Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-101910 Overview
The ip-address JavaScript library contains a classification flaw in its IPv6 privacy check. From version 10.2.0 through 10.5.0, the Address6.isPrivate method fails to recognize the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 defined in RFC 8215. Applications that combine isPrivate, isLoopback, and isLinkLocal to enforce a trust boundary can misclassify internal IPv4 destinations encoded through this range as external addresses. The maintainer resolved the issue in version 10.5.1. The weakness maps to [CWE-918] (Server-Side Request Forgery) and affects Node.js applications that rely on the library for allowlist or denylist decisions.
Critical Impact
Attackers can bypass server-side request forgery (SSRF) protections and reach internal services when the target network uses a NAT64 prefix within 64:ff9b:1::/48.
Affected Products
- ip-address npm package versions 10.2.0 through 10.5.0
- Node.js applications using Address6.isPrivate for trust-boundary decisions
- Deployments operating NAT64 with a prefix inside 64:ff9b:1::/48
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-101910 published to NVD
- 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-101910
Vulnerability Analysis
The ip-address library provides parsing and classification utilities for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The Address6.isPrivate classifier in src/ipv6.ts identifies Unique Local Addresses in fc00::/7 and IPv4-mapped or NAT64 well-known addresses whose embedded IPv4 falls in RFC 1918 ranges. It does not treat the RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 as private.
Applications commonly build SSRF filters by rejecting requests when isPrivate, isLoopback, or isLinkLocal returns true. Under the vulnerable classifier, an address inside 64:ff9b:1::/48 returns false for all three checks. The request proceeds to a destination that decodes to an internal IPv4 host on networks that operate a NAT64 prefix in that range.
Root Cause
The classifier logic omits the NAT64 local-use prefix. RFC 8215 reserves 64:ff9b:1::/48 for operator-selected NAT64 deployments. Because operators may carve prefixes of varying RFC 6052 lengths from this block, no single decoding of the embedded IPv4 is authoritative. The fix treats the entire /48 as private rather than attempting to decode the embedded IPv4.
Attack Vector
An unauthenticated remote attacker submits a URL or hostname that resolves to an address within 64:ff9b:1::/48. The vulnerable application evaluates the address against its private-range filter, receives a false result, and issues the outbound request. The NAT64 gateway translates the request to the corresponding internal IPv4 destination, crossing the intended trust boundary.
/**
* Returns true if the address is private, i.e. a Unique Local Address in
- * `fc00::/7` ([RFC 4193](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)) or an
- * IPv4-mapped / NAT64 address whose embedded IPv4 address is in one of the
- * [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918) private ranges
- * (e.g. `::ffff:10.0.0.1`). This is the IPv6 counterpart to
+ * `fc00::/7` ([RFC 4193](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)), an
+ * address in the NAT64 local-use range `64:ff9b:1::/48`
+ * ([RFC 8215](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8215)), or an
+ * IPv4-mapped / NAT64 well-known address whose embedded IPv4 address is in
+ * one of the [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918)
+ * private ranges (e.g. `::ffff:10.0.0.1`). This is the IPv6 counterpart to
* {@link Address4.isPrivate}; use it instead of {@link isULA} when you need to
* catch mapped RFC 1918 addresses as well as native ULAs.
*/
isPrivate(): boolean {
Source: GitHub Commit ab3dc88
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-101910
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP requests from application servers targeting IPv6 destinations inside 64:ff9b:1::/48
- Unexpected server-initiated connections to internal services that follow a NAT64 translation event
- User-supplied URLs or hostnames resolving to addresses within the NAT64 local-use range
Detection Strategies
- Enumerate package-lock.json and yarn.lock files across Node.js projects to identify ip-address versions between 10.2.0 and 10.5.0.
- Inspect application code for calls to Address6.isPrivate used in URL validation or SSRF allow/deny logic.
- Correlate proxy and firewall logs for traffic to 64:ff9b:1::/48 originating from application tiers rather than end-user networks.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on any egress traffic from server workloads destined for 64:ff9b:1::/48 prefixes.
- Monitor NAT64 gateway translation logs for source workloads that should not initiate outbound requests.
- Track dependency scanner output for the ip-address package and gate builds that pin vulnerable versions.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101910
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade ip-address to version 10.5.1 or later in all Node.js projects.
- Audit SSRF protections that rely on Address6.isPrivate and add explicit checks for 64:ff9b:1::/48.
- Restrict outbound network access from application servers to a documented allowlist of external destinations.
Patch Information
The maintainer released the fix in ip-addressv10.5.1. The patch updates Address6.isPrivate in src/ipv6.ts to return true for any address inside 64:ff9b:1::/48. Full advisory details are available in GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc.
Workarounds
- Add an explicit prefix check in application code that rejects addresses inside 64:ff9b:1::/48 before invoking outbound requests.
- Configure egress firewalls or service meshes to block application-tier traffic to the NAT64 local-use range.
- Where feasible, disable NAT64 on segments that host internet-facing application workloads.
# Upgrade the vulnerable dependency
npm install ip-address@^10.5.1
# Verify the installed version
npm ls ip-address
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

