption is trivial with the disclosed key.
The vulnerability is described in prose only; refer to the GitHub proof-of-concept writeup for the specific key material and decryption steps.
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Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2026-102241
Indicators of Compromise
- Presence of NAP930 backup archives (typically .tar or .bin files produced by the router UI) on non-router hosts, cloud storage, or email attachments.
- Unexpected access to the router administrative interface followed by a backup export action in device logs.
- Reuse of Wi-Fi or admin credentials previously stored only in the router configuration, appearing in unrelated breach data or attacker infrastructure.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect network egress from router management interfaces for outbound transfers of backup files to unfamiliar destinations.
- Correlate administrative logins to the NAP930 with subsequent backup download events, especially outside change windows.
- Hunt for the hard-coded key string or associated backup file magic bytes traversing the network or resting in file shares.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Log and alert on every backup export initiated on the NAP930 management interface.
- Monitor cloud storage buckets, mail flow, and endpoint file activity for NAP930 backup artifacts leaving the environment.
- Track credential reuse from router-managed accounts using identity monitoring tooling.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-102241
Immediate Actions Required
- Treat all existing NAP930 backups produced by firmware 0.1.241010.141410 as plaintext and rotate every credential they contain, including Wi-Fi PSKs and admin passwords.
- Restrict administrative access to the router to trusted management VLANs or hosts to reduce the population that can generate new backups.
- Remove existing backup archives from shared storage, email, and endpoint download folders.
Patch Information
No vendor patch is available. According to the disclosure, the vendor was contacted early but did not respond. Consult the VulDB advisory for CVE-2026-102241 and VulDB entry #411140 for updates on any future firmware release.
Workarounds
- Avoid using the built-in Backup/Restore feature until the vendor issues a firmware update that derives keys from a user-supplied passphrase or per-device secret.
- If backups are unavoidable, store them exclusively on encrypted media with strict access control, and wrap the archive in a second layer of encryption using an independent tool such as gpg with a strong passphrase.
- Consider replacing the device with hardware from a vendor that maintains an active security response process if long-term use is required.
# Example: wrap an exported router backup in a second encryption layer
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 --output nap930-backup.tar.gpg nap930-backup.tar
shred -u nap930-backup.tar
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
