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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-101998

CVE-2026-101998: Docker Sandboxes Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-101998 is an information disclosure flaw in Docker Sandboxes that exposes OAuth tokens and API keys when response-body reads fail. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-101998 Overview

CVE-2026-101998 affects Docker Sandboxes, where credential masking in protected proxy responses can fail open. When a response-body read returns data together with an error, affected handlers can forward unmasked bytes to the caller. Code running inside an authorized sandbox can exploit this flaw to recover host-managed OAuth access and refresh tokens. The same path can expose a derived Anthropic API key that was intended to remain outside the sandbox boundary. The weakness is categorized under CWE-636: Not Failing Securely (Failing Open).

Critical Impact

Authorized sandbox code can extract host-managed OAuth tokens and derived API keys that were intended to stay outside the sandbox, breaking the credential-injection trust boundary.

Affected Products

  • Docker AI Sandboxes with credential injection enabled
  • Docker Sandbox protected proxy component responsible for masking injected credentials
  • Workloads consuming host-managed OAuth tokens or derived Anthropic API keys through the sandbox proxy

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-08 - CVE-2026-101998 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-08 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-101998

Vulnerability Analysis

Docker Sandboxes route outbound traffic through a protected proxy that injects host-managed credentials and masks those secrets in responses returned to sandboxed code. The design keeps OAuth access tokens, refresh tokens, and derived API keys out of reach of workloads running inside the sandbox. The flaw breaks this guarantee when a response-body read returns both data and an error at the same time. Affected handlers treat the error as terminal before completing the masking step, then forward the already-read bytes to the caller unmasked. An attacker with code execution inside an authorized sandbox can trigger this condition and recover credentials that the proxy was supposed to redact.

Root Cause

The root cause is a fail-open error-handling path in the proxy response pipeline. Go-style io.Reader semantics allow a read to return n > 0 bytes alongside a non-nil error. The handler's control flow prioritizes the error branch and skips the credential-masking transform, violating the invariant that no response byte leaves the proxy without being filtered. The result maps to [CWE-636], where a security control defaults to the less-safe state when an unexpected condition occurs.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires code execution inside an authorized Docker Sandbox and adjacent-network reachability to the protected proxy. The attacker issues an upstream request whose response triggers a simultaneous data-plus-error read on the proxy side. The proxy then returns the raw buffer containing injected OAuth tokens or the derived Anthropic API key. No elevation beyond the sandbox context is required, and no user interaction is involved. The vulnerability compromises confidentiality of host-managed credentials without affecting integrity or availability of the sandbox itself. Technical background on the credential-injection design is available in the Docker Credential Injection Guide and the Docker AI Sandboxes Overview.

No verified proof-of-concept code is publicly available at this time.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-101998

Indicators of Compromise

  • Proxy response logs containing substrings that match OAuth bearer-token patterns or Anthropic API key prefixes delivered to sandbox clients.
  • Unexpected use of host-managed OAuth refresh tokens from IP ranges or user agents associated with sandbox workloads.
  • Repeated upstream requests from a single sandbox designed to produce short, truncated responses that coincide with upstream errors.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument the sandbox proxy to log every response path that returns bytes alongside a non-nil read error, and alert on any occurrence.
  • Compare outbound credential telemetry against the proxy's masking audit trail to identify tokens that reached a sandbox client.
  • Correlate Anthropic API usage records with sandbox identity attribution to surface keys used from unexpected principals.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging on the Docker Sandbox protected proxy and ship events to a centralized data lake for retention and search.
  • Monitor OAuth identity providers for refresh-token reuse, geographic anomalies, and token-binding violations tied to host-managed credentials.
  • Track Anthropic API key issuance and rotation events, and alert on first-use from any new network location.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101998

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Docker Sandboxes to a fixed release as soon as the vendor publishes a patched version addressing CVE-2026-101998.
  • Rotate all host-managed OAuth access and refresh tokens and any derived Anthropic API keys that were reachable through affected sandboxes.
  • Restrict which sandboxes receive injected credentials, limiting exposure to only the workloads that strictly require them.

Patch Information

No vendor advisory URL is listed in the NVD record at publication. Consult the Docker AI Sandboxes documentation and Docker's security channels for the fixed version and upgrade instructions. Apply the patched release across all sandbox hosts before re-enabling credential injection for sensitive integrations.

Workarounds

  • Disable credential injection in Docker Sandboxes for workloads that can authenticate without host-managed secrets.
  • Scope OAuth tokens and derived API keys to the minimum permissions required, and shorten token lifetimes to limit the value of any leaked credential.
  • Place the sandbox proxy behind an egress filter that blocks direct sandbox-to-identity-provider calls, forcing requests through an auditable gateway.
bash
# Configuration example: disable credential injection for a sandbox
# Refer to Docker documentation for the exact syntax in your release
docker sandbox run \
  --no-credential-injection \
  --network=egress-restricted \
  my-workload:latest

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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