CVE-2026-10128 Overview
CVE-2026-10128 affects IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.3. Authenticated users can abuse a built-in Langflow component to read arbitrary server environment variables. The flaw exposes secrets stored in the process environment, including API keys, database credentials, and integration tokens. Security controls designed to disable custom components fail to prevent this abuse because the vector is a built-in component. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated Langflow user can extract server-side environment variables, exposing credentials and secrets that support downstream compromise of connected services.
Affected Products
- IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3
- Deployments relying on environment variables for secret storage
- Self-hosted Langflow instances exposing authenticated user access
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-08-05 - CVE-2026-10128 published to NVD
- 2026-08-05 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-10128
Vulnerability Analysis
Langflow ships with built-in components used to construct low-code AI pipelines. One of these components exposes functionality that reads server-side environment variables at execution time. An authenticated user can invoke the component through the standard flow-building interface and receive the raw value of any environment variable accessible to the Langflow process.
Administrators typically disable user-defined custom components to prevent arbitrary code execution and data exfiltration. That control does not restrict built-in components, so the environment-reading capability remains available to any authenticated account. The result is an authenticated information disclosure that undermines the intended isolation between user-created flows and the host process.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing authorization on a privileged built-in component. The component was designed to expose environment variables to flow authors but lacks role-based restrictions. Server-side secrets stored in the environment are treated as flow-accessible data rather than protected configuration.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Langflow API and a valid authenticated session with low privileges. The attacker builds or edits a flow that includes the environment-reading component, references target variable names such as OPENAI_API_KEY or DATABASE_URL, and executes the flow. The returned output contains the plaintext values. No user interaction beyond the attacker's own session is required.
See the IBM Support Page for vendor-supplied technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-10128
Indicators of Compromise
- Flow execution logs referencing built-in components that access process environment data
- Outbound API calls from third-party services using credentials that should never leave the Langflow host
- Unexpected flow creation or edits by low-privilege accounts targeting sensitive variable names
- Authenticated API requests to /api/v1/flows endpoints followed by immediate execution of newly created flows
Detection Strategies
- Audit Langflow application logs for component invocations that read process environment state
- Correlate flow-creation events with credential-use events on downstream services such as cloud providers and databases
- Alert on any Langflow user account executing flows that reference known secret variable names
- Baseline normal flow-building behavior per user and flag deviations that include environment access
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Langflow application and access logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation with identity and cloud telemetry
- Monitor authentication events for the Langflow application and investigate logins from new locations or devices
- Track rotation status of secrets exposed to the Langflow process and alert on stale credentials
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-10128
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade IBM Langflow OSS to a version later than 1.10.3 once a fixed release is available from IBM
- Rotate all secrets, API keys, and tokens exposed to the Langflow process environment
- Restrict Langflow access to trusted users and enforce strong authentication on all accounts
- Review flow-execution logs for prior abuse of built-in components that expose environment data
Patch Information
Refer to the IBM Support Page for the authoritative advisory and fixed-version guidance. Apply the vendor-supplied patch as soon as it is available and validate the upgrade in a staging environment before production rollout.
Workarounds
- Remove sensitive secrets from the Langflow process environment and load them from an external secrets manager scoped per flow
- Place Langflow behind a network boundary that limits access to administrators and trusted developers only
- Disable or restrict user registration and require administrator approval for new accounts
- Audit and remove unused Langflow user accounts to reduce the authenticated attack surface
# Example: rotate secrets and remove them from the Langflow environment
# 1. Identify environment variables currently exposed to Langflow
sudo cat /proc/$(pgrep -f langflow)/environ | tr '\0' '\n'
# 2. Rotate exposed credentials at the source provider (cloud, DB, SaaS)
# 3. Restart Langflow with a minimal environment and inject secrets via a secrets manager
systemctl restart langflow
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

