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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-101910

CVE-2026-101910: ip-address Library Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-101910 is an authentication bypass flaw in the ip-address JavaScript library affecting NAT64 address classification. Attackers can bypass network trust boundaries by exploiting misclassified IPv6 addresses. This post explains the technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-101910 Overview

The ip-address JavaScript library contains a classification flaw in its IPv6 privacy check. From version 10.2.0 through 10.5.0, the Address6.isPrivate method fails to recognize the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 defined in RFC 8215. Applications that combine isPrivate, isLoopback, and isLinkLocal to enforce a trust boundary can misclassify internal IPv4 destinations encoded through this range as external addresses. The maintainer resolved the issue in version 10.5.1. The weakness maps to [CWE-918] (Server-Side Request Forgery) and affects Node.js applications that rely on the library for allowlist or denylist decisions.

Critical Impact

Attackers can bypass server-side request forgery (SSRF) protections and reach internal services when the target network uses a NAT64 prefix within 64:ff9b:1::/48.

Affected Products

  • ip-address npm package versions 10.2.0 through 10.5.0
  • Node.js applications using Address6.isPrivate for trust-boundary decisions
  • Deployments operating NAT64 with a prefix inside 64:ff9b:1::/48

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-28 - CVE-2026-101910 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-30 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-101910

Vulnerability Analysis

The ip-address library provides parsing and classification utilities for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The Address6.isPrivate classifier in src/ipv6.ts identifies Unique Local Addresses in fc00::/7 and IPv4-mapped or NAT64 well-known addresses whose embedded IPv4 falls in RFC 1918 ranges. It does not treat the RFC 8215 NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 as private.

Applications commonly build SSRF filters by rejecting requests when isPrivate, isLoopback, or isLinkLocal returns true. Under the vulnerable classifier, an address inside 64:ff9b:1::/48 returns false for all three checks. The request proceeds to a destination that decodes to an internal IPv4 host on networks that operate a NAT64 prefix in that range.

Root Cause

The classifier logic omits the NAT64 local-use prefix. RFC 8215 reserves 64:ff9b:1::/48 for operator-selected NAT64 deployments. Because operators may carve prefixes of varying RFC 6052 lengths from this block, no single decoding of the embedded IPv4 is authoritative. The fix treats the entire /48 as private rather than attempting to decode the embedded IPv4.

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated remote attacker submits a URL or hostname that resolves to an address within 64:ff9b:1::/48. The vulnerable application evaluates the address against its private-range filter, receives a false result, and issues the outbound request. The NAT64 gateway translates the request to the corresponding internal IPv4 destination, crossing the intended trust boundary.

typescript
  /**
   * Returns true if the address is private, i.e. a Unique Local Address in
-   * `fc00::/7` ([RFC 4193](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)) or an
-   * IPv4-mapped / NAT64 address whose embedded IPv4 address is in one of the
-   * [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918) private ranges
-   * (e.g. `::ffff:10.0.0.1`). This is the IPv6 counterpart to
+   * `fc00::/7` ([RFC 4193](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4193)), an
+   * address in the NAT64 local-use range `64:ff9b:1::/48`
+   * ([RFC 8215](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8215)), or an
+   * IPv4-mapped / NAT64 well-known address whose embedded IPv4 address is in
+   * one of the [RFC 1918](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1918)
+   * private ranges (e.g. `::ffff:10.0.0.1`). This is the IPv6 counterpart to
   * {@link Address4.isPrivate}; use it instead of {@link isULA} when you need to
   * catch mapped RFC 1918 addresses as well as native ULAs.
   */
  isPrivate(): boolean {

Source: GitHub Commit ab3dc88

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-101910

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound HTTP requests from application servers targeting IPv6 destinations inside 64:ff9b:1::/48
  • Unexpected server-initiated connections to internal services that follow a NAT64 translation event
  • User-supplied URLs or hostnames resolving to addresses within the NAT64 local-use range

Detection Strategies

  • Enumerate package-lock.json and yarn.lock files across Node.js projects to identify ip-address versions between 10.2.0 and 10.5.0.
  • Inspect application code for calls to Address6.isPrivate used in URL validation or SSRF allow/deny logic.
  • Correlate proxy and firewall logs for traffic to 64:ff9b:1::/48 originating from application tiers rather than end-user networks.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Alert on any egress traffic from server workloads destined for 64:ff9b:1::/48 prefixes.
  • Monitor NAT64 gateway translation logs for source workloads that should not initiate outbound requests.
  • Track dependency scanner output for the ip-address package and gate builds that pin vulnerable versions.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-101910

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade ip-address to version 10.5.1 or later in all Node.js projects.
  • Audit SSRF protections that rely on Address6.isPrivate and add explicit checks for 64:ff9b:1::/48.
  • Restrict outbound network access from application servers to a documented allowlist of external destinations.

Patch Information

The maintainer released the fix in ip-addressv10.5.1. The patch updates Address6.isPrivate in src/ipv6.ts to return true for any address inside 64:ff9b:1::/48. Full advisory details are available in GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc.

Workarounds

  • Add an explicit prefix check in application code that rejects addresses inside 64:ff9b:1::/48 before invoking outbound requests.
  • Configure egress firewalls or service meshes to block application-tier traffic to the NAT64 local-use range.
  • Where feasible, disable NAT64 on segments that host internet-facing application workloads.
bash
# Upgrade the vulnerable dependency
npm install ip-address@^10.5.1

# Verify the installed version
npm ls ip-address

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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